


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12 OCTOBER 1990



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# JPRS Report

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# Near East & South Asia

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-90-057

## CONTENTS

12 OCTOBER 1990

### ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Leader of Charity Organization Interviewed	<i>[Paris HARATCH 27 Jul]</i>	1
Dashnak Party Contacts Reported at CSCE	<i>[Paris GAMK 26 Jul]</i>	2
Gorbachev Order To Disarm Militia Deplored	<i>[Paris GAMK 27 Jul]</i>	3
APM Official on Election Results, Militia	<i>[Paris HARATCH 29 Jun]</i>	3
New Papers in Nonofficial Press Surveyed	<i>[Paris HARATCH 30 Jun]</i>	4
Turkey Modifies Rules on Patriarchal Election	<i>[Istanbul MARMARA 29 Jun]</i>	6
Dashnak Party to Open 'Central Office' in ArSSR	<i>[Paris HARATCH 10 Aug]</i>	6
Poll Suggests Strong Support for APM, Independence	<i>[Paris HARATCH 10 Aug]</i>	7
Changes in ArSSR Press Noted	<i>[Istanbul JAMANAK 7 Aug]</i>	8

### NEAR EAST

#### ALGERIA

Former Prime Minister Interviewed on National Issues	<i>[ALGERIE ACTUALITE 25 Jul]</i>	10
--	-----------------------------------	----

#### ISRAEL

IDF Chief Interviewed on Gulf Crisis, Intifadah	<i>[BAMAHANE 12 Sep]</i>	17
---	--------------------------	----

### SOUTH ASIA

#### AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Commander Dies of Wounds	<i>[Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST 2 Aug]</i>	22
Mujahidin Repulse Major Attack in Jouzjan	<i>[Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST 2 Aug]</i>	22
Mujahidin Kill 85 Regime Soldiers	<i>[Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST 7 Aug]</i>	22
Mujahids Capture 12 Regime Posts	<i>[Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST 9 Aug]</i>	23

#### IRAN

Majles Inquiry into Saipa Company Activities	
<i>[RESALAT 18-19, 21, 23-27, 30 Jun, 1-2, 4, 7-8, 10, 14 Jul]</i>	23

#### PAKISTAN

Pakistan's Military Involvement in Gulf Viewed		40
National Interests	<i>[THE MUSLIM 19 Aug]</i>	40
Saudi and U.S. Interests	<i>[THE MUSLIM 16 Aug]</i>	41
Rebuttal to U.S. Ambassador	<i>[THE MUSLIM 19 Aug]</i>	43
Diplomacy for 'A More Realistic Response'	<i>[THE MUSLIM 20 Aug]</i>	44
Advice to Interim Government	<i>[THE MUSLIM 22 Aug]</i>	44
Deployment Defended	<i>[THE MUSLIM 24 Aug]</i>	46
Commentary: Political Chaos Leads to Economic Ruin	<i>[VIEWPOINT 23 Aug]</i>	48
'Double Column' Proposal for Territories Revived		
<i>[Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 27 Jul]</i>		49
Sindh: Aspects of Problem, Solutions Viewed		50
'The Mohajir Factor'	<i>[THE MUSLIM 16 Jul]</i>	50
Alleged RAW Involvement	<i>[THE MUSLIM 17 Jul]</i>	51
Predismissal Commentary Views Possible Upheaval Action	<i>[THE MUSLIM 27 Jul]</i>	54

**Leader of Charity Organization Interviewed**

90AS0006A *Paris HARATCH in Armenian*  
27 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Khachik Stampoltsyan, leader of the Gtutyun Charity Organization and member of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, by Arpi Totoyan; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [HARATCH] Current affairs in Armenia are largely predominated by politics. Political formations and changes dominate life. Where did the idea of forming a charity organization come from in that atmosphere?

[Stampoltsyan] In 1922, all humanitarian organizations were closed down in the Soviet Union, including Armenia. After studying history, having returned to faith in 1980 and having noticed the people's strong passion for religion, I developed the desire to form a charity agency. It was not easy. The Karabakh movement provided the opportunity. I declared the formation of Gtutyun [Compassion] at a rally on 21 September 1988.

[HARATCH] Did you already have a fund to start with?

[Stampoltsyan] We did not have any funds. The initial capital was R 25 of my own money. That same day I announced a collection campaign, and R 30,000 was collected in a flurry of enthusiasm.

Then we applied to the government officially. After lengthy negotiations, they agreed to register the organization on 7 November. On 1 December they gave us a tiny apartment from which we continue to operate today.

Gtutyun is not like other world humanitarian organizations which have a narrow focus—like helping only the sick. Our goal is to assist the intellectual, moral and economic development of the Armenian people; to restore Armenian arts and crafts; and to provide for the needs of families with many children. We also wish to help lonesome people and the elderly as well as pay visits to prison inmates.

[HARATCH] How many people do you have?

[Stampoltsyan] We have 12 to 13 paid employees, but many people help as volunteers.

Approximately 350 murders are committed in Armenia each year. We want to open a special office and offer help [to people in distress] over the phone. Another office will work on family problems. The number of divorce cases has grown since 1960. We would like to help over the phone or on a person-to-person basis.

[HARATCH] Do you have branches?

[Stampoltsyan] Our first branch was Amaras in Karabakh. We have a similar branch called Bert [fortress] in

Gedashen, Shahumyan. We also have branches in Lenakan, Kirovakan, Echmiadzin, Sisian, Goris and Khapan.

Today Gtutyun has knowhow difficulties; we do not know how to provide charity, and the people do not know how to accept it. The influx of refugees, the earthquake disaster and the blockade all occurred about the same time and put their full burden on a newly formed organization.

These difficulties are compounded by the uncooperative attitude of the Soviet and Armenian governments who block our work. In the Moscow prison they demanded that I refrain from charity work.

[HARATCH] Can one conclude then that you do not receive any support from the government?

[Stampoltsyan] Not a single kopek. Our entire income is from contributions.

[HARATCH] Are these contributions based on organized and regular subscriptions?

[Stampoltsyan] Certain institutions have made a commitment to contribute a certain percentage of their turnover each month to our organization. They tried very hard to block that, but it is the people who gave birth to this organization and they care for it like their child. [passage omitted]

[HARATCH] You have your own monthly, LUSAVORICH, which is fully published in classical spelling. How was that received by your readership?

[Stampoltsyan] Our organization had to have its press organ. We plan to establish our own printing office which must print what has been overlooked for 70 years.

LUSAVORICH knocked on the doors of government for months and finally received permission, with difficulty, to publish once a month. As for classical spelling, 99 percent of our readers in Armenia welcomed it.

Our principal goal is to return to our ancestral roots. This spelling also strengthens the ties between the Diaspora and Armenia. I think that after some time Armenia will revert to classical spelling and even—why not—classical Armenian [grapar]. I say that as a dream or a utopian wish.

[HARATCH] Have there been any arrangements to receive sustained assistance from the Diaspora?

[Stampoltsyan] Many organizations, such as SOS-Armenie, Aznavour and Hope for Armenia, decided to collaborate with Gtutyun. We plan to open a charity store in Yerevan which will sell gifts by the people—artworks, gadgets and clothing.

[HARATCH] What about assistance from non-Armenian organizations overseas?

[Stampoltsyan] Leaders of charity organizations from West Germany and the United States visited us. We wish to establish ties with all charity organizations of the world to help them and to receive help.

[HARATCH] Gtutyun has an account in a Swiss bank, does it not?

[Stampoltsyan] Gtutyun decided to open a bank account in Geneva (Union de Banques Suisses, Fondation Stamboltzian, Gtoutioun, 298-845-00G, B. P. 811-1211 Geneve 1) to improve Armenia's economy. This was done so that Diaspora Armenians as well as foreigners can help Armenia overcome its grave conditions.

When I decided to open the account, A. Mesropyan was with me. We found 1 Swiss franc in the street when we walked out of our hotel. We put 10 Swiss francs of our own money each and opened an account with a balance of 21 Swiss francs.

I am hopeful that our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora will realize how important their assistance is for Armenia. Armenia needs technology, machinery and equipment from overseas. After this report was published, B. Gulbenkian approached me in Paris and gave me FF 12,000 to be deposited in this account.

[HARATCH] What are your plans for the future?

[Stampoltsyan] We wish to open a goodwill hospital in Armenia which will eventually have branches in the Soviet Diaspora. We want to offer medical treatment with high-quality doctors. To this end, we plan to contact Armenian doctors across the world and ask them to visit Armenia and work in this hospital. That way we can have high-quality doctors which we do not have now. Also, during those visits the doctors in Armenia can learn from these high-quality physicians. The Armenian Health Ministry has already approved this plan. I have applied to the government to provide a suitable building.

We plan to open in Armenia a goodwill restaurant and to offer courses to teach Armenian to foreign-speaking migrants. Soon we will publish a book (in an edition of 100,000) in Russian to help our compatriots in the Soviet Union to learn Armenian.

A charity choir will be established to tour the world and to promote Armenian spiritual and popular songs.

A shop manufacturing carved wooden articles is already in operation. [passage omitted]

#### Dashnak Party Contacts Reported at CSCE 90AS0461A Paris GAMK in Armenian 26 Jul 90 p 4

[Excerpts] We reported earlier the work of the Office of the Armenian National Committee and its various commissions within the framework of the "human aspects" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] in Copenhagen.

Below we present to our readers some details of this work. We gleaned our information from an extensive report that was written after the completion of the work.

The 35 participating nations in the Conference finally agreed to impose certain restrictions on the powers of security forces at times of state of emergency. Through constant contacts with delegates from the United States, Canada and European members of the Conference, representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] played an active role in steering them to adopt certain restrictions in certain areas.

Representatives of the Armenian National Committee and the ARF established contacts and held consultative meetings with more than 20 delegations, including those of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. In the course of these meetings they argued for the endorsement of the said resolution in the form proposed by Holland and adopted by Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, San Marino and Yugoslavia.

The head of the ARF Armenian National Committee office in Washington has stated that even with revisions and its limited endorsement, the resolution introduces an important novelty by substantively reducing the powers of government security forces especially as applied to the repression of the rights of minorities, such as the disregard and repression of the rights of the Armenians of Artsakh by Soviet authorities or the brutal repression of minority rights in Turkey by that country's military as well as pseudodemocratic authorities. [passage omitted]

In the course of their consultative meetings and contacts, our representatives passed on to the delegates information packets and a memorandum about the status of human rights and democratic freedoms in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and the condition of the Azeri minority there as of January 1990. The delegates were also given copies of the letter signed by 71 members of the U. S. House of Representatives which was sent to President Gorbachev.

One of the documents in the information packet passed out to delegates at the Copenhagen conference was entitled "Facts and Issues Related to Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." We note this document because of its special importance.

Four points at the beginning of the document state that 1) the process of democratization in the Soviet Union is complex; 2) that Gorbachev's domestic policy is viewed by local forces as colonialist; 3) that human and political freedoms are disregarded and trampled upon; and 4) that military authorities are given excessively broad powers.

Then the following four points are stressed:

- 1) The right of self-determination of the Karabakh Armenians;

- 2) the excessively broad and limitless powers of the state of emergency forces;
- 3) the economic blockade around Soviet Armenia; and
- 4) the problem of refugees. [passage omitted]

**Gorbachev Order To Disarm Militia Deplored**  
*90AS0461B Paris GAMK in Armenian 27 Jul 90 p 1*

[Excerpts] Another Soviet presidential order has been issued. President Gorbachev has ordered the republics to disarm their nonofficial armed groups within 15 days. Otherwise, he says, Soviet Interior Ministry forces and political agencies (KGB) will intervene.

If the purpose of the order is to protect unarmed and innocent civilians, then President Gorbachev's initiative is welcome.

It is welcome because in the current economic conditions armed groups can and do resort to criminal acts by committing murders and robberies and cause terror among the populace. Surely, Gorbachev knows that the number of crimes in Moscow has increased dramatically in recent years.

That is all very well, but does Gorbachev know that Azeri official and nonofficial armed groups terrorize the people of Artsakh every day and every minute?

He does, but he pretends not to know. [passage omitted]

Why does Gorbachev concentrate on disarming Armenian groups with popular appeal and does not mention the Azeri brigands who commit all forms of evil, murder and acts befitting their beastly nature virtually on a daily basis?

The presidential order has a clear purpose: Gorbachev wants to prepare the grounds for the implementation of the insidious Azeri plan to vacate Artsakh of Armenians. The purpose of the presidential order is to expedite that plan of deporting Armenians.

The Armenian armed groups who enjoy popular appeal and who command respect were created out of necessity last January to defend Armenian lands which were threatened then—and continue to be threatened today—by attacks from Azeri official military units joined by brigands and criminals.

The Armenian groups with popular appeal are guerrilla [fedayeen] units dedicated to the sacred work of defending the Armenian land and the dignity and property of the Armenian people. They have left behind their homes, families and comfortable lives to fight back the assaults of bandits.

No, Mr Gorbachev, the order is not aimed at punishing the thieves and the murderers, but is designed to help the Azeris; it simply makes it easier for Aliyev's successors to clear Artsakh of Armenians.

The same Artsakh which today atrophies under the yoke of Azeri armed groups and the internal forces collaborating with them.

Gorbachev's forces must first disarm the Turkish-Azeri bandit groups who kidnap Armenian shepherds and rape Armenian women in broad daylight.

Let Gorbachev make no mistake: Our modern-day fedayeen, christened with the legacy of recent Armenian history, will continue their historic mission with the foremost goal of territorial unity and the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia.

Our modern-day fedayeen cannot shirk their responsibilities as long as the Azeris do not end their barbaric acts against the Armenian people and as long as Artsakh has not returned to its mother's bosom.

**APM Official on Election Results, Militia**  
*90AS0461C Paris HARATCH in Armenian  
29 Jun 90 pp 2, 3*

[Excerpts] The seventh regular meeting of the French-Armenian Writers' Association was held in the Manukian Hall of the Armenian General Benevolent Union from 8:30 to 10:00 pm on 23 June. Zulal Kazanjian presented the day's guest: Vano Siradekhyan, journalist, essayist and member of the Karabakh Committee and the leadership of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM]. Garabed Dakesian read a short story by Siradekhyan. Then Siradekhyan rose to the podium and talked about the political struggle in Armenia from 1988 through 1990 and the role of the Armenian writer in that struggle. [passage omitted]

Siradekhyan stressed that official circles did everything they could to disillusion the people. He said that they wanted to indoctrinate the people against not only the APM but also "constitutional" or electoral and democratic approaches. He added that they succeeded to a certain extent in rural areas away from Yerevan and the towns around it on the Ararat Plain.

Siradekhyan asked: "Why do the rayon secretaries get elected?" In other words, how can one explain the APM's victory in the capital and its environs and the comparatively big success of communist officials in the countryside? Siradekhyan gave interesting and elaborate explanations. First, he cited fraud in places where the APM could not ensure the presence of supervisors to oversee the election process. In one district, the rayon secretary took the ballot box home and when he returned it the next day he was found to have received 101 percent of the votes. He said that in other areas the rayon secretaries and prosecutors are demigods who can cut off people from jobs and food and who can send them to jail. He also said that some of the officials realize that the anti-Azeri struggle is helping them and that, as a result,

they handed out money, arms and ammunition to certain armed groups, particularly in the border regions, thus securing their reputation and position. [passage omitted]

Then Siradekhyan spoke harshly about the creative intelligentsia of Armenia (which was perhaps unpalatable for some people in the audience). He noted the landslide defeat that people like Silva Kaputikyan suffered in the recent election. Often referring to the people's sound judgment and instinct, Siradekhyan said: "Personally I did not expect the people to vote so unanimously against them." He noted that Kaputikyan came in 9th in a field of 9 candidates in her electoral okrug winning only 3 percent of the vote. He claimed that she could have won 10 percent of the vote if she had not published an "advisory" article against Levon Ter Petrosyan a day before the election—obviously at the instructions of official circles. He added that the people similarly dealt a resounding slap to a historian who has been writing volumes for many years to distort and to discredit the historical role of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. He said that the people also rejected Genrik Igityan and Zori Balayan because they are already members of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow and hence cannot carry out productive work if they have to spend their time shuttling between Yerevan and Moscow. [passage omitted]

Siradekhyan stressed that very few intellectuals and artists participated in the popular movement of the past 2 years. He charged that the Armenian Writers' Union remains a reactionary and regressive organization and that this was evident even before the Karabakh movement. He added: "The APM did not and does not have any illusions" with regard to the Armenian Writers' Union. Stating that what existed in the days of Norayr Adalyan and Grachya Hovhannisyan exists today, Siradekhyan said: "They are always the mortal enemies of progressive endeavors." He charged that in contrast to the artistic organizations in Lithuania which created the popular movement the ones in Armenia played a harmful role and that it was individuals working in "technical" institutions who led the Karabakh movement in Armenia. Siradekhyan mentioned Sero Khanzadyan as a memorable exception and as a writer who is prepared to take "risks." He also mentioned the useful role that Maro Margaryan played and also the more limited role of Karen Simonyan. [passage omitted]

A truly open discussion followed moderated decisively and fairly by Zulal Kazanjian. This is not the place to give a full account of the questions and the answers, but it is worth noting some of the answers. For example, Siradekhyan said that for years he worked in a building one floor of which housed the offices of the Committee for Ties with Diaspora Armenians. According to Siradekhyan, it is common knowledge that 90 percent of the workers of this organization are members of the KGB. In response to another question, Siradekhyan said that the 200,000 or more refugees who were forced out of the Armenian areas of Azerbaijan generally voted against

the APM because they blame the Karabakh problem and those who raised it for their adversity and distress. Siradekhyan also talked about some of the armed groups in Yerevan and the countryside and said that some of their members are people with criminal records who have just been released from prison and for whom guns—and sometimes the presence of an official sponsoring organization, officials or even nonofficial organizations—guarantee an "easy" life. He added that the police does not touch such people, that these people eat for free in restaurants, that the army also does not harass them because the army generally does not enter the city. [passage omitted]

#### New Papers in Nonofficial Press Surveyed

90AS0461D Paris HARATCH in Armenian  
30 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] As if to avenge for the mandatory silence of the last 7 decades, the press of Armenia is enriched with new papers almost every day. Here, the term "enrich" is not used in a casual or ordinary sense. Paralleling the trend in the official press, these new papers create a true climate of free speech—sometimes more successfully than the official press. In this climate a forum of unrestrained speech is offered to everyone from every class and ideology who has something to say about different aspects of Armenia's current affairs.

Some of the new names in this newborn press are ANDRADARDZ [Reflection], a weekly published by the administration of the Journalists' Association; MUNETIK [Town crier], a weekly published by the "Gidelik" [Knowledge] society; and GORTS [Work], published by the Cooperatives' Association of Armenia.

These members of the independent press share some common features. Constantly present in their pages are reprints from works by the political leaders and intellectuals of Armenia between 1918 and 1920. While most of these pages were initially devoted to [General] Andranik, today the names that are most commonly encountered are S. Vratsian [prime minister of the Armenian Republic of 1918-1920] and K. Nezhdeh [military officer of the same period]. Another novelty, which has only recently begun to appear in the official press, is reports from the Diaspora Armenian press and various Western publications. It is now commonplace to find in the new papers reports related to Armenian affairs reproduced from, for example, HARATCH, ASBAREZ of Los Angeles, and MARMARA of Istanbul, as well as British, French and German publications. Even reports from the Turkish press, generally taken from MARMARA, are reproduced.

Another common feature of the new papers is their boldness. The three papers mentioned earlier are no exception though MUNETIK is the most remarkable of the three. In the paper's 2d issue, an article entitled "Time to Introduce the Dog to Its Master" by Aydin Morikyan provides a clear analysis of the current situation and sets one of the best examples of boldness.

Morikyan sharply criticizes the [Soviet Armenian] government—which is the “dog” mentioned in the title—for the 27 May incidents in Yerevan and says that that government is made up of people “who blocked in every way the formation of a new, democratic and national government on 20 May and who value their deputyship and monopoly in the parliament more than the blood of their own people.” After these characterizations, Morikyan concludes: “The government which has no clue about what is happening or what is being planned in its domain of authority can do nothing except give a reckoning before the people’s court.” He adds at the end: “As a nation we must understand that our blood is meant to flow in the veins of future generations and not to be spilled by the inhuman bullets of Soviet soldiers.”

A principal feature of MUNETIK is the “Free, Independent and Unified Forum” where the views of different political personalities can be expressed. In the paper’s 2d issue, the “Forum” poses the following three questions to potential respondents:

- What is the highest priority issue on Armenia’s political life in the coming months?
- Interpretation of the 27 May incidents.
- Is there a danger of a civil war in Armenia, and how can that be prevented?

The answers to the first question concentrate around two principal points: Declaration of independence and the establishment of a national army. Another view that is expressed is that governmental authority must be turned over to new people. The climate of free speech also gives rise to certain absurdities. Azat Arshakyan, representing the “Christian Democratic Union Party,” cites a tyrant such as [Francisco] Franco as an example of new people.

Underscoring the need for self-government, Karen Vardanyan of the Constitutional Rights Association makes a more successful argument. He demands the “creation of a politically, economically and militarily independent order.”

The comments on the events of 27 May are virtually unanimous and are defined by a sense of “betrayal and conspiracy.” Armenian Pannational Movement deputy Ashot Manucharyan charges that that provocation was staged to crush their movement. He asserts that initial attempts at achieving that goal were confined to ideological attacks, such as the article written by L. Khurshudyan, and that when the expected result was not achieved they resorted to military means.

The respondents to MUNETIK’s questions virtually are unanimous that a certain danger of a civil war exists in Armenia and that the only way to prevent that is to have a national army. Azat Arshakyan is the most optimistic about this issue. He says: “There is unity among the armed groups and they must eventually be brought under a single flag. That must be our army.”

Another unique initiative by MUNETIK is a prize of R 1,500 for the person who can make the most accurate forecast and who can predict most accurately “what the

social and political situation will be in Armenia in September 1991.” MUNETIK’s editor-in-chief is Mher Davoyan.

Another new paper is ANDRADARDZ which is published by the administration of the Journalists’ Union and is edited by G. Z. Manasyan. The 2d (24 May) and 3d (31 May) issues of the weekly carry reproduced historical material. The 2d issue carries S. Vratsian’s article entitled “The Position of the ARF with Respect to Armenia and the Soviet Regime.” The 3d issue carries an article written by M. Teuleulian in 1940. Although political affairs remain the paper’s principal focus, ANDRADARDZ provides more space to news, probably to justify its affiliation.

In general the Soviet Armenian press appears to be trying to correct its past flaws of exasperating conformity. That endeavor is also evident in the official press. But the newly published papers seem to have mastered the secret of appearing contemporary and interesting and, motivated by those objectives, they resort to various means to keep in touch with their readers. Interviews, questions and competitions are commonplace in their pages. The editorial board of ANDRADARDZ asks its readers to propose mottos for the Armenian Republic. The most remarkable features of the 15 proposed mottos published in the paper’s 3d issue are: The phrase “freedom and independence” is used eight times and “God and faith” is used six times. Would it be too insidious to guess from this small pool of information what the people want and from whom?

The third of the new papers is GORTS. Its 10th issue was published in June. The paper is published by an editorial board. The editorial in its 10th issue is entitled “We Have a Mandate to Live” and underscores the need for pannational unity. In general, the paper follows the example of the others, though its primary focus is on labor affairs. The questionnaires that are published are also related to this topic. For example, views are expressed on establishing free trade unions. The overwhelming opinion is that the new unions that will be created must be exactly the opposite of the existing ones.

The paper also has a section entitled “Ask Us, We will Answer” which give explanatory responses to readers’ questions. Although GORTS is a labor publication, it also has its page of reprinted material from the past. Its 10th issue continues the serialized memoirs of Nezhdeh who writes about self-defense and says: “The nation which relies on everything except its own forces does not deserve to have an independent homeland and to live freely. The nation that is passively martyred is despised; it suffers also morally. Such a nation generates despise and not respect for itself. They may pity such a nation, but they would never become allies with it. The weak cannot have allies.”

MUNETIK, ANDRADARDZ and GORTS are papers published by three different groups but they all share a deep concern about the country’s political status. They

also agree on the recommendations for ending the current political chaos. The large number of people who believe that self-government and a national army are essential suggests that the exhortations of Andraniks and Nezhdehs have been received correctly despite the continuing obstinate efforts to deflect such thoughts.

### Turkey Modifies Rules on Patriarchal Election

*90AS0461E Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian*  
29 Jun 90 pp 1, 4

[Text] We are pleased to inform our readers that the government decree on the election of a patriarch finally reached the Patriarchate yesterday. This time, rather than summoning the locum tenens of the Patriarchate to the Security Directorate, government officials delivered the decree to Archbishop Shahan at the Patriarchate in return for his signed acknowledgement of receipt. The delivery was made yesterday at 12 noon.

We are pleased to report that the new decree is fully compatible with our traditions and Constitution [of 1836]. Indeed, having examined the decree quickly this morning, we find that it is a verbatim translation of our constitutional rules. According to the decree the patriarch will be elected at 10 am on 5 September 1990 in the Armenian Church of Kumkapi, which is the Patriarch's seat, by previously elected clerical and lay delegates under the direction of the locum tenens and the eldest lay representative.

The new decree also makes possible the reelection of the Religious Council which has remained unresolved for many years.

- The lay delegates who will participate in the patriarchal election will be elected on 2 September 1990 by the members of the Armenian community.
- The churches of Istanbul and the provinces are each considered an electoral district. Each electoral district will elect one or more lay delegate depending on its population.
- Each parish council will form a parish electoral council by adding to its membership two or three invited members of the parish.
- The clerical delegates who will participate in the patriarchal election will be elected by the Ecclesiastical Congress which will be held in the Patriarchate with the participation of all clergymen in Istanbul on 1 September 1990.
- The clerical delegates to be elected must have been ordained at least 5 years earlier and must be at least 30 years old.
- [Patriarchal candidates must:] a) Have Turkish citizenship acquired through their fathers; b) Have the trust of the government of the Turkish Republic; c) Have the rank of bishop; d) Be at least 35 years old; e) Not have any criminal convictions or be subject legal restrictions preventing them from performing public service; f) Must possess the skills and capabilities which will enable them to execute the office of the Patriarch properly.

- The new patriarch will be elected from a previously determined list of five clerical candidates.
- The patriarchal election will be held by secret ballot and the votes will be counted in public. Eight delegates, four clergymen and four laymen will supervise the balloting and the counting of votes.
- The candidate who receives the largest number of votes will be considered and declared as the Patriarch of the Armenians of Turkey.
- When copies of the report of the patriarchal election are delivered to the locum tenens, he will report the outcome of the election to the government and, in accordance with the law on religious garb, will also request permission for the new patriarch to wear religious garb outside places of worship.

The decree ends with the text of the oath that the newly elected patriarch must take. The oath is a verbatim translation of the oath specified in the Constitution.

This decree will surely cause great satisfaction to our community.

### Dashnak Party to Open 'Central Office' in ArSSR

*90AS0007A Paris HARATCH in Armenian*  
10 Aug 90 p 1

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The interval from 6:00 to 7:00 pm was a time of free expression [in the 8 August sitting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet]. During that time period, a deputy told the session chairman (that day Deputy Chairman Babken Araktsyan substituted for Levon Ter Petrosyan) that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] has a declaration which it wanted read in the Supreme Soviet. The chairman asked that a deputy read it (let us mention that if a deputy does not volunteer, the motion decided upon by a vote). Finally, a member of the Constitutional Organization volunteered to read the proclamation.

We present the full text of the said "declaration" before expressing some of our thoughts.

#### Declaration

In view of present state of affairs in the Armenian Republic, in particular the peril that threatens Artsakh and the imperatives of the current phase of our continuing national liberation struggle, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation hereby announces its organizational presence throughout Armenia and declares to the Armenian people that:

- a) The ARF will soon have a central office [getronagan krasenyag], a press organ and a press information center in Armenia.
- b) In the coming months, the ARF will present to the people of the Motherland its official platform of activities in the political, economic, public and social domains.

c) Finally, armed with the century-old experience of national liberation struggle and propelled by the imperative of unity in the battle for national demands, the ARF henceforth pledges all of its forces and capabilities to the attainment of the national and human rights of the Armenian people and the political, public, economic, military-technological [zinadekhniagan] and cultural strengthening of the Motherland.

From the attainment of sovereign status for Armenia to the establishment of a united, free and independent Armenia, our struggle will be long and arduous. We must persevere, struggle and attain our national aspirations through phased accomplishments.

On this path of commitment and devotion, the ARF consciously assumes the mission incumbent upon it.

Bureau of the ARF, 8 August 1990.

According to this declaration (on whose contents we will not comment for the time being), the Bureau of the ARF, if we understand them correctly, has moved from Athens to Yerevan and has set up shop there. But that is not the issue. For us what is incomprehensible, to say the least, is the haste with which such a declaration has been made at a time when Armenia is at a fateful crossroads. Would it not be preferable to wait a little and to give the new leaders some time (even though they are persona non grata for the ARF) to prepare the new Armenia? Then we would be convinced that the ARF is the party we know: the one that puts the national interests of the Armenian people above all else and which is not driven by ulterior motives. The founder of this paper believed that parties—particularly his own—are created to serve the people and not the other way around. We still want to believe that the ARF will not try the hamper the course of tomorrow's new Armenia, which fills the hearts of the entire Armenian people with hope, despite its bitter disillusion over the results of the recent elections (the ARF press has been waging a battle against the Armenian Pannational Movement for nearly a year).

#### Poll Suggests Strong Support for APM, Independence

90AS0007B Paris HARATCH in Armenian  
10 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "What the Changes Have Brought"]

[Excerpt] The impact of the spirit of freedom on the Soviet people has been manifesting itself in different forms. In Moscow people wait in line for an hour so as not to be deprived of the latest fashion in American taste, hamburgers. Coca-Cola sales are promoted ostentatiously as a benefit of perestroika. Of course these most conspicuous phenomena are also accompanied by positive developments. One such development is the increasing frequency of opinion polls that appear in the press.

The 27 July issue of YEREKOYAN YEREVAN carries a half-page report entitled "Sociological Issues," which presents the results of a survey of 1,000 citizens who were asked nine questions. The questions are related to political issues, and the answers give a sense of the opinions of the population. Of the 1,000 respondents, 650 are residents of Yerevan, 200 are from Leninakan, 100 from Artashat and 50 from Abovyan. The selected sample includes people from all walks of life: workers, academic circles, students, party members and entrepreneurs.

The paper mentions that although there are more than 60 public organizations in Armenia today, only the most well-known are represented in the survey.

According to the survey, nearly half (48 percent) of the population considers the economic situation and the Artsakh problem as the most pressing issues before the Armenian people. These two are followed by the disaster zone (34 percent) and the democratization of the political system (30 percent). The problem of the refugees is cited as the most important problem by the least number of people.

Only 14 percent of the respondents express confidence in the newly-elected Supreme Soviet. Workers form the largest group (21 percent) among respondents who expressed this opinion. In contrast, academic circles form the largest group (60 percent) among the respondents who responded in the negative to this question. In general, the answer that was chosen by most people was "time will tell."

The third question in the survey focuses on specific issues rather than general assessments. The question asked: "Which of the following groups in the Republic best represents the interests of the Armenian people?" The choices were: The Communist Party, the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM], the National Self-determination Association [NSA], the Armenian National Army [ANA], the Veradznund [Rebirth] Association and the Mashtots Association. An overwhelming plurality of the respondents (48 percent) voted for the APM as the most deserving political group. The largest group (66 percent) among the respondents who picked this choice was made up of students. The ANA came in a distant second by 16 percent and the NSA third by 15 percent. Only 4 percent of the respondents picked the Communist Party. Among students, 66 percent support the APM and none voted for the Communist Party. The distribution of the respondents' answers was nearly the same to the next question: "Whose representatives among these organizations would you prefer to see in the Supreme Soviet?" The APM once again won the largest number of votes (50 percent), and the Communist Party was among the least preferred with 5 percent. The students were once again the largest group (64 percent) among APM supporters. It is interesting to note that the largest group which supports the Communist Party is made up of party members who accounted for only 15 percent of the respondents.

The last question related to political affairs was about the future legal status of Armenia. The largest plurality (35 percent) voted for "economic and political independence." [passage omitted]

### Changes in ArSSR Press Noted

90AS0007C *Istanbul JAMANAK* in Armenian  
7 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Hovig Ordekian: "Armenia's Press Today"]

[Text] The openness that has unfolded across the Soviet Union entered Armenia after considerable delay. The Soviet Armenian press took a conservative and cautious stance in the initial stages of the Artsakh movement. Later it gradually aligned itself with popular dispositions. That was followed by the congress of the Armenian Communist Party in September and the call by [former first secretary] Suren Arutyunyan for the "reinstatement of the blank spots of history." The "mass information media" of Armenia were instructed to write about that issue. In a sincere effort to evaluate objectively the events of our nation's history in the last 100 years, Soviet Armenian historians and journalists went to extremes, consciously or unwittingly. A pendular pattern became evident in the pages of the press where freedom of speech was transformed into a celebration of the past with offerings of half-truths marked by emotional outbursts and an absence of scholarship and conscientiousness. Even so, the Soviet Armenian press underwent a historic transformation and echoed the pattern of democratization and liberalization in public life. Phony values and undeserving idols were knocked down, and the road was cleared for a triumphant march toward the truth. The press of Soviet Armenia slowly shook off the restrictive hold of party oversight and the heavy hand of the nomenklatura to attain freedom of speech. At the same time, it strived not to be left behind by the "sensational" offerings of the nonofficial organizations and publications. KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN, YEREKOYAN YEREVAN, AVANKART, GRAKAN TERT and the monthly GARUN seemingly stopped being "agitation and propaganda" vehicles of the Communist Party. As a result, employees of the Glavlit [Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press], who for years acted as censors, have started complaining about unemployment.

The appearance of HAYK (editor Samuel Gevorgyan), the weekly publication of the Armenian Pannational Movement, obviously played a transforming role in the history of the Soviet Armenian press. The first weekly not controlled by the Armenian Communist Party was naturally a stimulating phenomenon of political pluralism and freedom of speech in the press. Although reservations may be expressed about the orientation of that weekly and the ideas it expounds—particularly its bizarre articles and analyses of the Armenian question—it is impossible to contradict the tireless battle of that organization and its press organ for the democratization of the state structure of Soviet Armenia. Today HAYK

enjoys broad popularity in Armenia, and its continued presence is more than a necessity.

Another impressive newcomer is the weekly URBAT [Friday] (managing editor M. Mikayelyan) published by KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN. The weekly covers issues which are excluded from KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN because it is so overladen with official matters. URBAT represents a step forward in terms of its presentation and especially its tidy page layout.

LUSAVORICH (editor R. Ishkhanyan), the official press organ of the Gtutyun [Compassion] Charity Organization, carries on the top of its front page the inscription: "Blessed are the wretched because they find compassion." Rather than preaching compassion and mercy, LUSAVORICH is a forum for R. Ishkhanyan to attack the "treacherous" Armenian intelligentsia, the Diaspora and, in particular, [Dashnak Party leader] Hravir Marukhian and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. One positive quality of this publication is its relentless struggle for Armenian speech, Armenian writing and Mesrobian [classical] spelling—naturally with Ishkhanyan overtones and often with gross violations of spelling rules.

The weekly ANDRADARDZ [Reflection] (editor G. Manasyan) was launched with the purpose of reform on 13 May by the Central Committee of Armenian Komsomol and the administration of the Journalists' Association of Armenia. The weekly did not carry any editorials or lead articles in its first issue. Because of its dual affiliation or for reasons unknown to us, this publication does not yet have a distinct character to become a paper of clear purpose, impartiality and readership.

Mher Davoyan, the editor of the weekly MUNETIK [Town Crier] which began to be published on 27 May, makes the following promise: "We do not have our mill and we will not carry water to anyone else's mill (even those overseas). Instead, we will try to explain to the reader how mills work in general." Initially the official press organ of the Knowledge Association and the Philosophical Association and later only the Knowledge Association, MUNETIK has a broad area of interests but in contrast to others it commendably monitors events and developments related to Armenia in Turkey, Iran and generally Middle Eastern countries.

The biweekly ORINAPAHUTYAN DIRKERUM [On Positions of Obedience to the Law], published by the Armenian Ministry of Interior, provides details of the unstable and "explosive" situation in Armenia with documentation. One can get a sense of the character of this publication when one adds to the dryness mandated by the nature of its contents the traditional dullness of the Soviet Armenian [official] press. It is obviously true that the political stabilization of Armenia is in our interests, but how correct is it to inform our enemies and

the entire world about what is happening in Armenia, how many people are killed, or what attempts are made to seize weapons?

The weekly GORTS [Work] (edited by an editorial board), published by the Cooperatives' Association of Armenia, is the most successful newcomer on the Armenian press scene in terms of its contents, presentation and new ideas. This weekly advocates an end to the socialist concept of collective ownership and praises free-market economics which is so essential for the prosperity and well-being of the people of the Motherland.

Recently the Sasun Compatriotic Association published its official organ, YERKIR AVEDÝATS [Land of Good Tidings] (edited by an editorial board and printed in the City Print Shop of Leninakan), which appears every 10 days.

The weeklies mentioned above obviously do not present a complete and definitive picture of the developments of the last 2 years. In addition to these new publications, the streets of Yerevan are flooded with the periodicals of public and political organizations which can be transformed into the rich press of the multiparty Armenia of the future. Naturally, the papers controlled by the Armenian Communist Party may be expected to change further especially when the Communist monopoly on power and the "avant-garde" role of this party comes to an end after 70 years. It would not be superfluous to

mention here the name changes that have taken place within the framework of changes in the Soviet Armenian press. The term "soviet" has been permanently erased from the titles of many publications. SOVETAKAN DPROTS [Soviet School] has become DBRUTYUN [Studentship], SOVETAKAN GRAKANUTYUN [Soviet Literature] has become NORK [Newness], and SOVETAKAN ARVEST [Soviet Art] has become ARVEST [Art]. Also the inscription "Proletariat of all countries, unite" has been removed from the mastheads of many publications.

The newly emerging Soviet Armenian press still does not have a distinct identity and direction. The only exception is HAYK which has persistently pushed its ideology while others have been busy quoting Karekin Nezhchek. Meanwhile, the official organs of the Armenian Communist Party have chosen to praise the Dashnak Party, appropriately or otherwise, as the best course of filling a political vacuum and covering up the political bankruptcy of their party.

Armenia still has a long way to go in the path of establishing political pluralism, gentlemanly party rivalry and a healthy free press environment, and apparently the prerequisites and factors for their establishment in the near future are yet nonexistent. Intolerance remains prevalent in the Soviet Armenian press, and the absence of an information policy remains an obstacle blocking the expansion of the Soviet Armenian press across the Soviet Union and beyond.

**ALGERIA****Former Prime Minister Interviewed on National Issues**

*90AA0291A Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French  
25 Jul 90 pp 6-9*

[Interview with former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah; date and place not given; first paragraph is ALGERIE ACTUALITE introduction]

[Excerpts] The reader will note that this article contains no questions relative to the results of the 12 June balloting. The reason is that the interview took place shortly before that election. We delayed publication of the interview and tried to contact the interviewee to obtain his views on the election results. But Merbah could not spare the time, according to the people around him, because of a particularly heavy schedule!

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Ten months after the fact, how do you explain your departure from the government?

[Merbah] There is an official reason that was given to me and other reasons have been cited through the press. All of it together may give an idea of the reasons that could be mentioned for my departure. The first is the shortages. I will not dwell on that subject. I will simply say that shortages have always existed. Both before and after independence. And shortages were part of the reason for the events of October 1988.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] The cigarette shortage was a new one, and it had a more sensational impact on public opinion. Do you think you were the victim of a set up?

[Merbah] I must say first of all that during the first six months of 1989, the country's economic situation improved considerably. Only the shortages in Lahda and Isis still existed. As far as the shortage of cigarettes is concerned, I am wondering whether it was not deliberately provoked. The reason is that all the necessary steps had theoretically been taken at the start of July to ensure that the SNTA [National Tobacco and Match Company] would produce more cigarettes than usual in order to meet the demand in August. I myself had asked that cigarette production be increased by 20 percent. But it was precisely the opposite that happened, since there was a shortage as early as 15 August. When I asked for an explanation, I was told that part of the inventory had burned during the events of October 1988 and that the numerous strikes at the SNTA had made it impossible to replace that inventory, with the result that only about 20 million packs were in inventory. And since that was the annual vacation period, the management of the enterprise had closed three out of five factories. The result was that only 40 million were produced in August, whereas the total should have been 80 million.

Articles were later published in the press, and all of them—that in LIBERATION, that in ECHARQ EL

AWSAT, and that by the editor of ALGERIE ACTUALITE—brought up the same arguments. They all had the same texture. It was obvious that they were "planted" articles written by journalistic hirelings in obedience to instructions. It was Mguedem, the former head of the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency, who had fed them the arguments making me out to be an opponent of the political and economic reforms.

I feel that I cannot do something that I do not believe in. And I am not a dissembler. If I had been opposed to the reforms, I think that the Council of Government, the Council of Ministers, and public opinion would have known it. And until there is proof to the contrary, we must think that the population has not accepted those arguments at all. And so far, it is still trying to find out the exact cause of my departure.

As far as the political reforms are concerned, I consider that I carried them out very quickly indeed. The Constitution was approved on 23 February 1989, and four months later—at the end of July—we had the principal laws: the election law, the law on political parties, and the law on information. Other laws were put before the APN [National People's Assembly], which was forced to hold a special session for the first time in its history. Despite that, it was unable to examine all the bills we had drawn up. It adjourned on 20 August without taking action on such important bills as the law on the right to strike and that on public demonstrations, which we, as the government, wanted to see passed as quickly as possible.

Not to mention the steps I took in my capacity as prime minister—examples being the request for ratification of the international convention on human rights and the submission to the APN for ratification of the international convention against torture. I also caused certain steps to be taken in connection with the prohibitions on leaving the national territory so that everyone entitled to a passport could get one.

So as far as the political reforms are concerned, there is absolutely nothing that I can be criticized for.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Besides the shortages and opposition to the reforms, you are also accused of "playing politics"—in plain language, of taking all the credit yourself.

[Merbah] Just a word before I answer that question. The fact is that whatever the case, it is possible to make comparisons now: the law on information that was prepared by my government was drawn up in four months. But the second reading lasted six months. I made 250 enterprises autonomous. Not many enterprises have become autonomous since then.

I will skip those two points in order to answer your question. First of all, it needs to be asked whether a government is playing politics or not when it takes responsibility for its program before the APN. We were

criticized in particular for trying to win the friendship of the deputies and not defending the legislative bills submitted to the APN. That was the real accusation.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] You mean the accusation that you placed good relations with the APN ahead of the texts you were submitting to it?

[Merbah] Yes. But I must say first that it is normal for a government to seek an understanding with the deputies, since it is the APN which, at the end of the year, must approve or reject the government's action program. It is the APN that sanctions that program. So it is natural to seek perhaps not friendship but at least a climate of healthy cooperation with the Assembly. As regards the bills, the ministers defended them with determination. Two items posed a problem, and they were the basis of the criticism: the first was the item, altered by the Constitutional Council, which stipulates that any candidate for president of the republic or for the APN must have a wife who is a native-born Algerian. The second had to do with the national language used by the press as that is dealt with in the law on political parties. There was also a language problem in the law on information. It is true that there is a contradiction between those laws. And in that connection, the government did its best. The problem presenting itself is whether the Assembly has a degree of freedom. A second problem is this: who controls the majority in the APN? The FLN [National Liberation Front]. As far as I am concerned, it is up to the FLN to speak to the deputies, who are primarily party deputies, and ask them exactly what their intentions were and what their fickleness meant. It is up to the party to enforce voting discipline. But that was not done. And anyway, I do not see the importance of that argument.

I have also been told that I undermined the Constitution. I put a big question mark alongside that. I do not see it at all. Especially when everyone knows that I have always been a legalist and that I have always been a person who respects and enforces respect for the law. I believe that the charge about undermining the Constitution is linked to the contradiction existing between the two laws passed by the APN that we were just talking about.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] In your opinion, what were the real reasons for your departure?

[Merbah] All the reasons mentioned are completely unfounded. And they have not convinced anyone. People still do not understand. And I myself must say that I am left with suppositions.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] You reject as false all the reasons mentioned. What was the reason for your departure, because there must have been one?

[Merbah] There was certainly a reason, of course. But what I would like to say to you is: go ask that question of the chief of state. Only he knows the real reason.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Do you mean that you yourself do not know the reason for your departure?

[Merbah] I do not know it. I have only suppositions, like everyone else. And I think that all analysts are arriving at the same conclusion: either I was being used from the start to get through a difficult situation, after which someone would replace me, or, as other analysts are saying, it was a matter of someone with a rather strong personality who carried a certain amount of influence and who was able to increase that influence and cause problems.

But I say that I have never been guilty of the slightest behavior that might be interpreted as being intended to undermine the Constitution. There was a difficult situation and it even had its perilous moments. I faced it calmly. I tried to move things forward in the area of democracy while facing up to the problems of the hour, examples being supplies, stimulation of the economic apparatus, and so on.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Looking back on it now, do you feel that you made mistakes as head of the government?

[Merbah] Frankly, no. Except perhaps in the case of the government program that was drawn up in 48 hours. I should have taken more time. The government that succeeded me took more time because the circumstances were different. Other than that, I do not see what mistakes I can be accused of making.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Not even toward the press?

[Merbah] Maybe. In all sincerity, I do not think I made mistakes. But there is reason to ask whether one might not have done things differently. Right from the beginning, I wanted to attach all desirable importance to the information sector. I had resolutely decided not to speak to the foreign media and to reserve everything I had to say for the national media. In keeping with that decision, we tried to change certain practices, notably that of having the minister of information speak immediately after meetings by the Council of Government and the Council of Ministers. I tried to ensure that my relations with the information sector were as correct, cordial, and professional as possible. What came along to poison the atmosphere was the Information Code. There were fanciful rumors about it. Some people said there were several versions: one in the Ministry of Information, another in the government, and still another somewhere else. For my part, I saw only one, and that was the one drawn up by the commission appointed by the minister of information and then reworked by the government, which turned it into the bill that was examined by the APN.

What complicated things at the media level was the fact that there were prefabricated conflicts—caused by others—between the minister of information and the editors. The previous system had worked as follows: the media were theoretically answerable to the minister of

information, but in fact, it was the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency that managed them and did what it wanted with them in the name of the Office of the Presidency. The problem presenting itself to that department after the formation of my government was that things were likely to change. Because the government was responsible to the APN, the minister of information became answerable to the head of the government and was no longer under the dual supervision of the prime minister and the president. Those changes were feared by some, who thought that the information sector was going to escape the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency and come under the control of the government.

And that was why artificial problems were created. There was a conflict between the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency and the Ministry of Information over control of the media. And that was why certain people worked against the ministry. Who threatened to fire the former heads of television and ALGERIE ACTUALITE?

Relations between the ministry and certain media were poisoned beginning in April 1989. Wherever things began to improve, problems started appearing.

Some journalists accuse us of having done nothing to change editors. Just when I was asking to do so, the decree of 10 April 1989 appeared. There was a period when the government had other concerns. That was in November and December 1988: there was the presentation of its program to the APN, the FLN Congress, the preparation of the budget and annual plan for 1989, and, above all, the problem of finding the money with which to get through 1988, because I found a deficit totaling \$800 million. After that it was necessary to draw up the law on information and then to wait for a decision on the power of appointment and how it would be shared between the president and the head of the government. And when that text appeared, it became impossible for the government to make those changes. But deliberately caused agitation and muffled struggle within the apparatus continued.

Proof that the agitation was deliberately caused can be seen in the fact that since my departure, everything has calmed down. There is absolutely no activity on the part of the MJA [expansion unknown]—no protest and no critical articles. The MJA dissolved itself. This means that those who were keeping the agitation going stopped doing so.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Your government's censorship of the editorial by the former editor of ALGERIE ACTUALITE was a revealing feature of those struggles.

[Merbah] Listen, I want to ask you a simple question on that issue. The article by Kamel Belkacem was written in April 1989. That was only five months after the government had been formed. He criticized the government for not resolving the economic crisis, saying that more serious crises in other countries had been resolved in less

time. He also referred to the fact that in Jordan, social agitation had brought about the prime minister's resignation. That was the first article. The attack was clear, but the article was passed anyway, even though it was absolutely without foundation. That is the question: why, after five months, was not the same article written about the government that succeeded me? After all, it was the opinion of everyone, including the newspapers and even the Council of Government at its meeting on 24 April 1990, that the situation had grown worse. I am not talking about the serious error that consists of believing that the situation we were experiencing could have been resolved in a few months and that indicates a glaring lack of professionalism. The minister of information spoke to the author of the article and asked him not to write articles like that in the future. So it is easy to guess that if he had not had protection, he would never have ventured to write such articles.

Two weeks later, he wrote an article even more violent than the first. You know about all the publicity given that article on television—something that had never happened before and has never happened since. The reason was that there was a link between the editor of ALGERIE ACTUALITE, the head of television, and the chairman of the League of Human Rights, attorney Brahimi, who is the cousin of the head of television. That link was the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency, headed by Mguedem.

The minister of information was absent that Tuesday. It was the secretary general and the minister of interior who asked Kamel Belkacem to rewrite his article because it had been submitted as an editorial, and editorials are the responsibility of the state, which determines their content. In other words, if the editor held a point of view opposed to that of the government, he should express it as a free opinion of his own. That he refused to do. So the ministry censored the article.

What I want to say is that while I was head of the government, I never censored anyone at any time. The Ministry of Information never referred questions of that kind to me.

The fact is that other people were involved in that intrigue—people who had had ambitions before 5 October and who had been thwarted by events. That group was hoping that the sixth congress would enable it to occupy a certain number of important positions. After my government was appointed, there was a period when the group in question was disoriented and destabilized, with no reaction by its members. After a few months, they felt that the time might be right for resuming their project, destabilizing and changing the government, and going back to the previous situation as though 5 October had never occurred.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Who belonged to that group?

[Merbah] There was Mguedem, the former head of the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency; Kamel Belkacem, the former editor of

ALGERIE ACTUALITE; the former head of television; and the former chairman of the League of Human Rights, all headed by a high-ranking official whom you will forgive me for not naming, even though he is the most important of all. They are the people who manipulated the operation in the hope of causing conflict between the head of the government and the president of the republic, getting rid of the head of the government, and putting their own candidate and team back in the saddle. In fact, some journalists accused some of them of belonging to "Hizb Franca." Perhaps Mguedem's departure from the Press and Information Department of the Office of the Presidency after my departure indicates that it was finally realized what a harmful role he was playing and that he was manipulating the press for personal reasons rather than doing his job in the service of the state.

Moreover, the uproar caused by the episode with the editorial in ALGERIE ACTUALITE—amplified by television and relayed by Brahimi's League of Human Rights—needs to be compared to the total silence that has surrounded the arrest and trial of EL DJEM-HOURIA's editor Rachedine and the two female journalists who wrote the offending articles. Not a word about this affair has been mentioned on television, even though it is much more serious, and Brahimi's League of Human Rights has not made the slightest protest. Why the silence surrounding that affair and the general mobilization in response to the other one?

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] When all is said and done, is it not true that your mistake was to accept the job of head of the government, as certain observers are saying?

[Merbah] I have often asked myself that question. It is easy to say now, after the fact, that it was a mistake. But one must consider the circumstances of the time. A problem was presented to me. I was offered the job of head of the government. I knew that the situation was difficult. I knew that the state's coffers were empty and that it would be necessary to find \$800 million in the following months. I knew that the population was in a state of latent rebellion. I knew that I would have to deal with an economy that had been limping along since 1986. I knew all that. And there were only two responses: I could accept or I could refuse. Refusing would have presented me with the following problem, which I discussed with the Central Committee. I have always been in the service of my country in the most difficult circumstances and have always done my best to make things go well, and turning down the offer would have meant running the risk of being accused of refusing to serve my country in difficult circumstances. I might be seen as someone who, for cheap political reasons, was refusing to place himself in the service of his country—as someone who had avoided his responsibilities when his country needed him. That is unacceptable to me. I have always accepted such responsibilities with the greatest selflessness, and that was what led me to accept, even though I knew the situation was a difficult one. The second

solution would have been to accept on certain conditions. I have often been asked why I did not lay down conditions. I accepted because I was already being mentioned all over Algeria as a future head of the government, be it said in passing. I was forced to take that popular pressure into account, and I had no right to disappoint the people. Of course I considered laying down conditions, but I decided that there was really no point in doing so, since the president had told me that I deserved the post he was offering me because of my effectiveness in the positions I had held previously. He had said that I was the only solution and that we would "help each other." I thought I understood from what he said that my mission was tied to the APN. In other words, as long as the APN was in place, I would have no problems, because I was there for a period of time linked to the legislature. If the APN were dissolved and a new majority elected, a new government would naturally be formed, and if the FLN retained its majority, a decision would have to be made as to whether the government corresponded to the new situation or not.

I knew it was possible that the APN would be dissolved before the end of the three years it still had ahead of it at the time. But I realized that my fate was linked to that of the legislature. That was why I considered it pointless to lay down conditions. Besides, I am a person who has never imposed conditions on anyone.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Do you have the feeling that you were used, as some analysts are saying?

[Merbah] Of course. One inevitably reaches that conclusion, since one of the reasons that probably led to my being selected was the fact that I had lengthy experience and had proven myself in a very difficult situation in 1978-79, and another was that the population was favorably disposed toward me because of the results I have achieved in sectors in which I have worked. It is clear that my image was taken advantage of to get through a difficult situation.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Did you really refuse to leave when you were told that your mission at the head of the government was ended?

[Merbah] I did not refuse to leave. I brought up a political problem posed by article 74 of the Constitution, which I felt—and still feel—should be clarified. That article states that the president shall appoint and dismiss the head of the government. That is all. Other articles deal with the head of the government's appearance before the Assembly, his program, the formation of the government team, and its appointment. All of that is quite clear. But when it comes to the departure of the head of the government, there is only article 74 and nothing more. As an example, the provisions in France are more or less the same. Under De Gaulle, Pompidou was put in charge of organizing the legislative elections, which resulted in the election of a strong majority favorable to Pompidou, who was prime minister. If De Gaulle had pressed his prime minister to resign, the

latter could have demanded the right to go before the National Assembly. And since the Assembly was favorable to Pompidou, De Gaulle ran the risk of finding himself faced with a problem. To avoid those problems, De Gaulle asked Pompidou for a signed but undated resignation and got it.

What I did was ask that that point in the Constitution be clarified. I think there was a misinterpretation of something I said. I said "H'na ymout kaci" in response to a question by a reporter who wanted to know what I intended to do next. My answer was that I intended to stay in my country and that I had no intention of leaving it.

To get back to article 74, someone like Boualem Benhamouda backed me up. The president himself admitted that I was right during a press conference six months later in which he said that in order to step down, the current government would have to go before the Assembly. It is normal for problems like this to arise, because what we have is a new Constitution that is not yet "broken in."

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] The power of appointment also caused a problem between the prime minister and the president.

[Merbah] Yes, it did. Now there are jobs whose holders are appointed by the president and others whose holders are appointed by the head of the government. Those jobs have been divided into "state jobs" and "civil jobs." The decree of April 1989, which introduced that division, was drawn up by departments in the Office of the Presidency. And it is a questionable solution. But its implementation will have the effect of gradually oiling the machinery and correcting what needs correcting. When I arrived at the APN, I was criticized for not having sent the documents 48 hours in advance so they could be studied by the deputies; I was asked to produce a more complete program because the one that had been prepared was too general. A number of practical questions were asked that day.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Now that the power of appointment has been divided up in a manner unfavorable to the head of the government, do you feel that the latter has the necessary means for carrying out his mission?

[Merbah] My view of the problems was based not on texts but on practice. I had made proposals to the effect that all appointments be based on an agreement between the president, the head of the government, and the minister concerned. I was not very enthusiastic about that theoretical division, which is going to cause problems. I had proposed that the president appoint everyone but that the process be one of consultation in which the advantage would go to capable cadres who had proved themselves. So as far as I was concerned, it was not so much a matter of correcting an imbalance between the power of the chief of state and that of the prime minister.

Instead, it was a matter of establishing a process in which consultation would play a big part.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Splitting the power of appointment legalizes to some extent the distrust existing between the head of the government and the chief of state.

[Merbah] That's true. And it poses many problems. The secretary general of the government is appointed by the president of the republic even though he works essentially with the head of the government. In France, Tunisia, and Morocco, he is responsible to the head of the government. In our country, there is a special situation in that the secretary general of the government also works for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of National Defense, which are responsible to the president. But that does not prevent the secretary general of the government from working for both. The problem also exists in the case of the governor of the Central Bank of Algeria [BCA]. Since he is appointed by the president without the minister of finance's having the right to make recommendations, the governor of the BCA is elevated practically to the rank of minister, and the minister of economy and finance has no authority over him. The problem also arises in the case of the national directors of the security services. The director general of the DGSN [Directorate General of National Security] is theoretically responsible to the minister of interior. But when the director general is appointed by the president, as stipulated by the April decree, without the knowledge of the minister of interior and the head of the government, it is practically impossible for them to work together.

So does the head of the government have what he needs to pursue his policy? Theoretically, he lacks a great deal: the governors, the security services, the press, the BCA, and so on. But in reality, it all depends on the relations between the president and the prime minister. The chief of state can give him everything, but he can also refuse him everything.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Hence the importance of the departments in the Office of the Presidency, through which the president perceives his relations with his prime minister.

[Merbah] That is the second problem that has come up in connection with the people surrounding the president. With the change in the Constitution, there had to be a transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister. This meant that overnight, the ministers, for example, stopped going to the Office of the President and that anything having to do with the working schedule or orders and expenses affecting the ministries had to pass through the government. There was a complete change in the situation, which had previously been characterized by direct management of the government through the departments of the Office of the Presidency. That change in the situation caused the president's people to try to get back some of their power, and they

were very probably the ones who played a role in drawing up the decree of 12 April. They were indeed the ones, because when I talked to the president about how the transfer of governors should be carried out—since those changes would involve the minister of interior, the head of the government, and the secretary general of the Office of the Presidency for the first time—the president had no objections.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] The Hamrouche government has given itself three years in which to straighten out the country's economic situation. Do you feel that it has made a good or bad start toward achieving that goal?

[Merbah] First of all, I do not see why Hamrouche is being given three years when the same amount of time was not given to the government that preceded his. Second, must we wait three years to learn whether he succeeded or not, or are we entitled to demand continuous improvement giving an indication of his success or possible failure?

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Isn't Hamrouche being shrewd by giving himself three years from the start, the obvious purpose being to avoid being judged before that time is up?

[Merbah] He has certainly learned a few things from what happened to his predecessor.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] What do you think of the current government's actions?

[Merbah] Actions are judged by their results. And what results are the government offering the population? If we take another look at the Council of Government's communique dated 24 April, we find that even it admits that production has fallen off, that employment has dropped, that there has been widespread speculation for many months, and that there was an unprecedented rise in prices during Ramadan. What we can remember about the government's actions is that the economic crisis has grown worse, that the shortages are even more numerous than before, and that insecurity has increased, as has the lack of discipline. It seems to me that the current government spends too much time theorizing and not enough time actually doing something. We no longer hear anything about productive investments or improved productivity. All we know is that those investments have stopped. The history of meat imports during Ramadan reveals a lot through its fits and starts, its contradictions, and finally its failure. Potatoes were imported, even though potatoes had not been imported for five years. Onions, too. The government did achieve one thing: it caused the announcement of a general strike by the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] even though the latter's leadership includes a number of people who are members of the FLN Central Committee. That shows how far the situation has deteriorated. In reality, the current government has neither a political nor a social base, since the FLN is not yet convinced that the reforms are a good idea—it is still debating the question of their appropriateness. The world of labor has

little faith in them, as can be seen from the UGTA's statement. And since it is not seeing any results, the population itself has doubts in view of the fact that its purchasing power is declining. Not to mention the cadres, who, following a number of dismissals and appointments contrary to the law on autonomy, are also having doubts—and they are the backbone on which the administration must rely in the current situation in order to offset its lack of popular support.

The government's political discourse criticizes all the actions of the past to justify the reforms, but those reforms can be justified without making things worse for the FLN out in the field. The FLN is being criticized and blamed for every evil. There is also a tendency to overpoliticize things. Because something is not working, people are said to be against the reforms. People have a right to be against the reforms if they are not persuaded by convincing proof. So it is vital that the government's actions lead to results producing support.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Is the FLN a party in power or in the opposition?

[Merbah] The law is specific: the purpose of any party is to assume power. It is true that without that objective, the party would lose the reason for its existence. There must be a common ambition welding the members together. But what is a party in power? In international practice, it means a program adopted by all the members and implemented by the men at the head of the party. In our country, the FLN's members are still at the stage of asking themselves questions because there is a triple problem. First, there is a problem at the party's leadership level. Party members and the population in general know that that leadership has been challenged. The executive body of the Central Committee—that is, the Political Bureau—is being challenged by the rank and file, which feels that it does not represent the rank and file. Second problem: the government is not, if we stick to the terminology, an FLN government because sufficient numbers of FLN militants or members of the FLN leadership capable of implementing the program are not part of that government. Third problem: until the last special congress, the rank and file felt that the program being implemented by the government was not the FLN program. At the congress last November, appearances were kept up by adopting the government's current program. But the rank and file is still asking whether that program is really the FLN's program, whether it is rooted in the National Charter, and whether it safeguards the basic principles on which the FLN has based its militant action for many years.

Last, I feel that the question you asked will continue to have no specific answer until those three problems are solved.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Do you approve of the government's refusal, on various pretexts, to approve the National Council Against Torture?

[Merbah] I do not have enough information on which to base a judgment because the matter was not submitted to me while I was head of the government. But from the standpoint of principles, that association should be approved.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Many people are of the opinion that torture does not date from October 1988 but in fact goes back to 1962, when you were head of military security.

[Merbah] I do not know if one can use the word "torture." As far as the service I headed was concerned, there were certain excesses. I am thinking particularly of 1965 and 1966. As soon as those excesses were brought to my attention, I did what was necessary to stop them. The memos must be in the files. I personally saw to it that those excesses were not repeated. I think all that has disappeared. And incidentally, that is why I do not think you will find anyone who can claim that he was the victim of those excesses between that date and 1978.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] It is said that you are feared because you have worked up files on many high officials.

[Merbah] Your question is worded in a tendentious manner. Files are not worked up. Such files either exist or do not exist depending on whether there is or is not anything to put in them. I have never worked up a file on anyone and have never used a file against anyone. If I have done that to anybody, all he has to do is stand up and say so. I have a certain code of ethics concerning the way state affairs should be conducted, and it prevents me from engaging in such practices.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] You were at the head of the military security organization that opponents accuse of assassinating Khider, Krim Belkacem, Colonel Chabou, and Medeghri.

[Merbah] You asked me a question about torture a few minutes ago, and I tried to answer it by saying that the services in question were more or less well behaved, that abuses were combated constantly, and that as a result, the security services I headed for a number of years were services that remained clean from the standpoint of corruption, excesses, and so on. I always worked to keep the activities of those services within the bounds of legality, and the apparatus was never used for personal ends. Severe sanctions were applied. Those services remained honest. I always saw to it that the services did their job legally. The result is that at least here in Algeria, as far as I know, there were no disappearances of Algerians or of foreigners and no violent deaths due to the assassination of Algerians or foreigners in Algeria.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] There was Medeghri.

[Merbah] To my knowledge, Medeghri committed suicide. Now as far as the deaths of two opponents abroad are concerned, what I myself can say at the moment is that the services I headed were not involved in those two incidents.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] There was also Chabou.

[Merbah] Col. Chabou died in a helicopter accident during very bad weather on 1 April. An investigating committee made up of leaders in the Air Force, the security services, and the Ministry of Defense was appointed, and it concluded that the incident was an accident. But for my part, there was nothing to prevent me from thinking at the time that something might have been cooked up, since those two Puma helicopters, which had been bought from France in 1970 and that were equipped to carry important figures, both crashed. The first one crashed in Setif during a test flight, and the second crashed with Col. Chabou on board. There was all the more reason for doubt in that we were in the midst of nationalizing the hydrocarbon industry. It was a hypothesis—a supposition that could not be cleared up.

I would like to point out in passing that all in all, the number of opponents arrested by military security was very small. I do not have the exact figures because I never added them up, but the total was somewhere between 200 and 250 during the period from 1965 to 1978.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] You said a moment ago that the services you headed were not involved in the assassinations of Kider [spelling variation in name as published] and Krim Belkacem. Does this mean that there were other services not under your authority or that the assassinations were not the work of any Algerian services at all?

[Merbah] Of course there were services not under my authority—everybody knows that. First of all, there were the official services: the National Gendarmerie and the Directorate of National Security, which in the early 1970's were headed by Bencherif and Draia, respectively. There were also the parallel services, one headed by Zeggar, who occupied a special position with President Boumediene, and the other headed by Col. Chabou. But I want to point out that I am not accusing anyone.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Who was Zeggar? The average Algerian never heard of him until Boumediene died and Zeggar had problems with the new government.

[Merbah] Zeggar was a longtime friend of the president. He had met him on the border in 1957 and 1958 and had stayed in contact with him. Zeggar occupied an important position in the Ministry of Armament during the war of liberation. He had close ties to Boumediene, whose friend he was. He had created a parallel network of friendships, intelligence, and information of benefit to the Office of the Presidency. And he used those resources to gather information, exert influence in certain countries, and even to carry out special missions requested of him at the time by the president. That was the position occupied by Zeggar at the state level. He was an intimate friend of the president. If one were to look down the list of Boumediene's friends, Zeggar would be the first and one of the few names on that list. He was Boumediene's only intimate friend.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] You were one of the main participants in the transition from Boumediene to Chadli. How did it take place? Why Chadli?

[Merbah] First we must place ourselves in the conditions of the time. The important thing in my mind, and I explained this to the Armed Forces, was that legality and the Constitution should be respected. It seemed important to me that the people remain united and that the Armed Forces also remain united. It was in that general setting that I participated along with other figures in positions of power. [passage omitted] [end of interview]

**Positions Occupied by Merbah From 1962 to 1989**

From 1962 to 1978: director of military security

From 1979 to 1980: secretary general of the Ministry of National Defense and member of the FLN Political Bureau

In 1980: departure from the FLN Political Bureau

From 1980 to 1982: deputy minister of national defense in charge of military industries

From 1982 to 1984: minister of heavy industry and alternate member of the Political Bureau

From 1984 to 1988: minister of agriculture

From February to October 1988: minister of health

From November 1988 to September 1989: prime minister

**ISRAEL**

**IDF Chief Interviewed on Gulf Crisis, Intifadah**

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[Interview with Dan Shomron, Chief of General Staff of the IDF, by Yosy Argaman; place and date not specified]

[Text] [Argaman] On the eve of the [Jewish] New Year, it is impossible not to begin with a single, typical question: What will be? I mean of course the situation around us...

[Shomron] Since its establishment, the state of Israel has existed in an unstable area filled with dangers. Nonetheless, in addition to building its military power, it is developing in all fields while also absorbing new immigrants. Despite the difficulties, the overall picture is good and will be good in the future as well.

[Argaman] Let us talk about the present. The situation in the gulf remains unclear, a sort of impasse. Time is passing. Can you define what is happening?

[Shomron] I suggest that we perform a diagnosis. We are not in a situation of waiting to confront Arab armies on our borders, as we were on the eve of the Six Day War.

A large coalition of armies is now positioned at the Iraq-Kuwait border. Moreover, states that were clearly our enemies year after year, such as Egypt and Syria, are sending forces against Iraq. Given this situation, I do believe that the state of Israel is in an impasse. Nor are we paying a heavy price on account of the passage time. It is understood that the manner in which the crisis ends is likely to have a far-reaching effect on the situation in our region.

[Argaman] Is the Iraqi chemical threat indeed inflated out of all proportion, as the chief of the Air Force intelligence group told BAMAHAINE?

[Shomron] I have no doubt that the fears stemming from this threat are exaggerated. I do not say that there are no dangers in this regard, but it should be remembered that the conventional weapons that are actually on our border, in Syria and Jordan, pose no less and perhaps a greater danger. These weapons can deliver many tons of ammunition to settlements and Army concentrations. This threat is constant. However, we have become accustomed to living with it, because we understand, and rightly, that our military power deters it.

[Argaman] However, in this case, is there not a psychological element of fear of unconventional weapons, regarding which there is only limited information?

[Shomron] I do not recommend underestimating the threat, and we certainly do not underestimate it. We have been training and preparing the rear and the Army for years. We have invested large sums in self-protection means. If one is prepared for chemical weapons, they are less dangerous than conventional weapons. Therefore, I think that chemical weapons must be treated in the correct proportion.

[Argaman] Has the general staff made any efforts to define the nature of the threat against the rear?

[Shomron] The Operational Research Department in the Planning Branch did exactly that in the scope of its duty. We laid out all the possibilities vis-a-vis the threat, and of course, the response.

[Argaman] What would you say to the concerned citizen—in simple language that everyone can understand—in light of the protracted tension?

[Shomron] I would say that the citizen has no reason to be more fearful now than in the past. Moreover, I would perhaps say that the dangers in many areas are actually smaller now than in the past. At the same time, we must be prepared for the harshest possibilities. Regarding deterrence and self-defence, we are indeed prepared for such possibilities.

[Argaman] A question asked a month ago still persists: Did intelligence again fail to warn of the invasion, or should intelligence not be expected to provide such a specific warning?

[Shomron] Intelligence mainly works to identify and define processes. It does not aim to make concrete determinations about what will happen at a certain moment. Knowledge of the decisions of the enemy's deciding echelon is available only sometimes, especially given that the deciding echelon closely guards its decisions. In many cases, enemy leaders who are supposed to make a certain decision have themselves not made the decision while intelligence is analyzing the processes and options. As to whether or not the United States will attack—I or intelligence can treat the different possibilities. I am not certain that President Bush has himself made a final decision. Therefore, it is unfeasible to ask intelligence to estimate what precisely will happen, when the decisionmakers themselves do not know the answer. Therefore, there is no need to be disappointed whenever there is no clear, unequivocal, advance warning of a certain development.

[Argaman] This time, there really was no...

[Shomron] Intelligence certainly said that such possibilities existed, namely that the Iraq Army is concentrating forces against Kuwait, that it is threatening to invade, and that it has good reasons to invade. All of this was known. As to whether Saddam Husayn was going to enter Kuwait, I do not know if he himself made that decision more than a short time before the invasion. He in fact prepared the option for a long time. However, when did he make the decision? It could be that he made the decision only several days before the invasion...

[Argaman] In your estimation, is Saddam demonstrating any signs of flexibility, as if he has suddenly understood where he has chanced to be?

[Shomron] I do not yet see signs of flexibility on his part. However, the threat that is forming against him is gathering strength. The economic blockade and the arraying of forces, led by the United States, is a process that has yet to be completed. I would say that the blockade is beginning to leave its mark.

[Argaman] How so?

[Shomron] An army the size of the Iraqi Army that is cut off from its supply sources for spare parts and regular provisions, as is currently the case regarding the Iraqi Army, can, in a short time, reach a situation in which a much of its combat equipment is unusable.

[Argaman] Can you give an example?

[Shomron] During readiness time, aircraft fly, ground-to-air missiles need to always remain warmed up, and radars are operating. All of this causes wear on equipment and requires spare parts. The process has a cumulative effect.

[Argaman] In your estimation, will there ultimately be a military clash there?

[Shomron] I do not know. I am willing to hazard to say that even the United States has not made a final decision. In the meantime, it is building the military option and employing the embargo.

[Argaman] Do you see Iraqi attempts to climb down from the tree?

[Shomron] Formally, no. However, it seems that some of the proposals that the Iraqis are offering, none of which have been acceptable to anyone, reflect an attempt to seek ways to avoid a military confrontation and the embargo, while still preserving the main gains of the occupation. [Argaman] What is currently happening regarding the intifadah?

[Shomron] In terms of the general concept, it still exists. In other words, as long as the Arab public in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza has political aspirations, and as long as it views violence, which is seen in the press and on television, as a way to realize these aspirations, the intifadah will continue. Of course, the question is: What is its intensity?

[Argaman] Let us pose the question another way: What is the current level of violence?

[Shomron] It is relatively low, which is due to very many factors, especially our forces' activity and a more realistic appraisal on the part of the Palestinian public in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza of the limits of its power.

[Argaman] Are you saying that this public has become wiser?

[Shomron] Since the intifadah began our goal has been to make them understand that they cannot change the political situation through violence, and to rid them of any such illusion.

[Argaman] Could this have been brought about earlier?

[Shomron] I would like to clearly state that, technically, calm could have been achieved through the use of great military force and the unchecked use of the Army's combat means. It is obvious that such methods would have forced us to pay an extremely high price for the fact that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] would be acting against the behavioral norms of Israeli society, its own norms, and the customary norms in developed countries, some of which have been our friends and supporters since the state was established. The alternative that was adopted is the use of controlled force, in the framework of the law, to rid the broad Arab public of its illusion, and to pointedly handle the hard core of terrorists and inciters to violence.

[Argaman] Has the media's focus on the gulf helped to divert attention from the intifadah and produce a state of relative relaxation?

[Shomron] I do not know. I assume that the media would return to the territories immediately if there were riots there.

[Argaman] Even though the media is immersed in gulf affairs?

[Shomron] Wherever there is a little smoke and a little blood, the media is there.

[Argaman] You previously said that you attribute the relative relaxation primarily to our forces's operational mode.

[Shomron] Yes. Since the start of the intifadah, we have attempted, as a fundamental concept, to create a separation between the broad public, which understands the limits of its power, and the hard, relatively small nucleus of those who are willing to act using all forms of violence. We have reached a situation in which we are successfully contending with that hard nucleus, but nonetheless enabling the broad public to live its life in a reasonable manner as much as possible. In this way, we are succeeding.

[Argaman] Is it correct to say that you have devoted most of your time to the intifadah?

[Shomron] That would very incorrect! I suggest that you look at several open developments that have occurred in the Army, because you do not see the developments that are not open, although they exist.

[Argaman] For example?

[Shomron] Much time has been devoted to improving advanced combat means, operational plans, forms of training at all levels, and command and control systems.

[Argaman] In your view, which open developments reflect your tenure as chief of general staff?

[Shomron] For example, the simple fact that 93 percent of the recruits of the August class volunteered for combat units, and the fact that most soldiers now want to attend command courses, especially the officers course. We now have many more officers and career army personnel who are interested in continuing to tie their future to the Army. It should be remembered that all of these developments are occurring during the intifadah, even though many predicted the Army's collapse, especially when the intifadah began.

[Argaman] Can you comment on a press report that parents offered to finance an officers course for their sons after they were told that their sons were turned down because there was no budget?

[Shomron] That is only an anecdote. However, something is really happening in the IDF on an unprecedented scale. Soldiers want command positions. They want responsibility, to be so-called 'big chiefs,' and to realize their potential. Not long ago, it should be recalled, we were facing a situation of resistance to the officer corps. Now, some do not attend officers school, despite having very good qualifications, because the Army does not need so many officers. Moreover, young officers, much more so than in the past, now want to stay in the Army

for long periods and see themselves as part of the Army. These are the open developments.

[Argaman] How did this process occur in the field? Did you go out to talk with and persuade soldiers?

[Shomron] Are you asking if I met with and persuaded each soldier? Certainly not. However the climate, the method, and the direction being taken in military instructional courses and the system's activity apparently created the feeling that this is what must be done. It should be remembered that all of this has occurred in a most difficult period, when the Army has been preoccupied with the intifadah, and has been operating in a sensitive area of political disagreements.

[Argaman] Did you expect this trend?

[Shomron] Absolutely. Before assuming my post, when I said that I was aiming at a shake-up, this is what I meant, and we have succeeded in this regard. A broad stratum of commanders was made a partner in this achievement. We engaged in this despite, and amid, the intifadah. This is a great change that ensures a better army.

[Argaman] When you assumed your post, the slogan 'small, smart army' was attributed to you. What have you done in this respect?

[Shomron] This requires an explanation: I too want a large, smart, suitably equipped army. However, that would entail considerable resources that do not exist. Therefore, I said that, given the resources that the state of Israel can give to the IDF, priority should be given to quality. To ensure quality, it is necessary to invest in two major components that give us an advantage over our enemies in the Middle East: Manpower and a high level of technology. With these two, we will build a successful military power. In order to divert resources to develop quality, we have no choice but to make the Army smaller, as we have actually done. At the same time, we have invested in commanders, soldiers, and the development of advanced combat means and more advanced training methods. We must make maximum use of our only two relative advantages, namely manpower and our level of technology.

[Argaman] Are accidents and hitches a measure of discipline?

[Shomron] Absolutely. The Army is now operating with great intensiveness. This applies not only to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, but to our borders as well. Each year, hundreds of terrorists are killed attempting to penetrate by sea, or across the northern border and our borders with Jordan and Egypt. The Army, including regular and reserve forces, changes its deployment very rapidly according to changes in the field. Many more vehicles are travelling In Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza compared to the past. Yet, in absolute numbers, there are fewer accidents compared to the past. Does someone really

think that the number of traffic and training accidents could be reduced by such a percentage if discipline did not exist?

[Argaman] Moving to another area, what is happening in Lebanon as far as the IDF is concerned?

[Shomron] Attempts to infiltrate from the northern border have not ceased. However, the state of Israel in 1990 is different from the state of Israel in previous years. Now, any citizen injured on the border is a very difficult matter from the standpoint of national morale. Therefore, we are investing great means in preventing infiltrations and attacks. We are operating not only in the security zone, but also north of it, wherever we detect organizing activity or infiltration routes.

[Argaman] Is an attempt being made in Lebanon to exploit the tension in the gulf to reorganize?

[Shomron] There is no direct connection between what is done in Lebanon and the gulf. In the meantime, it should be remembered that there are also internal wars between the different organizations, and this absorbs some of their energy. Nonetheless, although it is not publicized in the media, there are constant attempts to infiltrate into the state of Israel or to attack the IDF in the security zone. The IDF and the SLA [South Lebanon Army] are warding off these attempts day and night.

[Argaman] Permit me to move on to a happier topic, immigration. More concretely, will there be a need for fewer reservists when the size of the conscription classes is increased?

[Shomron] The new immigrants are not being conscripted into the Army immediately. However, in the future, the change will enable us to shorten the service of regular soldiers and reduce reserve service. In any case, this will not happen immediately.

[Argaman] What will the IDF contribute to the absorption of immigration?

[Shomron] The IDF is a very serious partner in the absorption of immigration. We are partners not as soldiers, but as citizens of the state of Israel. We will also assist in social absorption through language instruction, the adoption of families, and a matter as basic as creating space to house new immigrants.

[Argaman] To what extent can the IDF stretch itself in this regard?

[Shomron] As much as necessary. Immigration is currently one of the greatest national challenges, and the IDF, as an arm that carries out national missions, will clearly provide broad support.

[Argaman] Lieutenant General Shomron, let me ask about a completely different matter, the selection of your successor. What is your position regarding the current, customary process of selecting the chief of general staff?

[Shomron] I am not preoccupied with this matter. This area does not concern me at present. I can only say that there are very good candidates, and whoever has the duty of making a decision will need to select from among very good candidates.

[Argaman] How do you view the involvement of the public and the media in the selection of the chief of general staff? Some weeks ago, the defense minister told BAMAHADE that he regards involvement surrounding this issue as natural, because the post is a very senior one, and the question of who will fill it arouses curiosity.

[Shomron] Curiosity is natural, but involvement, in my opinion, is damaging. To my regret, the media treats senior commanders as it treats politicians. It even calls them 'contenders.' 'A contender for a position' in a political context implies a political lobby that says how good a candidate is. However, to create a contrast, the lobby must concurrently declare how bad the other candidates are.

[Argaman] Is that not also natural?

[Shomron] The problem is that the same commanders who are labelled 'bad' in the scope of a contest will nonetheless continue to be good commanders. However, in wars, and in the most difficult situations, when they must issue orders that entail risk to life, I do not know to what extent damage to their credibility (in the process of 'contending') will affect their level of functioning.

In general, it must be understood that, in the Army, there is actually no process of contending. In the Army, there are appointments; there is no vote, and candidates are not elected by a majority of votes. Therefore, dealing with this matter in political terms is damaging.

[Argaman] This interview is indeed not a summary interview. Nonetheless, I would like to ask you about your feelings toward the post you now occupy. Do you enjoy being the chief of general staff?

[Shomron] Enjoyment is not an applicable definition. I can enjoy a vacation, although I do not remember when the last one was. However, it can be said that the position of chief of general staff is one of the most interesting. It is very satisfying when you succeed in advancing matters of importance. The post entails contending with many difficulties, because of the high degree of responsibility it entails.

[Argaman] Let us talk about Entebbe. Until your appointment as chief of general staff, you were identified by the public mainly as the commander of the rescue operation in Entebbe. What is the operation for you?

[Shomron] There were many components in the Entebbe Operation. It was a very complex military operation that included many risks. It also had a unique human dimension from our standpoint as Jews, which is linked to the fact that Israelis were separated in Entebbe from the rest of the passengers in a process of 'selection,' a word we remember with aversion. They were threatened with

actual liquidation at a time when the state of Israel already existed, and when the IDF, with the long arm of its Air Force and special forces, existed. I was happy that this privilege fell to me, and that fate summoned me, exactly in that period, to be chief officer of the Paratroops and Infantry Corps and, naturally, the commander of the operation as well.

[Argaman] I read your conversations with the platoon commanders that were published in BAMAHANE. You speak there about the need to become reconciled with the media's existence, the need to understand the intervention of parents, and about matters of openness that were once completely unacceptable. The question is: Do all of these matters create difficulties for you?

[Shomron] I live in a certain reality. I cannot say stop the world, I am getting off. We need to maintain the IDF within the reality of a society that absorbs the norms of the free world, even though the countries with which Israeli society wishes to be compared do not face a daily danger to their existence. Nevertheless, we adopt these norms. This is the reality. We in the IDF have nothing to hide. On the contrary.

[Argaman] Do you think that the media is good to the IDF?

[Shomron] In my opinion, the media is good to the IDF. The only problem is that the media is beholden to spiciness, not to mention digging. More than once it has perceived some flaw and blew it out of proportion. I would expect the media to illuminate the many positive lines in the IDF with the same enthusiasm with which it finds faults in it.

[Argaman] What about the interference of parents in army life?

[Shomron] This is now part our culture. True, they sometimes overdo it, which bothers the commanders. However, it should be remembered that parents also help. This has many positive aspects. They help their children overcome difficulties and advance in the Army.

[Argaman] Do you believe that this produces some softness in the soldiers?

[Shomron] I do not accept that. There was also talk of softness in the espresso generation before 1967 and the 1973 generation. Practice has shown that each generation, without exception, has proven that it has no softness the moment an emergency situation arises. I of course see this in the Army's daily activity. We have s-p-l-e-n-d-i-d soldiers. Really, I see absolutely no indication of softness as a phenomenon.

[Argaman] Let us look ahead to the remaining months of your tenure. Are there any other things that you would like to do before stepping down?

[Shomron] In a large system such as the Army, it is impossible to make changes overnight. I began to implement all of the changes that I wanted on my first day in this post. I expect to see these changes implemented and established when I pass the baton to my successor.

[Argaman] Thank you, have a good year!

[Shomron] A good and blessed year to the IDF and to the entire people of Israel.

**AFGHANISTAN****Afghan Commander Dies of Wounds**

*90AS0431B Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 2 Aug 90 p 2*

[Text] A representative of commander Maulvi Jalalud Din Haqqani, a well-known mujahideen commander in Paktia province, informed MIDIA [MEDIA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AFGHANISTAN] that the younger brother of commander Haqqani, Mohammad Ismail, was wounded during a face to face battle with the Kabul regime forces in Gardez. He died of his wounds in Rawalpindi on Tuesday evening, report MIDIA.

The 28 year old young commander, who headed the Shuoo Kandau front of Mujahideen, who attacked Kabul regime military convoy which was moving from Gardez towards Zurmath, for an offensive on the positions of the mujahideen.

He had received a mortorshell and was taken to Rawalpindi hospital for emergency surgical operation, where he breathed his last. He was buried in Miranshah yesterday.

**Mujahidin Repulse Major Attack in Jouzjan**

*90AS0431A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 2 Aug 90 p 3*

[Text] Report reaching the Media Information Department of the Islamic Interim Government of Afghanistan (MIDIA) speak of heavy fighting between the mujahideen and the Kabul regime military units in the strategic district of Paghman and other parts of Kabul.

The mujahideen are also reported to have foiled a major offensive by regime forces in Jouzjan last week.

A report from responsible mujahideen commanders in Kabul says that during a concerted onslaught against the out-posts and military concentrations of the regime forces in Darulaman, Baghe Daud and the military garrison of Qargha, a large number of soldiers were killed or wounded. The attacks occurred on 28 July.

The report further adds that four tanks and six vehicles were also blasted with heavy weapons.

Similarly, Kabul regime military forces at the Seh-Gunbud area of Paghman district were raided by the mujahideen on 23 July, as a result of which at least 34 officers and soldiers died when their post was smashed under heavy fire from the mujahideen. On the other hand, mujahideen have beaten back a major offensive of the Kabul regime forces on their positions in Sang-Charak district of Jouzjan province recently. The regime forces left behind 72 dead and 7 wounded.

The mujahideen also recovered 65 pieces of Kalashnikov rifles and a RPG- 7 rocket. Meanwhile indiscriminate

bombing by the regime aircraft has left six civilians dead and 4 wounded in the Maidan province, on 21 July. Six shops were also destroyed.

**Mujahidin Kill 85 Regime Soldiers**

*90AS0431C Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 7 Aug 90 p 2*

[Text] Mujahideen in an ambush killed 30 communist regime's soldiers and injured 20 others, when the regime's forces were going to Qalai Adam Khan, Qalai Hassan "Wardak," and Qalai Qazi's areas, 5 kilometer off Ghazni city to deploy their posts on 4 August, a mujahideen source reported to MIDIA [MEDIA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AFGHANISTAN] from Gahzni province. The regime forces were also forced to retreat, the source added.

Mujahideen in their four-hour attack on Sinjatik's posts, captured one post, killed four militiamen and took a huge quantity of arms and ammunition as a booty, at the same date.

According to another report, communist regime forces attacked mujahideen's position in the said area of Ghazni province, on 5 August. They were confronted with the counter attack of the mujahideen, and suffered death of 55 soldiers and militiamen. Three Klashnikov rifles were also captured. Two mujahids were injured in the attack, the report added.

Mujahideen under commander Abdul Sattar attacked security posts of the gas pipeline in Chamtan district of Balkh province, killing nine regime soldiers and burning two tanks and one military vehicle, on 31 July, reports reaching MIDIA said. Forty-nine servicemen were also captured along with one heavy machinegun, one Z.K-1 heavy machinegun, and seven Klashnikov rifles in the attack the reports added. Abdul Ali, a senior mujahid, was martyred and two others were injured.

Mujahideen stepped up a cohesive operation on the communist bases in Qargha and Bagh-i-Daud-outlying northern areas of Kabul and the 8th army division, killing 29 soldiers, injuring 1 officer and 4 soldiers and destroying 4 army lorries, on 3 August, reported a source of Jandullah Front in Paghman.

The report added that mujahideen staged another attack on the security cordon of Paghman and captured one outpost in Khwaja Musafer of the district, killing six servicemen and seized nine others on 4 August. Ten assorted weapons were also captured.

Mujahideen artillery and long-rang rockets severely hit positions of the regime in the southern slopes of Paghman valley, setting ablaze two tanks and four army vehicles, on the same date.

Mujahideen under commander Mirza Mohammad Naseri attacked security posts of the Kunduz city, killing

a large number of servicemen of the regime and capturing 10 different weapons on 5 August, reports from Kunduz province said.

The reports added that artillery and multi-barrel howitzers of the regime in retaliation, bombed heavily civilian targets, killing 5 peasants and injuring 15 women and children. The artillery raid of the regime also left many muddy houses razed.

### Mujahids Capture 12 Regime Posts

90AS0431D Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 9 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] Twelve posts of the Kabul regime were captured and more than 20 soldiers killed when mujahideen attacked the regime security belt in the Charwazgai area of Charasiab district, 18 kilometres south-east of Kabul province on 4 August, reports Afghan News Agency.

The attack was jointly launched by the mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami, Hekmatyar and Khalis, under the command of Mohammad Darwesh. Heavy loss of life and material was inflicted to the regime forces and more than 20 soldiers were reported to be killed and a number of others wounded.

Eleven mujahideen were also martyred while 15 others received injuries.

Meanwhile, a big ammunition depot of the Kabul regime was set ablaze at the Bagram airbase when mujahideen of HIA (Hekmatyar) in joint collaboration with HIA (Khalis) attacked the airbase from Kohe Safi in the Parwan province the same day. Mujahideen shelled the positions of the regime forces with heavy artilleries. About 48 regime officers and soldiers were also killed and 3 aircraft, 4 tanks, and 8 military vehicles destroyed in the attack. The blasting at the ammunition dump continued for more than three hours, the report claimed.

In retaliation, the regime soldiers attacked mujahideen positions from Gulghundi, Charikar security posts. However, their attack was blunted by the mujahideen. Heavy losses were reported on both sides but the same could not be rounded in figures.

According to a MIDIA [MEDIA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AFGHANISTAN] press release eight militia and a number of soldiers were killed as a mujahideen planted anti-vehicle mine explosion wrecked an army lorry of the regime on the Kabul-Charikar road.

The report added this was the fifth army truck which had been destroyed and dozens of mercenaries killed on the same road, during the past month.

The mujahideen also attacked Khost airport, destroying one four-engine Communist regime plane and inflicting great damages to the airport at 3 a.m. on Sunday.

Mujahideen also killed three Khad's servicemen, destroyed eight military vehicles and three jeeps, when they launched an Khad's battalion in Gardez city, the capital of the said province, the source added.

### IRAN

#### Majles Inquiry into Saipa Company Activities

90AS0285A Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
18-19, 21, 23-27, 30 Jun, 1-2, 4, 7-8, 10, 14 Jul 90

[18 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—Following the request by a number of the Majles deputies for an inquiry and investigation into allegations concerning the financial misappropriations of the Saipa Company, this request was referred to the judicial and legal affairs commission on 67/8/19 [10 Nov 1988]. On 67/9/15 [6 Dec 1988], the commission members, recognizing the need for continuation of the inquiry, unanimously voted for the continuation of the investigation into the allegations of misappropriations by the Saipa Company.

In the aftermath of this decision, the investigation continued for another five months and, finally, on 68/2/23 [13 May 1989] a comprehensive report in 61 pages was composed by the deputies responsible for the Saipa Company inquiry and investigation, which was discussed in the open session of the Majles two months later, however, the text of the report was not read. Since the said report contains important points which can raise the public's awareness about various methods of abuse by the leach-like individuals within the government organizations and among the people. Also, concentrating and monopolistic policies which prepare the grounds for such corruptions may be better introduced. The text of this report will be published for our readers' attention in several issues:

Motivated by the goal to attract the foreign exchange earnings of Iranian compatriot workers and employees in the Persian Gulf region and in order to collect from passengers their foreign exchange at national ports of entry through the Shahed Investment Company, in 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March 1987], according to that which has been sanctioned by the Council of Ministers, manufacturing units under the jurisdiction of the industrial ministries and the Shahed Company, for the purpose of collecting foreign exchange from the expatriates working in the Persian Gulf region and passengers at ports of entry—with the aim of increasing the foreign exchange capacity of the country—are authorized to conduct the sale of manufactured goods on the rial foreign currency basis.

According to this sanctioned directive, expatriate Iranian workers in the Persian Gulf region can, once annually, themselves or their representative as named in the purchase form issued by the Saipa Company, purchase a Renault automobile by presenting their work

permit, passport, and all other documents to the local representative offices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Persian Gulf countries such as Dubayy, United Arab Emirates,...by payment of 2,900 USD in addition to 687,360 RLS and receive one unit of the said automobile. Taking into consideration the difficulty of the workers' trips to Iran in order to deliver the vehicle, the contract was composed in such a way to enable the holder of the purchase form to transfer all his legal and religious rights acquired in accordance with Saipa's purchase form to another person. Based on the sanctioned directive and considering the aforementioned prelude, the following three contracts were signed in 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March 1987] between Saipa Auto Manufacturing Company, under the management of Mr. Turaj Mansur and other parties:

1. Contract signed with the [Iranian] Consulate in Dubayy concerning 2,043 automobile units. As of 67/3/9 [30 May 1988] (the date of formation of Saipa's file by the Central Government Complaints Commission a total of 1,698 Renault automobiles were delivered in accordance with this agreement.
2. Contract with Al-Mosader Company (consulate in the United Arab Emirates) for 81 units which, as of 67/3/9 [30 May 1988] 57 units had been delivered in accordance with this agreement.
3. Contract signed with Shahed Investment Company concerning 738 automobile units which, as of 67/3/9 [30 May 1988], 692 automobiles had been delivered in accordance with this agreement.

Before discussing the wrong-doings of the Saipa band, attention should be paid to the issue that, since there are correlations concerning this matter, we shall discuss the violations of this band in two separate phases which are directly related to each other. In the conclusion of the second phase, the crimes of various guilty individuals will be tallied up.

The reason for this is quite clear since—in the first phase—by considering the directive of the Council of Ministers in the hope of attracting the foreign exchange earnings of the expatriate workers and travelers, rial foreign currency transactions have been conducted. The Saipa band's violations in this phase will be discussed for our readers. In the second phase however—in view of directive number NM/5-14-4 dated 65/6/29 [20 Sep 1986] by the prime minister concerning the alleviation of the vehicular needs of ministries, governmental organizations, and institutions of the Islamic Revolution—authorization was granted for rial foreign currency transactions regarding vehicles. Also, as it will be fully discussed, violations of the letter of this directive, sale of the vehicles on the black market, causing inflation, and other difficulties resulted in the prime minister's issuance of directive number NM/6/8/-581 dated 66/4/27 [18 Jul 1987] in which rial foreign currency transactions were ordered to be halted. However, violations of these two directives by Mansur's band (Saipa) resulted in

windfall earnings of substantial sums. This will be discussed in detail within its respective context.

Now, we shall briefly introduce the Saipa band headed by Turaj Mansur.

This band consists of nine main members and many consultants who participated in crimes which are as follows:

1. Turaj Mansur, managing director of Saipa Company and the band leader
2. Behzad Mo'tazedi, chairman of the board
3. Mohammad Javad Najafi, deputy chairman of the board
4. Asghar Tavassoli, member of the board and executive assistant to the managing director
5. 'Ali Vahdi, logistics administrator of Saipa Company
6. Abolqasem Shahbeyg, banking affairs administrator of Saipa Company
7. Mehdi Ostadqasem, sales manager of Saipa Company
8. Gholamhoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin, auto sales agent
9. Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam, auto sales agent

In view of the evidence and documents kept in over 23 files, interviewing various people connected with this case—ranging from parties named in the contracts, the minister and officials of the Ministry of Heavy Industries, former and present officials of Saipa Company, officials and those involved with Governmental Complaints—in over 30 meetings, careful review of the issues in the files and checking their authenticity against statements made by individuals connected with the case from the time that this group was selected by the esteemed deputies, signatories of the inquiry and investigation directive, and since the start of the Saipa investigation, some revelations have been made which are listed below.

After ratification of the agreement with the Dubayy Consulate, auto dealers such as Gholamhoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin and Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam and...attempt to do two things. First, they attempt to acquire the purchase forms that Iranian workers in the Persian Gulf region have given to their representatives. In order to receive the vehicles out of turn during the first days when most of the purchase forms were in the sole possession of Mr. Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam (whose statements are recorded in the government liable suit), a sum of five to 10 thousand tomans per unit was given to Mr. Shahbeyg, Saipa's banking affairs administrator, without any receipts per the instruction of Turaj Mansur. This sum, in a short time, is the subject of bidding among the dealers and reaches fifty and, later, seventy thousand tomans in lieu of each vehicle and without any exception.

It must be said that the violations of the Saipa band begin here and the sums received from the dealers and those who were in possession of purchasing forms were largely without receipts and were deposited in what was called "a special account".

Among the board of directors and officials of Saipa, Messrs. Turaj Mansur, Behzad Mo'tazedi, Abolqasem Shahbeyg, 'Ali Vahdi, and the company accountant whose name is Morteza Ma'sumi were the principles connected with the special account, and the main recipients of the sums dispersed per the instructions of Turaj Mansur and Mo'tazedi were Messrs. Shahbeyg, Vahdi, and Morteza Ma'sumi. The estimated balance of the special account will be given in the following pages.

[19 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—The first part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of the Saipa Company was published yesterday on this page. In this issue, the method of sending the Renault automobiles to the black market by Turaj Mansur and his assistants will be presented.

It must be noted that all the sums received are deposited in the special account. Dealers who find these transactions profitable personally travel to Dubayy in order to acquire the purchase forms. In the confessions of the accused, more than these two dealers—namely Khorshidi and Layeqi-Moqaddam—are mentioned by these two (the statements of Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam and Khorshidi in the government liable files).

In any event—although the objective of the sanctioned directive is to attract the foreign exchange earnings of workers—dealers, by purchasing work the permits of the workers and having them sealed by the attache of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Dubayy (by the name of Mr. Gudarz Karimi), attempt to acquire purchase forms for 10 to 20 units at a time by paying 500 to 600 dinars per each work permit and follow this with attempts to acquire Renault purchase forms of the Saipa Company in Dubayy, as previously mentioned.

However, since it is stated at the bottom of the purchase forms (samples of which are available) that the vehicle may be delivered to the purchaser, they [the violators] simply export the necessary dollars from the country and attempt to acquire the purchase forms for 100 Renault units and dispatch them to the black market.

Here, not only is the objective of the government directive unfulfilled, but also the scheme results in the daily increase in the value of the dollar and the price of vehicles and thus imposes a back-breaking inflation upon the society which is at war. This causes the weakening of the purchasing power of the national currency.

It must be noted that in order to receive the vehicle, the acquired purchase forms by dealers are transferred to the

Saipa Company. It is interesting that with the coordination and consultation of Turaj Mansur and his band—who receive hefty sums for the rapid and out of turn delivery of vehicles—the automobiles are assigned coded numbers—for example, from one to 30 consecutively given to each dealer. At the time, the mass media reported about the coded automobiles of series...to...and requested the investigation of this issue to discover how these vehicles with serialized numbers are put at the disposal of Tehran car dealers.

For these and any other purchase forms that are presented to the sales department of Saipa, Mr. Mehdi Ostadqasem, the sales manager, introduces the customers to Messrs. Vahdi, Shahbeyg, and Ma'sumi. After about one month of activities, by putting the dealers' fees up for bidding, 50 to 70 thousand tomans are received for each vehicle and deposited in the special account which is controlled by Messrs. Shahbeyg, Vahdi, and Ma'sumi without providing any receipts (the statements of Vahdi, Khorshidi-Nikbin, Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam, and...the video tape). It must be noted that, according to the candid statements of 'Ali Vahdi, this sum was received for all automobiles without any exception.

In addition to the acquisition of work permits by dealers, providing the vehicles' purchase forms, and receiving and selling the vehicles in the free [black] market, Mr. Mansur decides to enter these profitable transactions himself and cash in on big profits resulting from the sale of these vehicles in the free market.

In order to realize this, some preliminary activities were conducted. This included finding a moneychanger in Dubayy to provide his representative with the necessary foreign exchange to acquire the purchase forms, coordinating with the attache of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Dubayy, Mr. Gudarz Karimi, to provide an adequate number of work permits, and his designation of an individual familiar with the Iranian expatriate workers community to act as liaison with them in order to acquire their work permits.

According to written and video-taped statements, Mr. 'Ali Vahdi, Saipa's logistics administrator, was designated by Mansur for travel to Dubayy and acquisition of purchase forms. According to the statements, in the month of Mehr or Aban of 1366 [23 Sep-21 Nov 1987] he [Vahdi] travels to Dubayy and—with the introduction of Mr. Turaj Mansur—in a meeting with Mr. Gudarz Karimi, the labor attache, he states the objective of his mission. Mr. Karimi introduces him to a Mr. Judi, a resident of Dubayy, with whose assistance he attempts to acquire 50 work permits at 500 to 600 dinars each. Also, there is need for 2,900 USD in foreign exchange which, per the introduction of Mansur, is provided by a moneychanger resident of Dubayy, by the name of Mr. Zeyn'ali for the acquisition of 50 purchase forms. With the accompaniment of Mr. Judi, he [Vahdi] deposits the money in Saipa's account at the Vedad Company's foreign exchange account in the Dubayy branch of

Bank-e Melli (foreign exchange account of Vedad Company). The work permits are then signed and sealed (by the Labor Attaché) and the originals are returned to their holders. Copies of the signed and sealed work permits, workers' passports, and all other acquired documents are put together and for each set the appropriate foreign exchange is paid. In return, purchase forms for Renaults are issued by Saipa Company. After several days of activities Mr. Vahdi returns to Tehran with 50 purchase forms for Renault automobiles and hands them over to Mr. Mansur.

According to Mr. Vahdi's statements, the vehicles are then sold on the free market by Mr. Mansur and Mr. Khorshidi-Nikbin, the auto dealer. Also, according to Vahdi, six purchase forms were given to him to be sold as compensation for his travel expenses. Mr. Vahdi claims to have given the proceeds from the sale of the six cars to Mansur. In addition to receiving a commission, Mansur and his band are able to impose the sale of some goods—along with each Renault car—for 2,000 tomans, which is higher than their normal market price and were considered useless. Thus, they place themselves in the position to participate in the transactions and cash in on higher profits.

Also according to 'Ali Vahdi's statements, 20 days after the first phase of his mission in Dubayy, he returns and follows the same procedure as before for the acquisition of another set of purchase forms. However, in this phase the moneychanger who provides the necessary foreign exchange for the acquisition of purchase forms for the vehicles is a person by the name of Al-Naqqash (Vahdi's statements). As Vahdi states during the interrogation, which is video-taped, Mr. Mansur deposits the money provided initially by the moneychangers in their accounts. In this phase, 60 purchase forms are acquired and are handed over to Turaj Mansur in Tehran by Vahdi. The corresponding vehicles were then sold in the free market by him and the sales dealer, Mr. Khorshidi-Nikbin, and the profits are deposited in the aforementioned special account.

Again, one month later, Mr. Mansur himself accompanied by two other employees of Saipa Company and Mr. Vahdi go to Dubayy. Mansur had several objectives in this trip. The most important of which was the export of dates, the export of shoes, the purchase of paint and raw materials for a paint manufacturing plant called Sani, located in Tehran-Pars [suburb of Tehran], which he owns in partnership with Mo'tazedi and several others, in addition to speedy acquisition of Renault purchase forms from workers in the Persian Gulf region. Perhaps he had other objectives, such as the transfer of foreign exchange or other aims, which he has not mentioned in his statements.

During this trip, he tells Mr. Vahdi that the other two persons should not, under any circumstances, learn about the issue of purchase forms. Also in this phase, about 100 to 110 purchase forms are acquired largely

due to Vahdi's activities. This is done with the cooperation of the Labor Attaché and Mr. Judi. The required foreign exchange for the acquisition is again provided by Mr. Zeyn'ali, the moneychanger of the first phase. The procedure is the same as before.

Two or three days after the return of Mansur and his two companions to Tehran, Vahdi also returns to Tehran with 110 purchase forms for Renault automobiles. He goes to the office and hands over the purchase forms to Mansur who suggests to him to bring the forms to the office in lots of 10 to 20 each day so that the corresponding automobiles may be delivered to the sales agent, Mr. Khorshidi-Nikbin. According to Vahdi, this is done and the vehicles are sold by Khorshidi. The profits are then deposited in the special account being maintained by Shahbeyg and Ma'sumi. Also in this phase, a number of cars—apparently five units—are given to Vahdi to compensate for his travel expenses, but he deposits the profits in the special account (Vahdi's statements).

It must be noted that a number of automobiles offered for sale in the black market during the three phases are sold by Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam, the auto dealer. In his statements, 'Ali Vahdi explicitly confesses to all the aforementioned situations and a video recording of his confessions is available.

#### [21 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—The second part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company (69/3/12 [2 Jun 1990]) was published on this page. In the third part of this report, the method of Turaj Mansur's collaboration with the managing director of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative and reasons for the growing disagreement between them will be presented.

This situation, the dispatch of vehicles to the black market, continues until the beginning of the month of Dey of 1366 [22 Dec 1987-20 Jan 1988]. On this date, the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative is formed and the acquisition of purchase forms—on an individual basis as well as through go-betweens or through Mansur's band—hits a snag.

From this point on, the other party in these transactions is the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative, especially its managing director. An agreement is reached between Mansur and the managing director to charge the amount of 700,000 for each vehicle to be divided between the cooperative and Mansur.

In this phase also, the liaisons were acquiring the purchase forms from the cooperative, collectively, and paying the same amount of 50,000 to 70,000 tomans, which is deposited in the special account. However, this 70,000 tomans is a new issue which Mansur demands from the cooperative under the guise of the cooperative's assistance to the welfare of Saipa Company employees.

After the sale of 200 to 260 purchase forms to the dealers by the Persian Gulf Workers Cooperative and non-compliance with the agreement between Mr. Mansur and the managing director of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative—which apparently Mr. Gudarz Karimi was named as the managing director of the cooperative—per Mansur's instruction, the purchase forms of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative are frozen. In the aftermath of this, Mansur announces that, with the approval of the board of directors of Saipa Company (this was indeed approved by the board of directors), there will be a surcharge of 500 USD for delivery of each unit, in addition to the sum of 70,000 tomans. This, which is a clear violation by the band—which pertains to raising the price of government subsidized goods and disregarding the current laws and regulations of the country—was implemented. The approximate amount of the funds resulting from this item will be mentioned along with the amount of other misappropriations and violations.

It must be noted that, after the formation of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative, Behzad Mo'tazedi travels to Dubayy per Mansur's instructions and attempts the acquisition of 100 to 110 purchase forms for vehicles from the cooperative. According to 'Ali Vahdi's statements, 50 of these automobiles were sold by himself in three lots of 37 units, three units, and 10 units, and the proceeds were deposited in the special account. The rest of the vehicles were sold by Mansur and other members of the band. It is interesting that—according to Vahdi—above and beyond the price of the cars and the profits, a commission fee was also charged without any exception. None of the purchase forms, including those from the Shahed Company, were exempted from this surcharge. He states that even in cases where the purchase forms were acquired from dealers by employees of Saipa Company, delivery of automobiles took place only after the payment of fees marked as "out-of-turn fees" to Messrs. Shahbeyg and Ma'sumi (the accountant).

As was previously mentioned, 200 to 260 purchase forms for automobiles were given to dealers in 10-unit, 20-unit, and 30-unit lots. For each automobile 70,000 tomans, as profit, was paid to the cooperative by the dealers. This was supposed to be divided between Mansur and the managing director of the worker's cooperative who was in pursuit of the profits from the cars for its members. However, the managing director does not comply with the agreement and divides the money among its members without paying Mansur's share. Mansur, whose share is not paid, freezes the purchase forms of the workers cooperative and, in addition to the commission, demands 500 USD plus the 70,000 tomans from the buyers of the purchase forms. He refrains from delivering about 500 Renault automobiles. (According to the said agreement, this additional fee results in the unprecedented rise in the price of Renault automobiles and, according to some dealers, the price goes above 800,000 tomans.) The earned sums from foreign exchange transactions as well as various deals are deposited in the special account without exception.

[23 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—The third part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company was published in these pages on 69/3/31 [21 Jun 1990]. In it, the method of Turaj Mansur's collaboration with the managing director of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative and reasons for the growing disagreement between them was discussed. In part four of this report, the total amount which was received—within the framework of the agreements between the Dubayy Consulate, Al-Mosa'der, and the Shahed Company and in the spirit of the directive aimed at collection of foreign exchange from workers and passengers at national ports of entry—and plundered by Mansur and his band and kept by them in a special account will be revealed and the pursuing discussions will be presented for our reader's attention.

In short, in this phase of this band's violations it is determined that a total of 310 to 320 vehicles were purchased by the band from Iranian expatriate workers in the Persian Gulf and sold on the free market by dealers and members of the band, void of collecting any foreign exchange from them. As stated by Mr. Gholam Hoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin, the auto dealer who arranged for the sale of most of Mansur's automobiles, each vehicle earned him between 160,000 to 320,000 tomans in profits and other instances which, perhaps, are not gained by Mansur and his band. A number of these purchase forms were also acquired by other dealers in the same fashion as practiced by Mansur's band. Thus, not only wasn't the intended objective of the directive—which was collection of foreign exchange from Iranian expatriate workers in the Persian Gulf region—realized, but also flagrant abuse of it was undertaken by Mansur's band and other dealers.

Now we shall discuss the profits—gained in this way and by way of the three aforementioned agreements—which were deposited in the special account up until the date of formation of Saipa Company's government liable file, 67/3/9 [30 May 1988]. It must be noted that in these calculations the minimum rial profits have been considered.

A. Since after the sale only a few of the overall number of vehicles were delivered corresponded with the purchase forms [as published], the latest statistics confirm the number of 1,755 units. Since 50,000 to 70,000 tomans was deposited in the special account for each automobile, the sum total of all deposits from this item is 125,300,000 tomans.

B. After the delivery, 200 to 260 units from the purchase forms of the Persian Gulf Worker's Cooperative and about 500 units from the overall number of delivered vehicles were subject to a 500 USD surcharge per Mansur's instruction in addition to the 70,000 rials [as published] which was received in cash from recipients of the automobiles. As it has been calculated in the file,

1,255 vehicles were subject to these charges and the earned profits in this case are 163,150,000 tomans.

C. As was mentioned, due to the acquisition of purchase forms by 'Ali Vahdi three times and one time by Mo'tazedi—which totaled 320 vehicle purchase forms—also, the sale of the cars in the free market and considering that the gained profits (according to the dealers) were between 160,000, 250,000 and up to 320,000 tomans, then—by considering the average profit to be 250,000 tomans—the total gained profit would be 80,000,000 tomans.

D. Considering that for delivering vehicles belonging to Shahed Company, which according to this contract were 692 units, also between 50,000 to 70,000 tomans were collected—without exception—and deposited in the special account, the gained profit from these proceeds deposited in the special account totaled 41,525,000 tomans.

Based on the above, the total amount collected as a result of the agreements with the Dubayy Consulate, Al-Mosa'der, and Shahed Company—in view of the directive concerning the collection of foreign exchange from Iranian expatriate workers in the Persian Gulf region and passengers at ports of entry—by Mansur and his band and which was plundered and kept in the special account is 380,970 [as published].

[24 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the forth part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the national financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, the total amount received from the agreements with the Dubayy Consulate, Al-Mosa'der, and the Shahed Company, which was plundered by Turaj Mansur and his band and kept in the special account was discussed. In the fifth part of this report, the method of abuse of the directive issued by the prime minister at that time by Mansur's band will be discussed for the dear readers.

In this part of Saipa's file the following is stated: Government ministries and institutions of the Islamic Revolution are not permitted to purchase automobiles to alleviate their vehicular needs—per sanctioned laws by the Islamic Consultative Majles. Mr. Behzad Nabavi, the minister of heavy industries, in a cabinet meeting states that in order to resolve such difficulties (if ministries and institution of the Islamic Revolution can supply foreign exchange from their special share of the government subsidized allocation marked for the purchase of parts and accessories [kits]) their vehicular needs may be resolved through auto manufacturing companies such as the Saipa Company.

On this basis, he [Nabavi] dispatches telex message number M/2607 to the prime minister coded as "Secret-Very Urgent" and dated 65/5/30 [21 Aug 1986], the text of which is as follows: "Subsequent to letter number M/1521 dated 65/4/8 [29 Jun 1986], the previous reports

concerning the impossibility of providing vehicles, in view of the much needed vehicular requirements of organizations—however minimal and scattered—and, also, due to inability of this ministry to fulfill these needs and present readiness of some organizations to purchase them from abroad—however forbidden due to the legal prohibition—it is suggested that all government organizations and institutions of the Islamic Revolution that are prepared to fill their requirements from abroad by allocating foreign exchange, considering it is not possible domestically, they should inform this ministry of their requirements so that if the total volume of their orders satisfies the minimum requirements of foreign suppliers, by making use of their government organization foreign exchange allocations to purchase the CKD (parts and accessories kits) and assemble the vehicles domestically. Thus, while fulfilling the requirements, foreign exchange will be saved and the production lines of factories may be maintained (page one of file number two of government complaints).

In response to the above telex, the prime minister issues the following directive, number 65/6/29—MN/514-44, to the ministries, government organizations, institutions of the Islamic Revolution, and governorate generals: "In order to provide vehicles required by executive organizations and revolutionary organs and, also, to save foreign exchange while maintaining the production line of domestic automobile manufacturers, it is advised that all ministries, government organizations and institutions, governorate generals, and institutions of the Islamic Revolution that wish to import their needed vehicles from abroad, by payment of foreign exchange, should declare their needs to the Ministry of Heavy Industries for overall evaluation. In case the volume of the requirements is within the acceptable domestic limits, parts and accessories to manufacture the vehicles will be imported through utilization of foreign exchange capability of the said organizations (page three of file number two of government complaints).

Following this directive—without any follow up of its contents and drawing up plans based on the requirements of executive organizations and institutions of the Islamic Revolution based on the objectives stated in the letter of the minister of heavy industries and directive of the prime minister—transactions for the rial foreign exchange sale of automobiles by Saipa Company, manufacturer of Renault automobiles under the management of Turaj Mansur, begins.

It is interesting to note that not only just a few or no contracts are not signed with governmental organizations and the Islamic Revolution institutions, but also, in order to arrange so that the ownership of the vehicles are transferable and cars are salable to individuals, a foundation or institution is designated as the second party in the agreement, such as the Oppressed Foundation or Vedad Company. In line with these sham agreements, the license plates issued for these cars are private rather than governmental so as to be transferable to individuals. This point is very obvious and the objective of the

contracts, which was the misuse and sale of them [the automobiles] in the free market, is quite clear.

In addition, some of the companies which were designated in some of the contracts, such as Volks Machine which is a mock company set up by the Oppressed Foundation, state in writing that their motive for entering into this agreement is to gain substantial profits (objective of the contract to purchase the Renaults). Also the Vedad Company, a commercial concern attached to the National Olympic Committee, clearly states the purpose of this deal as commercial and the vehicles were sold to other companies such as Kimia-Afarin, Tehran Electric, Building Materials Export Company, National Industries Organization, and.... These companies, in turn, sold them to various individuals at the prevailing market price, after gaining the special profit.

It must be noted that the objective of the prime minister's directive is alleviation of the vehicular needs of government organizations and institutions of the Islamic Revolution which, according to the sanctioned law by the Islamic Consultative Majles, are not permitted to purchase automobiles. The only factor not considered by the officials of Saipa Company is implementation of this part of the directive, although it was sent to all government ministries, including the Ministry of Heavy Industries, and it must have been implemented.

In the aftermath of the issuance of the prime minister's directive, as it is indicated in the signed contracts and discovered contracts, the Saipa Company acts upon signing another contact for 11,055 Renault vehicles with the Imam's Decree Oversight Committee, Volks Machine, Vedad, and others. This is done at a time when the annual useful production of Saipa Company is about 5,000 units while its unfulfilled 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] obligations to Al-Mosa'der Company, the Dubayy Consulate, and the Shahed Company were about 3,000 units and, in addition, other obligations had risen in light of individual purchase forms presented in previous years. The delivery dates stated in all of these contracts is designated within the year 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988] (file number two of government liable suit concerning the ratification of contracts). Each one of these contracts has a separate problem which will be discussed in later reports.

[25 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the fifth part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, the misuse of the prime minister's directive by Mansur's band was discussed. In this part, we shall follow up on the continuation of the process of other financial misappropriations.

The following is what may be gathered from the text of the directive by the then prime minister. The other

parties in the contracts must be government organizations or institutions of the Islamic Revolution. They can enter into these agreements only for the purpose of alleviating their needs.

If the above were implemented, violations would have been minimum because the vehicles' license plates would have been of the government type and, thus, non-transferable to real persons. However, contrary to this expectation, this is the only matter which is not observed in any of the ratified contracts between the Saipa Company and other organizations.

It must be noted that government-owned cars, which have purple or blue license plates, may not be transferred to individuals without the passing of a special law by the Islamic Consultative Majles. Based on this, what is gathered from the statements made by officials of institutions involved in contracts and interviews with Turaj Mansur and Behzad Mo'tazedi—managing director and chairman of the board of Saipa—is that in some contracts, such as the one signed with Volks Machine which is the signatory to the largest contract as well as the recipient of the largest number of automobiles, the officials of the company have stated in writing that their objective for entering into the agreement was the purchase and sale of Renault automobiles and gaining profits.

Therefore, it is clear that in order for the delivered cars to be transferable to individuals the organization which was the main party in the contract was usually designated to be a charitable institution or a company that its official tasks and association of its members and board of directors with the government is considerable.

Selection and designation of such a company or charitable organization, for the purpose of ratification of the contract, was done by the concerned organization which was named in the contract and all documents were issued in the name of that institution or company. Because these institutions and companies were private, therefore, the delivered vehicles, which were issued white private tags, were transferred to individuals and sold on the black market.

As an example, the Supreme Judicial Council, in order to acquire vehicles needed by judges and even employees...engages in a contract for 1,000 Renault automobiles. In the contract, however, the Imam's Decree Oversight Committee for Abandoned and Abeyance Properties is named and introduced to Saipa Company as the second party in the contract. A person named Mohammad Reza Eftekhari receives and signs for all the documents for the delivered automobiles on behalf of the Oversight Committee. Also, as the evidence show, nearly fifty units of these automobiles are sold, on the spot, to persons named by Mr. Eftekhari and Messrs. Samadi-Ahari and Rajabi who were named by the Supreme Judicial Council. The earned profits from the sale is then divided among these individuals and Turaj Mansur (clear and

concise confession of Mohammad Reza Eftekhari which is available in writing and on recorded tape).

The situation is much worse in regard to agreements with the Volks Machine Company or Vedad Company. In an attached addendum to the contract of sale between Saipa Company and Vedad Company, it has been shamelessly stated that 1,000 Renault automobiles shall be given as payment to the Saipa Company as proceeds of this contract. As it will be later revealed, a number of these automobiles were delivered to Mr. Turaj Mansur and were later sold on the black market.

Also in regard to the contract with Volks Machine, in which the Oppressed Foundation is named, the official of this company stated, in person, that the objective of entering into this contract was the purchase and sale of Renault automobiles. This was also stated in an official letter. From the delivered cars, Mansur transferred 330 units to various individuals named by certain persons. The earned profits from this transaction were deposited in Mansur's account.

Therefore, the contracts are mere fabrications and sham aimed at circumventing the text of the directive. In most of the contracts, the other party is not a government organization or institution of the Islamic Revolution, but charitable organizations and companies which are named by a government organization or institution.

[26 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the fifth part of the report by the inquiry and investigation group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, a part of the financial misappropriations of Mansur's band was discussed. In the seventh part of this report we shall continue with the subject of the band's disregard for the directive prohibiting the rial-foreign exchange transactions.

In some of the ratified contracts even the person of the second party have not been named and the contract is vague. An example of this is the one with the National Industries Organization.

Per the then prime minister's directive, after a few months only a small number of contracts are signed between Saipa Company and charitable organizations and non-government organizations. However, due to some adverse effects of the rial foreign exchange transactions on the economy of the Islamic society—resulting from the conduct of the work outside of the legal process intended by the government—and the fact that in lieu of attracting the hard currency of workers in the Persian Gulf region (per the previous directive) the foreign exchange of ministries and institutions of the Islamic Revolution were used to purchase the automobiles, this causes the business of go-betweens and speculators to become hotter.

Also, by increasing the demand for foreign exchange for acquisition of vehicle purchase forms, the value of

foreign exchange rises on a daily basis and, thus, causes crushing effects on the national currency. As a result, inflation is introduced in the Islamic society which is engaged in war. Also, instead of the delivered automobiles acquired through purchase forms from the Dubayy Consulate, Al-Mosa'der, and the Shahed Company becoming a relief for the national foreign exchange problems or, at least, a relief for auto manufacturing plants, they are sold on the black market. This causes an increase in the price of automobiles and also results in overall inflationary effects. The consequences and effects of the rial foreign exchange transactions constitute deadly blows to the national economy.

As a result of documented reports in this regard and considering its adverse effects on the national economy, another directive is issued by the then prime minister and rial foreign exchange transactions are prohibited. As a result, it is natural that government organizations and institutions of the Islamic Revolution, including the Ministry of Heavy Industries, must halt new contracts and act according to the directive. However, regrettably, it is observed that officials of Saipa Company as well as the person of the minister of heavy industries do not comply.

Until 1368/1/20 [9 Apr 1989] when the new guideline for government complaints sanctioned by the Expediency Discernment Council was announced and in it the rial foreign exchange transactions were forbidden also, the implementation of the prohibiting directive was hindered by all possible means. In some instances the contracts were tampered with and the dates were changed to reflect earlier dates prior to the issuance of the directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions—such as the case of the contract with the Supreme Judicial Council. In some instances contracts were signed in clear disregard for the directive and its prohibition.

In 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989], also, a new contract was signed by the previous management (Saipa band led by Turaj Mansur). Also, even, two contracts were signed with workers in the Persian Gulf region during the management of Mr. Gharavi in the form of rial foreign exchange.

The detailed text of the directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions (directive number MN/6/8-581 dated 66/4/27 [18 Jul 1987] sent to all ministries, organizations, government offices, institutions of the Islamic Revolution, and governorate generals) is as follows: To prevent probable damage to the national currency, all ministries, organizations, government offices, Institutions of the Islamic Revolution, and their respective offices are obligated to refrain from any and all rial foreign exchange transactions. It is natural that violators will be subject to legal actions (file number one of government complaints).

Following this, there should have been adherence to the text of the prime minister's directive. However, the

Saipa Company has entered into agreements without paying heed to this directive. After this directive was issued to the ministries—including the Ministry of Heavy Industries, which is the highest executive office regarding heavy industry and at that time its minister was personally the Directing Manager of the Organization for Expansion and Rehabilitation of Industries of Iran to which Saipa Company is attached—its content should have been implemented. However, this was not done and in addition, other directives such as directive number MN10/439 dated 66/10/7 [28 Dec 1987] concerning the prohibition of the sale of goods in rial foreign exchange form, issued by the then prime minister, were not done as well. In this directive, the text of which will follow, it is explicitly indicated that it should be sent to the governor-generals, the National Industries Organization, the Oppressed Foundation, the Shahed Company, and the Ministry of Heavy Industries: (From the then prime minister's office to Mr. Mirzadeh, the executive deputy prime minister, numbered MN10/439 dated 66/10/7 [28 Dec 1987]).

With respect, attached is the copy of the letter numbered 55374 dated 66/9/25 [16 Dec 1987] from the Commerce Ministry concerning the sale of goods in the rial foreign exchange form which was written as a follow-up to the memorandum of Brother Engineer Musavi, the esteemed prime minister, and is sent as follows: Brother Mirzadeh: (1) Any violation from directives will be included in governmental decrees and the violator must be subject to government reprimand and therefore the issue should not [as published] be communicated to the governor-generals. (2) If there is need for new directives or decision making in the Economic Mobilization Headquarters, all decisions and acts should be reported to me. The purpose of the second directive is that if there are rial foreign exchange transactions being conducted in an organization in accordance with the law of governmental libel, violators and those who have disregarded the directive should be dealt with.

Following these instructions, Mr. Mirzadeh issues a directive to the governor-generals all across the country and sends a copy of it to all appropriate ministries, including [the ministries of] Heavy Industries and Commerce, the National Industries Organization, the Shahed Company, The 15-Khordad Foundation,...and explains the prohibition concerning the rial foreign exchange transactions. The number of the aforementioned directive is MN8/3784 and was dated 66/10/17 [7 Jan 1987].

In addition, through the director general of the Protection Organization, the Commerce Ministry, and others involved, many letters in connection with the dangerous and pathetic consequences of rial foreign exchange transactions are in the governmental libel files. We shall refrain from quoting the text of these letters, however, if needed, they are available and presentable in the files.

[27 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division: In the seventh part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the

Islamic Consultative Majles concerning financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, the disregard by Turaj Mansur's band for the directive prohibiting rial foreign exchange transactions was discussed. In the eighth part, we shall discuss and present to our readers the role of Vedad Company in collusion with Saipa Company and the dispatch of automobiles to the free market.

Without paying heed to the aforementioned directives and their devastating consequences on the national economy, the Saipa Company entered into agreements even after communication of the directives, even after 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989], excerpts of which will be mentioned later in this report.

In some of the agreements, such as the one with the Supreme Judicial Council, although Mohammad Reza Eftekhari had been named as its representative in letter number Sh/13533/66 dated 66/11/14 [5 Mar 1987], however, in the agreement, the date of his appointment as the representative has been changed to 66/4/2 [23 Jun 1987]. This is despite the fact that the number of his introduction letter mentioned in the contract is the same as Sh/13533/66 and—in order to pretend that the contract was signed prior to the prime minister's directive—the contract date was changed to 66/4/9 [30 Jun 1987].

In other instances, agreements were signed after the directive had been issued. In some cases, the agreements are ambiguous and the representative to have been introduced by the organization is not named, such as the contract with the National Industries Organization (in file number two of the government liable suit all the points of the contract and their violations are mentioned.) Following is a short account of the most important agreements between the Saipa Company and other parties:

1. The Office of the Imam's Decree Oversight Committee for Abandoned Property concerning the Supreme Judicial Council: The number of vehicles subject of agreement is 1,000 units at 3,000 USD in addition to 687,360 rials in cash. The second party named in the agreement is Mr. Mohammad Reza Eftekhari from the office of the committee. In this agreement, Mr. Mohammad Reza Eftekhari is introduced—in reference to letter number Sh/13533/66 dated 66/11/14 [5 Mar 1987]—by the Supreme Judicial Council as its representative for the purchase of 500 automobile units in order to alleviate the needs of the Justice Ministry and for the use of the judges. Although by that time repeated directives had been issued and communicated to executive organizations—including the Ministry of Heavy Industries—prohibiting rial foreign exchange transactions, Mr. Turaj Mansur, at first, changes the date of the letter to a date prior to the issuance of the directive—to show the date of 66/4/2 [23 Jun 1987]—while showing the same letter number. Also, the contract ratified by him and Mr. Eftekhari is for 1,000 units instead of 500 (file number two of government liable suit, the subject of contracts). Thus the contract numbered 66/4/9-19/0057/6129 is signed. Without a doubt, the date of

ratification of this agreement had been after 66/11/14 [5 Mar 1987] and the date had been forged. Although this agreement concerned 1,000 units and there are no available addenda to this agreement in the file, as of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989] 828 automobile units were delivered. This is indicative of the collusion between Mohammad Reza Eftekhari and Mansur.

According to clear and concise statements by Mr. Mohammad Reza Eftekhari which are recorded in the government liable suite files, between 30 and 33 of these automobiles were sold in the free market by the joint efforts of himself and Messrs. Samadi-Ahari and Rajabi (from the Supreme Judicial Council). Even the photocopies of the birth certificates of the alleged buyers whose names were used to transfer the titles are available and, according to statements made by Eftekhari, some were below legal age and some were not employees of the Supreme Judicial Council. Buyers were introduced by Samadi-Ahari, Rajabi, and Eftekhari and the automobiles were sold with the assistance of Mansur. The gained profit—which according to Eftekhari was 45,300,000 RLS—was divided between these individuals and Mr. Mansur. Of course, in other parts of Mr. Eftekhari's statements it is deduced that the number of automobiles was 46 to 48 units. However, the issue of the money involved is much graver than has been discussed. Also, for the delivery, a sum of 50,000 to 70,000 tomans was designated for each vehicle which was collected by Mansur's band and deposited in the special account.

2. The Vedad Trading Company attached to the National Olympic Committee: The number of vehicles mentioned in the agreement and its addenda is altogether 3,000 units, which were subject to the rial foreign exchange transaction at 3,100 USD and 687,360 RLS. The company representative is a Mr. Zolfaqari (file two of the government liable suite). According to this agreement, the payment to Saipa Company was to be equal to the value of 1,000 units of Renault automobiles.

As it was later mentioned, the meaning of "payment to Saipa Company" is as follows: The Vedad Company receives the purchase forms in its name, but Mansur shall pay for them to the company—of course at a final price to Saipa. Then, these automobiles are put at the disposal of individuals and dealers introduced by Mansur. Also, in the same Document Registration Office the documents were to be switched to the names of these individuals. The gained profit was to be paid to Mansur. This was done for a large number of jurisdictions totaling 1,000 units. Some indications by members of Mansur's band point to this arrangement. The rest of the automobiles were sold through Vedad Company to other companies at the prevailing black market prices. As a result of this agreement represented by Mr. Zolfaqari, as of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989], 1,380 vehicles were delivered.

According to the studies by the investigation group, Vedad Company sold the delivered automobiles through other companies and foundations rather than dealers. As an example, over 500 of these automobile units were put

at the disposal of the Kimi-Afarin Company. According to the statements by Gholam Hoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin, the auto dealer, from this number four lots of 100 units were put at his disposal for sale and the gained profits were transferred to Kimi-Afarin. A percentage was also allocated for Mansur, which was paid in the form of a certain number of units. These were also sold and the profit for Mansur's share of the automobiles were deposited in the special account. Also, the Vedad Company has given a list of all the foundations and companies that purchased automobiles from it to the investigation and inquiry group. The greatest numbers were sold to Kimi-Afarin, Tehran Electric, and the Building Materials Export Company attached to the National Industries Organization. The gained profits from the sale of the automobiles by Vedad Company were deposited in that company's account. Profits gained from the sale of the automobiles by the said companies to dealers were deposited to these company's accounts. Some of these profits were deposited in Mansur's account.

[30 Jun 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the eighth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, the role of Vedad Company in collusion with Saipa Company in sending the cars to the free market was discussed. In the ninth part of this report, the Saipa Company's method of dealing with the Office of the Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution and the Kimi-Afarin Company, the Building Materials Export Company, the National Industries Organization, Tehran Electric, Pushineh-baf, and Volks Machine will be discussed.

Messrs. Khorshidi-Nikbin and Layeqi-Moqaddam, dealers involved with the sale of automobiles by the Saipa band, in their statements mention that 30 automobile units from Vedad's share were given to Mr. Khorshidi-Nikbin which were sold in the free market at profits of between 168,000 to 320,000 tomans. The gained profits were given to Shahbeyg and Ma'sumi, members of the Saipa band responsible for accounting and banking affairs of Saipa Company. This money was deposited in the special account.

Also, the 400 units concerning Kimi-Afarin which were put at Khorshidi-Nikbin's disposal in four lots of 100 each were from the Vedad Company allocation, which were sold on the free market. As of the date that Khorshidi-Nikbin was arrested, around the end of Khordad 1367 [22 May-21 Jun 1988], over 1,000 units were sold with a profit of 200,000 to 300,000 tomans per unit. As was indicated in Khorshidi-Nikbin's statements, altogether 320 vehicles belonging to Kimi-Afarin and 110 units of the purchase forms belonging to Mansur were sold on the black market by him [Khorshidi-Nikbin]. As for the rest of the vehicles belonging to Vedad Company, 570 units were sold to the Kimi-Afarin Company, 207 units were sold to the Building Material Export Company—attached to the National Industries

Organization, 97 units were sold to Tehran Electric, and the Iran Pushineh-Baf Company received 125 units which were delivered accordingly. Undoubtedly, there are no other scenarios except that, the vehicles were sold on the black market by dealers and a part of the profits were paid to Mansur. Full investigation about this aspect of the affair must continue. For the delivery of each unit, as was customary, 50,000 to 70,000 tomans was deposited to Mansur's special account.

3. Volks Machine Company, attached to the Oppressed Foundation: The total number of automobiles within the framework of four agreements is 5,200 units at 2,900 USD in addition to 687,360 RLS. The other parties named in the contracts are Messrs. Mirzahoseyni and Farahani. It is interesting to note that all four agreements, although for different numbers of vehicles, were ratified on the same day, indicating the same date and a single contract number and were concluded after the directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions was issued.

The said agreements—for 500 units, 700 units, 1,000 units, and 3,000 units accordingly—were designated by the number 66/6/1—1910057/6669. As of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989] a total of 1,618 automobile units were delivered within the framework of these agreements. It was announced by the management of Volks Machine Limited Company in letter number 499/1392 and dated 67/12/17 [7 Mar 1989] that, "In line with profitable activities stimulating to employment, the Saipa plan for buying and selling automobiles is implemented. Also, the above agreement has been entered into in order to encourage the employees of the Oppressed Foundation. (The text of the letter by the management of the Volks Machine Company is available in the files prepared by the investigation and inquiry group.) Therefore, with the authorization of the Oppressed Foundation, the said vehicles were put at the disposal of certain designated individuals. Also, some units, not exceeding 400 units, were marked for companies under the auspices of the Oppressed Foundation. It is not clear if these companies took delivery of the said vehicles for their own use or for the purpose of selling them in order to gain profits.

The sale of the rest of these vehicles as explained in writing and in person by the officials of the Volks Machine Company was as follows: From the total of 1,618 vehicles delivered as of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989], only 408 units were given to companies under the auspices of the Oppressed Foundation. These were mostly distributed among the employees of these companies. In accordance with transfer papers issued by the oppressed foundation, 1,210 units were given to real or legal persons. From this number—according to the documents and available evidence, including the letter of the managing director of Volks Machine Company—330 units were given to individuals introduced by Turaj Mansur. In case if needed, the names of the individuals who received these automobiles are recorded in file three of the government liable suit and in the official letter by Volks Machine.

Therefore, 880 of these vehicles were sold, for profit, by Volks Machine on its own behalf. Also, for the 408 units which were put at the disposal of the units under the auspices of the Oppressed Foundation, surely some profits were collected. In addition, for the delivery of each of these vehicles, a commission of between 50,000 to 70,000 tomans was paid to Mr. Mansur and deposited in the special account. In addition to this, the foreign exchange required for the acquisition of the vehicles was provided by Mansur's band. This resulted in substantial profits which were deposited in the special account as well. Also, in regard to the agreement with Vedad Company and the Supreme Judicial Council, the required foreign exchange was being purchased through Mansur's band.

4. The Office of the Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution: Agreement for the purchase of 105 units in the form of rial foreign exchange at 3,100 USD in addition to 687,360 RLS in cash. The representative named was Mohammad Cheraghi. The date of introduction of this person is unknown. Most likely it was after the then prime minister's directive was issued. As of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989] 65 automobiles were delivered within the framework of this agreement.

Despite a personal interview with Mr. Cheraghi, there is no clear information concerning the method of transfer of these vehicles. However, in order to receive the vehicles from the factory, as of the arrest date of the Saipa band, the designated amount was received and deposited in the special account.

[1 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the ninth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the Saipa Company's financial misappropriations, the method of this company's transactions with the Office of the Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution, the Kimi-Afarin Company, the Building Materials Export Company under the auspices of the National Industries Organization, Tehran Electric, Pushineh-baf, and Volks Machine was discussed for our readers.

In the tenth part of this report we shall discuss the method of Saipa's dealings with the Provision and Cooperative Company under the auspices of the Social Provisions Organization and Sepah Cooperative stores, the Trade Company of the National Industries Organization, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, and the Shahed Investment Company.

5. Provision and Cooperative Company (under the auspices of the Social Provisions Organization and Sepah Cooperative stores): Agreement for the purchase of 1,000 vehicles was ratified in the form of rial foreign exchange at 3,200 USD per unit in addition to 687,630 RLS in cash. The designated representatives are Messrs. Mahmudzadeh and Hejazi. Up to the last letter from Saipa, dated 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989], the total number of delivered vehicles within the framework of this purchase

form was 124 units. All of the vehicles were, without any exception, distributed among the units attached to this organization for their use and no violation was detected.

6. The Iran National Industries Organization (the Trade Company of the National Industries): Agreement for the purchase of 550 Renault vehicles was signed between the Saipa Company and Messrs. Ra'iszadeh and Rahimpur in the form of rial foreign exchange at 2,900 USD in addition to 687,630 RLS. The date of introduction of the representatives for ratification of the agreement was 66/5/19 [10 Aug 1987] which is after the communication of the directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions. The agreement is numbered and dated as 19/0057/7116 of 66/7/14 [6 Oct 1987] and concerns the purchase of 550 Renault automobiles. Within the framework of this agreement, as of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989], 323 units were delivered. These vehicles were distributed among the units under the auspices of the Iran National Industries Organization for their executive use. No other violation except disregarding the prime minister's directive was detected.

7. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development: Agreement for the purchase of 200 vehicles in the rial-foreign exchange form was signed at the price of 3,400 USD in addition to 687,630 RLS in cash between the Saipa Company and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development represented by Mr. Kamrava. The date of ratification of this agreement is 66/5/12 [3 Aug 1987]. Within the framework of this agreement, as of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989] only 10 Renault vehicles were delivered to the aforementioned ministry. Also, the only violation of this agreement is its disregarding the directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions. However, the method of distribution was satisfactory and within the guidelines.

8. The Shahed Investment Company: A rial foreign exchange agreement was signed in 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] for the delivery of 738 Renault automobiles and we previously discussed this transaction. As of 67/3/9 [30 May 1988], as was mentioned before, 692 units were delivered within the framework of this agreement. Again, in 66/3/24 [14 Jun 1987] another contract was ratified at the price of 3,000 USD and 687,630 RLS per unit. As of 68/1/20 [9 Apr 1989], a total of 1,295 units were delivered within the framework of both of these contracts. Since 692 units were delivered in the first phase, the number of units delivered in the second phase was 603 units, which was mostly distributed among the distinguished families of martyrs. After a careful study of all the documents and evidence, no violation was detected in this case. However, the only violation was committed by Mansur's band that until 67/3/9 [30 May 1988], the start of Saipa's investigation, 692 units were delivered and for each unit, as in the case of other purchase forms, in addition to the mandatory sale of 2,000 tomans worth of accessories, 50,000 tomans in commissions—under the guise of out-of-turn fees—was collected from those in possession of purchase forms and deposited in the special account.

It must be noted that other contracts were signed between the Saipa Company and other companies or foundations. However, since these contracts were halted as a result of the arrest of members of Mansur's band, no money had been paid by the signing parties and no automobiles were delivered. We shall refrain from mentioning the names of these organizations.

[2 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the tenth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, some of Saipa's transactions with other companies were discussed.

In the eleventh part of this report, a general accounting of the sums which were deposited in the special account kept by the Turaj Mansur band for the Renault automobiles will be discussed.

Considering that the production for the year 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988] in addition to the number of units left from 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] had been 5,286 units. From this number, only 270 units were delivered to Al-Mosa'der and workers residing in Dubayy during 1366. The rest of the vehicles pertaining to phase one were delivered in 1365 and the amount of commission for them was formerly calculated. For 692 vehicles delivered to the Shahed Company, 284 units were delivered in 1366 and thus the amount deposited in the special account in this phase may be calculated as follows:

A. The total number of vehicles delivered in 1366 to contract holders was 4,223 units. Since the average amount received for each unit was 50,000 to 60,000 tomans per vehicle, therefore the sum total of the amount deposited in the special account is 259,380,000 tomans—considering an average of 60,000 tomans received per automobile.

B. As was explained in detail, in this phase of violations by the Saipa band, 330 units from the purchase forms of Volks Machine, 110 units from Vedad's, and 48 units from the purchase forms of the Office of The Imam's Decree Oversight Committee were put at the disposal of Mansur and his band. These were sold on the free market to various persons at the prevailing prices. Considering the statements of Mr. Gholamhoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin, the car dealer, from the sale of each vehicle for the sum of 200,000 to 320,000 tomans was gained by Mansur and his band. If we take the average to be 250,000 per automobile, the profit gained from the sale of 488 units that were put at Mansur's disposal for sale on the free market, in this phase comes to 122,000,000 tomans which was deposited in the special account.

Therefore, the net profit gained in this phase by Mansur's band is the sum total of A and B—381,380,000 tomans.

As a result, it is clear that the level of violations by this band has been very high and is proven that in the first phase 320 vehicles, in the second phase 488 vehicles, and all together 808 vehicles from the contract signed with the Dubayy Consulate, the Imam's Decree Oversight Committee, the Vedad Company, and Volks Machine were put at Mansur's disposal. These automobiles were sold—in consultation with the members of the board of directors, the banking affairs administrator, the accountant of Saipa, the logistics official, and two auto dealers by the names of Gholamhoseyn Khorshidi-Nikbin and Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam—in the free market. In addition, for the delivery of each unit, without exception, a sum of between 50,000 to 70,000 tomans was received and was deposited in the special account. For over 1,255 Renault units delivered in line with the contract with the Dubayy Consulate, there were surcharges of 500 USD in addition to 70,000 tomans. The sum total of these amounts which were calculated for phase one and phase two equal to a profit of 771,350,000 tomans, which was also deposited in the special account being kept by Shahbeyg and Ma'sumi.

To be short and concise, it must be noted that the amounts calculated are only a very small portion of the violations committed by Mansur's band. Until the time of the prohibition of rial foreign exchange transactions there were very few contracts ratified; and mostly after prohibition were such contracts signed. All organizations that entered into these contracts did so with the knowledge that rial foreign exchange transactions are prohibited.

In this regard, the Ministry of Heavy Industries, the National Industries Organization, the National Olympic Committee, the Oppressed Foundation, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Shahed Company, and the Provision and Social Cooperative Organization must be reprimanded in accordance with the law.

In addition, violations concerning three contracts of Volks Machine, the Oppressed Foundation, the Supreme Judicial Council (the office of the Imam's Decree Oversight Committee for Abandoned Properties) and Vedad Company (attached to the National Olympic Committee) go beyond disregarding the directive. It also includes the sale of vehicles in the free market and allocation of a number of these vehicles to Mansur's band for sale in the free market. In this connection, 330 units from the Volks Machine Company, 110 units from the Vedad, and 46 to 48 units from the Supreme Judicial Council were put at the disposal of individuals introduced by Mansur and his dealers to be sold by them.

In addition to these three instances, the required foreign exchange for acquisition of vehicles subject of the contracts was provided by Mansur and his band. Vehicles delivered to Volks Machine and Vedad were completely put at the disposal of other companies and individuals and were sold. From the vehicles delivered to the

Supreme Judicial Council per letter number 68/2-4-1900700/460 of Saipa's new management, at the time of the previous management 535 of its units have been delivered of which 46 to 48 units were sold by Messrs. Mohammad Reza Eftekhari, Samadi-Ahari, Rajavi, and Mansur and the profit gained was divided among them.

[4 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In part eleven of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majlis concerning the financial misappropriations of Saipa Company, the sum total of the amount for Renault automobiles which was deposited in the special account of Mansur's bank was discussed. In part twelve of this report, other points concerning the method of embezzlement by this band will be uncovered.

In addition, for each vehicle, the purchase of a total of 2,000 tomans worth of accessories per car was mandatory. The price of these accessories at the time of delivery was higher than the black market price. Also, in all contracts, with one or two exceptions, the guidelines as indicated in the then prime minister's directive were disregarded. This concerned the selection of institutions and commercial companies, the conduct of fictitious transactions, changing the dates of letters and contracts, and the ratification of new contracts after the date of the prohibition directive (such as the one with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development dated 66/5/26 [17 Aug 1987]).

A study of the files of contracts ratified by Saipa and other parties show that only in 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988] a total of 11,055 units of Renault automobiles were the subject of these contracts at a rial value of 698,024,080 tomans. This was in addition to the sum total of 34,290,500 USD received as proceeds of these contracts. If the price of the dollar on the black market during the second half of 1366, the time when most of the contracts were ratified, is taken to be 120 tomans, the rial value of this sum will be 4,114,860,000 tomans.

Overall, the sum total of about five billion tomans was in the hands of the managing director and the said band. This money was utilized for buying and selling foreign exchange on the black market, the export of shoes and dates, the purchase of raw material for paint to be used in a paint factory jointly owned by Mansur, Mo'tazedi, and other partners. The profits gained from this money which belonged to the Moslem treasury was instead deposited in the special account of Mansur's band.

Due to the fact that the Saipa Company was authorized to open foreign exchange accounts in order to attract the foreign exchange earnings of expatriate workers in the Persian Gulf region and its ability to receive foreign currency at the location, it entered into various contracts which were mentioned in the previous reports. At first, Saipa conducted its overseas banking activities through

account number 211-701 of the Dubayy branch of Bank-e Melli-ye Iran—which belonged to the Building Materials Export Company of the National Industries Organization. A short while later however, considering the connection it had with the Vedad Company and this company having had a foreign exchange account in the same bank, Saipa concentrated its banking activities in Vedad's accounts numbered 211/720 and 211/735. These accounts were later changed to numbers 211/745 and 211/750.

If the balances of these five accounts are revealed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and by the Governor-General of Bank-e Markazi, many of the movements of the Saipa band will be clarified. However, this important point must be the focus of attention that the most serious violations committed by this band are transactions that it entered into by utilizing this huge sum. They always tried to avoid the deposit of foreign exchange and rial sums in the Treasury Account and to make sure that they are deposited in the company's account. Immediately after receiving a check, Mr. Mansur or Mr. Mo'tazedi would endorse it and it would be cashed through dealers. The cash then would be utilized for months on end in transactions and only then the foreign exchange would be deposited in one of the above mentioned accounts in Dubayy and the rial sum would be passed on to the company. However, the gained profits were deposited in the special account.

As it is clear from the studies that in addition to the purchase of houses, income properties, and a factory, the greatest income was at first deposited in one of these bank accounts [in Dubayy] and later transferred to other accounts that Mansur and one of his partners in the paint factory by the name of Hoseyn Bat'hai had kept in Germany and Turkey.

In this part of the transactions, the Vedad Company played a crucial role and in accordance with the letter by the present management of Saipa, over three million USD of Saipa's foreign currency is kept in the above mentioned accounts belonging to the Vedad Company and one which Vedad has the right to withdraw.

[7 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the twelfth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of the Saipa Company, some other points regarding the methods of Mansur's band's abuses were discussed. In the thirteenth part of this report we shall continue with the revelation about the way Mansur's management orders were canceled and, consequently, he was barred from leaving the country.

In the year 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988], purchase forms for the vehicles—subject of rial foreign exchange transactions—were sold to expatriate workers in the Persian Gulf region and were also sold by the Shahed Company to dealers and speculators. In addition, over 300 purchase forms were bought from the expatriate

workers in Dubayy by Mansur and his associates. These vehicles were sold on the free market by these individuals in flagrant violation of the then prime minister's decree concerning the alleviation of the needs of ministries and institutions of the Islamic Revolution.

This caused the flooding of the market with these vehicles and resulted in an increase in the rate of inflation. As a result, although a directive was formerly issued concerning the alleviation of the needs of the government and institutions, the then prime minister in another decree—numbered 66/4/27-MN6/8-581—prohibited the rial foreign exchange transactions. Later, also, several directives were issued in this regard and were sent to government organizations, the revolution institutions dealing with Saipa Company, and the Ministry of Heavy Industries—which is the highest executive authority concerning the heavy industry.

As a result of non-compliance with this directive and continuation of rial foreign exchange transactions concerning the sale of Renault automobiles on the black market, on 67/2/23 [13 May 1988] the then prime minister sends the following letter to Mr. Mirzadeh classified as "Secret-Urgent" to Mr. Mirzadeh (file number one, page three of the government liable suit): "In The Name Of The Exalted One. It is being said that the Saipa Company is engaged in rial foreign exchange transactions. In view of the illegality of the issue, (1) a careful investigation must be conducted and (2) in case it is proven, action must be taken in accordance with liable procedure and the results must be announced. Copy to Brother Nabavi, minister of heavy industries, for follow up and cooperation."

Following this, Mr. Mirzadeh assigns and introduces four investigators to the Saipa Company. These four are Messrs. Taqavi, Saber-Tehrani, Dehqan, and Mo'menipur (page four of file number one of the government liable suit).

In continuation of these investigations, despite obstructions of the board of directors, the managing director, and employees of Saipa, on 67/3/9 [30 May 1988] Brothers Seyyed 'Abbas Taqavi and Mo'menipur submit a five-page report—containing the method of sales, composition of contracts, parties involved in the contracts, production in 1366 and leftover from 1365 and...—to the central commission for liable (pages five, six, seven, eight, and nine of file number one of government liable suit).

Based on this report, in the 67/3/21 [11 Jun 1988] session of the central commission for liable (pages 10 to 12 of file number one of liable) the order for investigation of the matter is issued in conjunction with a decree to fire the managing director of Saipa. Also, the managing director, members of the board of directors, and the sales manager of the company are barred from leaving the country and engaging in any transactions.

In 67/3/24 [16 Jun 1987] a complete report of the Saipa case is prepared. This report addressed the following:

Saipa's management, method of conducting sales and distribution of vehicles outside of the network [as published], the biography and modus operandi of the managing director—selling by direct reference in conversations with company employees [as published], subtle methods indicating substantial financial violations within the company—involvement of other people by the managing director, escalation of tensions among the officials of the company, employing automobile dealers and their connection with Mansur's band, rial foreign exchange sale of Renault automobiles after the communication of the directive prohibiting such transactions, overcharging the expatriate buyers in the Persian Gulf by 500 USD and 70,000 tomans, payment of commission, opening a special account, and engaging in foreign currency trading.

Also on 67/3/24 Mr. Mansur's orders as the managing director were canceled (page two of file number one). On 67/4/20 [11 Jul 1988] and under number 165 [as published], after one and a half months of investigation of the Saipa case, the Investigation and Inspectorate Unit of the Government Liable [Office] submits a detailed and relatively complete report which is kept in pages 24 through 27 of file number one of the government liable suit. A brief excerpt of that will be presented to the readers in the next issue.

[8 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—In the fourteenth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles a brief account of the financial and non-financial violations of Turaj Mansur, accusations of members of the board of directors and indication of the Saipa band's guilt, a record of previous embezzlement charges against the former managing director in connection with his previous responsibilities are mentioned which is presented to the readers as follows:

A. The financial operations of Turaj Mansur are as follows: (1) The financial operations of Turaj Mansur—according to the books and private papers—is hundreds of millions of tomans. (2) Written statements by this individual concerning foreign currency transactions involving various individuals and his profit-takings. (3) Deeds of various properties belonging to Turaj Mansur in various parts of Tehran and its suburbs. (4) The private bank account of Turaj Mansur in the American Express Bank of France. (5) The current bank account of Turaj Mansur inside the country.

B. Non-financial matters: (1) One large bottle and eight small bottles of alcoholic beverages and...found next to the confiscated documents. (2) Profane eight mm video tape and....

After the presentation of this report on 67/4/21 [11 Jun 1988] per the written decree of Mr. Mirza based on the orders issued by the esteemed prime minister, warrants for the arrest of Turaj Mansur and his main associates are issued as follows (page 28 of file number one of the

liable suit): "In view of the approval of the esteemed prime minister following the presentation of report number 67/4/21-170 to him—in reference to paragraph two of part "B" of the correction concerning the guidelines of the government liable cases—appropriate action should be taken to arrest Mr. Turaj Mansur and his main associates in connection with the government liable case which have been brought forth in the investigative unit and the liable commission. Concerning the evil acts [with regard to the alcohol and the video], the file should be completed and the case should be referred to the judicial branch. The Government Liable Office should be informed of the results of the activities along with the speedy completion of the file concerning the related issues (pages 35 to 40 of file number one of liable case concerning the managing director and members of the board of directors). Following is a brief gist of the accusations being brought against members of the board of directors and other members of the Saipa network headed by Mansur Turaj, the managing director:

1. Forging the dates of some of the contracts to reflect dates after the communication of the esteemed prime minister's directive prohibiting the rial foreign exchange transactions. Conduct of rial foreign exchange transactions in all of the contracts.
2. Price gouging by increasing the price of the delivered vehicles from the quota of the Dubayy Consulate by 500 USD in addition to 700,000 rials in cash.
3. Out-of-network distribution through: (a) Exchange of papers with the vehicles at cheap prices. (b) Sale of vehicles in the free market (808 units) and utilizing the profits for personal interests. (c) Imposing upon companies which entered into transactions with the Saipa Company in order to issue purchase forms in the names of certain individuals and transferring those purchase forms to dealers for sale in the free market. Designating family members, friends, and associates by them, an example of which can be seen in agreements with Vedad, Volks Machine, and others and the evidence is available.
4. Imposing the sale of goods to customers at the time of delivery of the vehicle. (A number of useless accessories worth 2,000 tomans was sold.)
5. Extortion from the dealers. (a) Receiving 500,000 rials for the delivery of white and silver automobiles and also for out-of-turn delivery. This amount was extorted without exception from all holders of purchase forms and deposited in the special account. This was started at 10,000 tomans and later increased to 50,000 to 70,000 tomans. Of course, the delivered vehicles during 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989] could not be calculated from the beginning of the year up to the time of arrest. Documents and related evidence concerning the extortion of this amount is available in the government liable file—especially in written and video-taped statements by 'Ali Vahdi, Khorshidi-Nikbin, and Hasan Layeqi-Moqaddam. (b) Extortion of other amounts and gifts and using them for personal purposes.

6. Utilization of the human resources of Saipa Company for personal use.
7. Buying and selling foreign currency with the money from the Moslem Treasury and using the profits for personal purposes.
8. Plundering the Moslem Treasury for personal purposes.
9. Fabrication of accounts in order to avoid answering to the official accountants from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and also to avoid paying taxes.
10. Complicity in forming a network and band for conducting the above activities.

Members of the board of directors are:

1. Turaj Mansur, managing director and member of the board.
2. Behzad Mo'tazedi, chairman of the board.
3. Mohammad Javad Najafi, deputy managing director and member of the board.
4. Asghar Tavassoli, executive deputy managing director and member of the board.

Allegations concerning each individual separately: (1) Turaj Mansur—managing director and member of the board of directors of the Saipa Company. He was educated in the field of civil engineering in the state of Michigan in America. After the revolution he came to Iran and started working in the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution as the administrator of the Shemiran Branch (north of Tehran) of the Housing Foundation. His activities in the Housing foundation and the method of allocation of valuable land parcels of northern Tehran to corrupt people of the past regime and sale of some of these parcels must be investigated separately. After being fired from the Housing Foundation, as a result of embezzlement, he was hired by the General Electric Company which was under the auspices of the Oppressed Foundation. In Shahriar of 1363 [23 Aug-22 Sep 1984] he was appointed the managing director of Saipa. In 67/4/22 [13 Jul 1988] he was arrested by the Inspection Unit and Investigative [Branch] of the Government Liable Office. In the search of his residence a quantity of alcoholic beverages was discovered and he admitted to consuming alcohol from time to time. Also, a letter which is indicative of his views in regard to the imposed war with Iraq, the security and economic conditions of the country, the situation in the Bazaar, the condition of national trade and the fact that he has entered it and would like to leave the country in the future was found. In this letter, officials of the country have been referred to in a very disrespectful manner.

[10 Jul 90 p 15]

[Text] Economic Division—In the fourteenth part of this report it was mentioned that in searching Turaj Mansur's

house a letter—indicating his views concerning the imposed war, the country's security and economic situation, the trade situation and the fact that he has entered into this bazaar but wishes to move abroad in the future—was discovered and confiscated. Together we shall continue the issue.

In file number 13 of government libels, the original letter is recorded. In this letter which was written by Mansur to his friend on 66/11/23 [12 Feb 1988] it has been stated: "Where in the world do you see so many facilities and possibilities for business. In short, I have seriously fallen in with business and money. Indeed, as a result of the chaotic situation, this is unavoidable. It is only enough that you take the first step in business and, later, you will be forced to fall in with making money without any effort. In short, unfortunately and compulsorily, I have fallen into this chaos of business."

Based on a five page letter addressed to Mr. Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries, and written on 66/11/23 [12 Feb 1988]—the text of which is available in file number 13—it seems that he had a meeting with Mr. Nabavi on that morning. In this letter, he explicitly attacks the government officials and refers to Mr. Nabavi as a hero who can stop the government and refrain from compliance with its directives.

In a part of this letter it is stated: "I know that, regrettably, neither these sentences nor simple words in the form of street slang and with these meanings can have the slightest dent in the ears of these midgets of height as well as mind." (He means the prime minister and officials of the Government Liable Office.)

Also, in a letter to his wife—which he wrote on a cigarette paper from the prison and is recorded—he has instructed his wife to seek the assistance of Mr. Behzad Nabavi and Samadi-Ahari for his release. Indeed, the necessary actions were taken by Mr. Behzad Nabavi which is exemplified by his letter classified as "Secret-Direct-Personal" to Brother Musavi, the prime minister, dated 67/4/29 [19 Jul 1988]—one week after the arrest of Turaj Mansur.

A part of this letter is as follows: "The arrest of Mr. Mansur, for any violation, was, firstly, without my knowledge and contrary to your own directive and, secondly, his alleged violations have nothing to do with Mr. Mirzadeh, the Government Libel [Office], and the Ministry of Information. And, thirdly, the way of handling the matter has been very un-Islamic, inhumane, and wrong. Fourth, at a time when thieves and bribe-takers of companies under our auspices which are identified and introduced to the judicial branch are immediately released, why must the managing director of a public company be arrested in the fashion of political opponents of the regime...." The original text of this letter is in the liable file concerning the letters of the prime ministry.

After the writing of this letter by Behzad Nabavi, Mr. Musavi, the prime minister, orders that a meeting be set

up with the participation of Mr. Reyshahri, the minister of information; Mr. Mirzadeh, head of the Government Liable Office; one person from the investigation group and Nabavi so that he may be informed of the allegations against Mansur's band. According to Mr. Mirzadeh, this meeting lasts two hours during which all the issues concerning the Mansur band as of that date were presented to him. This included all the evidence in addition to the texts of the confessions of Mr. Mansur and members of his band. At the conclusion of this meeting Mr. Nabavi states that, "How can it be certain that the confessions are not extracted under pressure?" It shows that he was not only dissatisfied, but also wished to take the upper hand.

After nearly 20 days from this meeting, in a memorandum dated 67/5/24 [15 Aug 1988]—classified as "Secret-Direct"—addressed to Brother Mirzadeh, Mr. Nabavi changes his position as follows: "After Greetings, other instances beyond what was discussed in the meeting concerning the Mansur case have been discovered by other brothers. I have ordered that the case be completed and charges be brought against him. I have heard that his interrogation has finalized. Please ask the gentlemen interrogators to wait a few days. Perhaps the new information can open new cases which, after consultations between our people and your people, we may be able to announce new charges against him...."

Consequently, in the twenty-sixth meeting on 67/6/21 [12 Sep 1988] which coincided with the time of Nabavi's getting a vote of confidence in the Majles, the official gazette, in reporting the proceedings of the Islamic Consultative Majles, reported the plundering of 700 million tomans from the Moslem Treasury by the Mansur band. Incidentally, this figure is very close to the rial figure concerning the apparent violations of the Mansur band. This feat was presented as one of the achievements of the Financial and Consulting Services Company under the auspices of the Expansion Organization.

In interviews with the daily newspapers KEYHAN and ETTELA'AT which took place at that time, Nabavi officially announced that, "The managing director of Saipa was active in the transfer of foreign currency between various organizations without our knowledge, and a number of vehicles have been sold contrary to the procedure which was based on purchase forms issued by the vehicle distribution office." He added: "The difficulty of this issue was that it would authorize organizations that were receiving the vehicles to sell some of these in the free market in order to provide foreign exchange for themselves."

Then, in regard to delivering vehicles out-of-turn as a violation committed by the Saipa managing director, Mr. Turaj Mansur, he states that the sums received were being deposited in his accounts inside and outside the country. The sums in his deposit books amounted to 700 million tomans (page one of file number 11 of the

government libel suit contains the text of the interview with the minister of heavy industries).

[14 Jul 90 p 11]

[Text] Economic Division—The sixteenth part of the report by the investigation and inquiry group of the Islamic Consultative Majles concerning the financial misappropriations of the Saipa Company has been dedicated to studying the protections of the former minister of heavy industries regarding rial foreign exchange transactions of the company.

After receiving a vote of confidence from the Majles and strengthening the position of Mr. Behzad Nabavi, as of 67/7/21 [13 Oct 1988], the minister's tone of voice in connection with the Saipa issue changes and certain correspondence takes place by him concerning support from Mr. Mansur. An example of this was through the letter number M/3250 dated 67/6/30 [22 Oct 1988]—which was nine days after receiving the vote of confidence—requesting the prime minister to transfer to him all the files concerning Mansur's band and threatens to resign if this issue is not put to rest and files are not given to him. In letter number 67/6/31-MN13/1726—the text of which is in the prime ministry file collected by the investigation and inquiry group tasked with the Saipa issue—the prime minister responds as follows: "I cannot give any orders concerning the transfer of all the files of Saipa to you and you, disregarding the facts, have been unfair about those who discovered this scandalous affair during the cabinet meeting by branding them as politically motivated and other such things, rather than thanking them....I think you are making false accusations when Saipa's infection was much more than what could be limited within the factory and it is necessary for you to completely wash your hands from this issue by thanking all those who helped discover this scandal and....I do not expect to face political or other pressure in regard to the discovery of corruption in connection with every organization. Otherwise I will be forced to scream in the society and...."

The investigation of this issue continues and Mr. Behzad Nabavi is still of the opinion that the rial foreign exchange transactions of the Saipa band have not been against the law, despite the fact that more than five separate directives in this regard concerning the prohibition of such transactions have been issued by the prime minister. Also, the Expediency Discernment Council, in a ruling concerning the government libels which have been enforceable as of 67/1/20 [9 Apr 1988], prohibited the rial foreign exchange transactions.

Since the cases of those in the Saipa band accused by the Government Libels [Office] have been referred to the Tehran Public Magistrate, Branch 21, for the investigation of issues within the jurisdiction of the revolution and public courts, on 67/9/14 [5 Dec 1988] that magistrate releases Turaj Mansur and the other members of the band. However, as a result of correspondence and

follow-up of the Central Commission of Government Libels, Turaj Mansur and Behzad Mo'tazed were re-arrested on the same day.

In a telephone-gram, the magistrate of Branch 21 of Tehran's Public Magistrate requested the views of the Ministry of Heavy Industries concerning the Saipa issue. Mr. Behzad Nabavi, who in many previous cases had stated various instances concerning this band in writing, in letter numbered 67/9/16, 1-3024/39643 addressed to the investigator of Branch 21 of the Tehran Public Magistrate, announced: "Concerning the crimes and violations as stated in the Islamic Criminal Law, this organization has not filed any complaints nor has it accused the former management of the Saipa Company. It must be added that as a result of continued perseverance, part of the checks concerning Saipa have been recovered and the remaining sums have also been deposited in account number six of the treasury at Bank-e Markazi and...."

This is when, as was mentioned, in the letter dated 67/5/24 [15 Aug 1988] addressed to Mr. Mirzadeh, he first wrote the subject of the criminal charges and second, at the time of receiving the vote of confidence on 67/6/21, made certain statements which were non other than official declarations of the charges and the crime.

Third, in his statements during interviews with the newspapers—excerpts of which have been mentioned—he also announced the charges being brought against the culprits.

Fourth, in a three-page letter addressed to Mr. Mirzadeh, under the number 67/5/30,0130/59602, he [Nabavi] has written that he has made public all the violations and crimes committed by this band and has accordingly sued (file number eleven of the Government Libel). Also, his letter to Branch 21 of the Tehran Public Magistrate has been recorded and is kept in file number eleven of the Government Libel.

Considering what has been said, in the view of the minister of heavy industries, no wealth has been plundered and no violation has taken place. Considering the points mentioned in this report and those officially revealed by the present management of Saipa concerning the plundering of the Moslem Treasury by Mansur and his hands, these are all a part of the overall picture.

We invite you to sit in judgment in regard to this issue. With an all-encompassing investigation of the points and angles, it will be determined that the contradictory statements made by the minister of heavy industries are clearly indicative of the hidden truth that until its full discovery the officials must not rest.

## PAKISTAN

### Pakistan's Military Involvement in Gulf Viewed

#### National Interests

90AS0435A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
16 Aug 90 pp 1, 6

[Article by Dr Shireen M. Mazari: "Whither Pakistan's National Interests?"]

[Text] Pakistan's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia is suicidal in politico-strategic terms as well as in terms of the human lives and suffering that Pakistanis in Iraq and Kuwait may have to endure in the form of being held hostage. At the purely human level, this decision reflects the scant value the Pakistani leadership places upon the lives of its citizens.

At the politico-strategic level, the decision is yet another reflection of growing U.S. dominance in the region as well as one more instance of the Pakistan ruling elite's misplaced faith in the United States for its survival—notwithstanding the lessons of the past. Historically, the degree of subservience has increased in periods of unrepresentative government—with the previous government perhaps being one exception—and the new regime in Pakistan has been swift in continuing this tradition.

From the U.S. perspective, Pakistan's decision to send troops into Saudi Arabia not only draws Pakistan into American global strategic parameters, but also allows the United States to seek greater control over events in South Asia by diverting Pakistan away from its concern over Indian military ambitions and thereby reducing the regional uncertainties in U.S. global politico-strategic dominance.

Ostensibly, the decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia has come in answer to a Saudi request. But, given the fact that Saudi Arabia itself is now more or less following the dictates of U.S. strategic policy in view of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the policy of collecting forces from Muslim states in Saudi Arabia seems to have emanated from Washington. Given American reluctance to see its nationals killed in the Gulf, the idea of pitting Muslims against Muslims is ingenious. The fact that the United Nations Security Council has condemned Iraqi aggression and sought global action against it, is meant to reflect a non-partisan interest of the whole international community.

Yet, even in this, one can see the hypocrisy of the United Nations Security Council, which has over the years failed to move against Indian intervention in East Pakistan, American interventions over the years in various Latin American and Caribbean States, and continues to ignore the annexation of the West Bank by Israel. In any event, Pakistan, like the majority of the international community members, has forcefully condemned the Iraqi action. That it should go beyond this moral condemnation to assist its friend Saudi Arabia, is debatable.

To some extent it is true that Saudi Arabia has been a provider of economic assistance to Pakistan, even though this has increasingly led to interference in Pakistan foreign policy over issues like Afghanistan. However, in return, Pakistan has provided military and technical know-how and services, as well as political support in international fora. In contrast, the Saudis were extremely late in coming out openly in support of Pakistan's position on Kashmir. In fact their late support coincided with Iraqi aggression, as did the OCI [Organization of the Islamic Conference] Resolution on Kashmir. Is Pakistan's decision to send troops a quid pro quo for the OCI Resolution?

In any event, the Iraqi action does not threaten Pakistan's security or vital interests which do not stem from the maintenance of the monarchies and sheikhdoms of the Gulf. To take sides physically in an intra-Arab conflict is to be unnecessarily drawn into a dangerous strategic situation which the country can ill-afford given its limited resources—especially at a time when Pakistan itself faces a security threat in South Asia from India.

That this factor seems to have been ignored is the most questionable aspect of the decision to send Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia. Strategically, no state can afford to send forces to defend a third country when it faces a military threat itself—especially from a militarily much stronger state. For the last few months, the Pakistani military and the president have been talking of the military threat posed by Indian troop mobilisation and Pakistan reservists have been called up. In addition, the most recent round of Pakistan-India talks has ended in failure.

The Pakistani civil-military leadership's response to these developments is to suddenly divert military resources to defend the House of Saud. The absurdity of the situation makes one question the priorities of these leaders. Do Saudi sovereignty and U.S. global interests come before Pakistani national security?

The Indian attack in the Kargil sector is proof enough that the threat of an Indo-Pakistan war is still a reality which cannot be wished away by diverting troops to Saudi Arabia.

While the United States and Pakistan may wish Kashmir into the background, the realities of the region, especially India's continuing inability to stem the nationalist struggle in occupied Kashmir and its military might, demand that the Pakistani armed forces focus solely on this threat.

As for the civilian ruling elite, it would seem to have enough on its domestic plate to occupy itself with, without attempting to get involved in external third-party military conflicts. Or, does it see this as a means of diverting public attention from the domestic political crisis and perhaps even as a pretext that could serve to delay/prevent national elections scheduled for October? And if Pakistan is willing to give this degree of commitment to the United States, then it is not too far-fetched

to assume that perhaps the United States has already been given an understanding of bases in Pakistan also, so that it can maintain its military dominance of the Gulf.

What is amazing is that the high command of our armed forces, which was so reluctant to accept any form of national civilian control over military deployment in Sindh, is prepared to accept foreign control in terms of strategic and tactical deployment in Saudi Arabia—since the Pakistani forces will have to fall into the overall command of U.S. and perhaps Saudi military policy.

It is a pity that the Pakistan government has not sought to play a mediator role and at least explore the latest offer of Saddam Husayn which has certain interesting and rational quid pro quos. After all, it surely makes perfect sense to seek the return of the West Bank from Israel in return for the sovereignty of Kuwait.

Instead, the cavalier attitude with which the Pakistani military-civilian leadership has decided to send its forces to Saudi Arabia bodes disaster for the national security and sovereignty of Pakistan.

#### Saudi and U.S. Interests

90AS0435B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
16 Aug 90 pp 1, 6

[Article by Nasim Zehra: "Pakistan To Defend House of Saud and U.S. Interests"]

[Text] Pakistan is now a direct participant in the Gulf crisis. The Pakistan establishment has decided to practically support the American position, resented by most Arabs and many U.S. allies, to undertake a provocative force build-up to make Saddam Husayn pull out from Kuwait. The Pakistani decision undermines to some extent the security of over 150,000 Pakistanis residing in Kuwait and Iraq. It also in no way promotes Pakistan's own national security interests.

The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Thunayyan, arrived in Islamabad to finalize the agreement with the government of Pakistan. He met with the president, the caretaker prime minister and the COAS [Chief of Army Staff]. Details of "military assistance" may already have been worked out. Logistical support may include use of naval and sea bases for foreign forces employed in defence of the Saudi Kingdom.

Pakistan had the option to side with any of the three positions that had evolved on the issue:

- i) to tacitly support Saddam Husayn's move by not condemning it outright, ii) to censure his move diplomatically, calling for an Arab diplomatic solution with outside assistance if necessary, and
- iii) to practically support the American-authored policy of taking charge of Saudi Arabia militarily and of the Gulf sea-lanes by imposing a naval quarantine on Iraqi

ships, hence turning the conflict largely as a clash between Arab nationalists/Muslims versus the U.S.-led Western world.

The Benazir government appeared to have taken the second position condemning Iraq and calling for a settlement through inter-Arab efforts. The military leadership took the decision at the eve of our 44 Independence Day to give up diplomacy and neutrality for open confrontation and partisanship at the "advice" of the Americans and the "request" of the Saudis. On 8 August when the American ambassador Oakley had indicated that "dialogue" was going on, our own foreign minister denied outrightly Oakley's statement. Sources suggest that the Foreign Office had no input into the decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia.

The quid pro quo promised by the Americans and the Saudis to Pakistan for the "mercenary" services will be made public. Nevertheless, it is likely to be along the past familiar lines—some more weapons to Pakistan, extended covert support for the Afghan Mujahideen and some vague security guarantee against India.

Pakistan's job will be to ensure survival of the House of Saud and to safeguard Western oil interests. The official statement issued by the government attempts to cast the Pakistani move within the Islamic mould. It states that on Saudi request Pakistani contingents will leave to join the Islamic "contingents" in Saudi Arabia to protect our Holy Places. Inter-Arab rivalry and industrialised Western countries and their allies are the two themes of the Gulf crisis. Islamic labelling may be a tactical move taken by the Pakistan government to justify their move. After the Afghan Jihad, this would be the second Islamic "cause" undertaken by Pakistan in partnership with the Americans.

The only other time Pakistani troops were required for out-of-area potentially combat mission was in 1951. The American Secretary of State Acheson requested Prime Minister Liaquat Ali to provide Pakistani troops for the U.S.-initiated UN Peace-Keeper Force for Korea. Liaquat Ali demanded "U.S.'s complete and unqualified support on Kashmir and Pushtoon issues as quid pro quo." The Americans declined. Pakistani troops did not join the Peace-Keeper Force."

The American-Saudi "request" for Pakistani troops is understandable. In their calculation, it may serve a two-fold purpose. It may help give an Islamic colour to the operation and undermine Saddam's call for jihad against the Western powers. Like the 1950s, the 1990s Pakistan may again become the token Muslim country supporting the American position "punishing" the militant Arab countries. Then it was Egypt, Iran under Mossedegh and Iraq after the Ba'athist revolution. Now it will be Iraq, Jordan, Libya, etc.

Secondly, Pakistani troops with their outstanding "martial" skills and their familiarity with Saudi defence apparatus would be effective front-line defenders. American policy-makers and military men had argued in the

50s that combat Pakistani troops would be given precedence over American troops. For the Americans, they would be more expendable than the 100,000 Americans headed for the Gulf.

It is unlikely that Pakistan's presence on the Saudi side would take the sting off Saddam's call for jihad. From Pakistani action, only Nasser's criticism of Pakistan's pro-Western policy will reverberate in the minds of the Arabs; that Pakistan is a Western "stooge" only too willing to compromise and violate principles on Western beckoning. Most Arab people and some States will resent Pakistan's direct involvement in the Arab crisis.

Pakistan's Islamic cry is too obviously a sales gimmick. It is invoked to justify its continued role of a junior operator for its distant godfather, the Americans, and to a lesser degree the Saudis. In the 1950s, Pakistani people actively condemned their government's anti-Arab-nationalist position. The Arab nationalist states joined in the condemnation. Now at this juncture how the Pakistani people will react is not clear—the Arab and even important regional neighbours like Iran may resent Pakistani decision.

There is virtually no justification for Pakistan's involvement in what is essentially an Arab conflict. We maintained neutrality during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. We justified neutrality in what was an obvious case of Iraqi aggression by invoking neutrality as our policy in inter-Muslim conflicts. This decision to side with the Saudis and the Americans negates our claim of neutrality. It establishes us as minions of the Americans and Saudis perpetually engaged in promoting their interests.

The Gulf crisis is peculiarly an Arab crisis. It is a crisis borne of the Arab history; history of the Arab world's encounter with the West since the end of the Ottoman empire and even earlier. Saddam Husayn is a creation of that history. He is one of the many ironies of the Arab world—a nationalist, an Arabist, a socialist and a Muslim all in one! Yesterday those who abetted and nourished him, the Arab monarchies and the West, are today his enemies. Today it is unlikely that Arab people in Israeli-occupied intifada-ridden West Bank and Gaza, in King Hussein's Jordan, in Mubarak's Egypt, Chadli's Algeria and Hassan's Morocco, will not rise to support Saddam.

This is where unresolved problems, created by the Arab world's bitter encounter with the West and perpetuated to some extent by their present monarchs and dictators, have brought the Arab people. Arab people believe Saddam can help settle "historical scores" with the West and with Israel.

Arab people and states may also not be at peace with themselves until ideological and political differences are sorted out. Especially after Saddam's Ashura invasion of Kuwait it appears that simultaneous survival of the pro-Western monarchs/dictators and Radical Arab nationalist autocrats like Saddam, Gadhafi and Hussein may no longer be possible.

**Rebuttal to U.S. Ambassador**

904S0435C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
19 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Abdussalam Khan: "Look Who's Talking!"]

[Text] One is greatly amused by the double standards of judgement applied by our worthy friend, Mr Robert B. Oakley, in his article in THE MUSLIM under the heading "Stopping Iraq Everyone's Business."

The first question: Who set Saddam Husayn up in this business of letting loose his war machine on neighbours? Who kept quiet and did not declare it "everyone's business" when he was using chemical weapons on innocent Kurdish children! Who financed his war efforts for 8 long years to crush Iran?

But let us start analysing Mr Oakley's statement from the beginning, He says.

Pakistan's positive response to Saudi Arabia' request for military support is judicious and appropriate, reflecting the world-wide concern about Iraq's adventurism in the Gulf.

If Pakistan were to send troops to the West Bank to help the down-trodden Palestinian people to regain freedom from the Israeli aggression, would you still call it positive and judicious? Bet you 10 to 1, you would not!

You have one yardstick for your friends and another for your adversaries?

One could go on to count places where Pakistani troops could be sent "judiciously" and "positively" such as Grenada, Panama, etc. But, seeing that you are our guest here, one wouldn't like to embarrass you too much. For that matter, they could be sent to help the Red Indians regain their legitimate claim on the United States as the original owners of this real estate!

But, let bygones be bygones. Americans have been in the United States since the 16th century which is long enough for them to establish a claim of ownership, one might say. But have the Palestinians no legitimate claim to Palestine even after 2,000 years or so? Double standards, eh?

Let's go on and read further: "It demonstrates the determination of civilised nations everywhere that aggression not go unchecked..."

Where was the resolve of the "civilised nations" when Israel attacked Arab countries in 1967? Were the "civilised nations" not fully behind the aggressor? and did they lift a little finger to "not let the aggression go unchecked" against Israel?

In fact, it was this sin of omission that has provided our friend Saddam Husayn the rationale to go for "might is right": "If I am to be checked in Kuwait, how do you justify Israeli aggression in the West Bank? Let us sit

down and sort it out," he has declared. The whole mess has to be cleared, not just the wee bit you want to clear, he insists.

Mr Oakley further states: "The decision to provide support was made by Pakistan alone...." without any prodding by Uncle Sam! Now that you have issued a certificate of clearance to our government (and one must fully accept that from a gentleman) one's faith in the independence of old man GIK [Ghulam Ishaq Khan] is fully restored. One was always sure he was his own man—being an old-fashioned Pathan, who are born to be individuals and not part of a herd. This act of his confirms it.

"This decision is fully consistent with Pakistan's long-standing relationship with the Gulf and its ties with Saudi Arabia," he adds.

Now this part of his statement has two parts: our strategic relationship with the Gulf and our close ties with Saudi Arabia.

Come on, now, Mr Ambassador! First you made us join the Budghdad Pact against Russia, then you went and mended your fences with the Soviets, and are now trying to make us join an anti-Baghdad Pact! With this dizzying game of musical chairs, we are giddy. We do not know whether we are coming or going! Sir, if your country's interests keep changing, and you can go around forging Baghdad Pacts and anti-Baghdad Pacts, allow us the same facility to act in our own national interest, which is:

With India breathing down our necks, it would be suicidal to scatter our forces and our attention at this juncture of time.

Full marks to THE MUSLIM for pointing this out in Thursday's editorial titled "unparalleled servitude."

Let's go on:

"By its actions Pakistan underscores the importance it attaches to the rule of law and international order and brings great credit to the country, its leadership and its people." I'm not sure if it does! It might bring us more 'credit' in the form of Saudi Rials, but that's about all! It brands Pakistan as a mercenary, ready to send its troops anywhere, without consulting the people (for there is no Assembly), at the whim of GIK and a couple of others, edged on, of course, by the pressure lobby in Islamabad.

A sorry state of affairs, indeed. The rule of law, as applicable in the United States, demands that the president gets an Okay from the Congress before committing its troops anywhere. It is a good rule, worthy of being emulated! Getting involved in a Middle East shootout is just not on, given the domestic and border situation.

He adds further: "Acting together, the United States, the Soviet Union and 12 other members of the Security Council have taken a clear position that Iraq's unprovoked military takeover of Kuwait, a small defenceless and peace-loving member state, will not be tolerated.

A very ethical, a very sound moral position. But why was such a clear position not taken over the occupation of Arab territories by Israel? Or, India's usurpation of Kashmir? Double standards, Mr Oakley?

And you seem to display degrees of intolerance: In the case of Iranian threat to Kuwait you drew a firm line on the sand and told Iran: "Hands off Kuwait" you flagged Kuwaiti ships with your own flag. But this time round, there is no firmness and action in your intolerance: it is just rhetoric, sabre-rattling, troop deployment, but no action on the ground. Why?? Is it because you consider Saddam to be your own man, though gone berserk for the moment, but useful to your interests, whilst you have nothing to expect from the Iranian "fundamentalists"!?

I sympathize with "small, peace-loving, defenceless Kuwait, but why show intolerance towards it by freezing its assets? Now what can the poor Emir of Kuwait do in exile without funds? Is it because your main interest in every situation is economic, not moral or ethical? As for the blockade, why not plug the Aqaba route? Is it because the West wants to get hold of Iraqi oil which Saddam shall have to dump at throw away prices soon in order to survive?

Sir, there is something rotten in the State of Denmark, as the Bard of Avon so aptly said. For all I can see is that:

- Kuwaiti assets frozen...may be for the next 10 years. Who benefits from this bonanza?
- Aqaba route left open, so that Iraqi oil can be hijacked at loot-sale prices!
- Iraq told off but not repulsed, so that the status quo can continue for the next few years, with obvious benefits to the arms-dealers and oil-guzzlers (they also reaped a bonanza in the 8-year Iraq-Iran war)!
- Arab unity shattered and destroyed forever, with obvious relief to your friend, Israel!

Well, good luck to the Yankee arms merchants, if they want to sell arms to both sides and take home a barrel or two of oil home for a song. But, Sir, leave us alone, what with India massing troops on our borders and with tension in Sindh.

#### Diplomacy for 'A More Realistic Response'

90AS0435D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
20 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's departure on Sunday for Iran on a trip which will also take him to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is a highly welcome, albeit belated, step taken by Pakistan towards what would hopefully emerge as this country's evolving a more realistic response to the Gulf crisis. Even if the initiative for our Foreign Minister's visit to Tehran has come from the latter side in view of the need felt by Iran to consult what it rightly considers as its strongest friends in Pakistan and Turkey, the

occasion can and should, provide Islamabad with an opportunity to correct the ill-effects produced by its initial fumbling on the question of despatch of troops to Saudi Arabia. It is about time that Islamabad woke up to the reality that Pakistan, Iran and Turkey are today not only ideally placed to together play perhaps the decisive role in averting the looming catastrophe in the Middle East, but also that it is only through a joint approach by the three Muslim countries that they can secure their collective as also individual interests. The dramatic rapprochement between Iraq and Iran has already removed the major impediment to the three non-Arab Muslim countries, offering themselves as a party acceptable to both the sides currently engaged in a potentially deadly, military stand off in the Middle East. Some headway in that direction could possibly be achieved even during the instant meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries in Tehran during a time when their Iraqi counterpart would also happen to be in town.

That such an initiative is likely to find wide receptivity among not only the principal parties to the dispute but also among the other major world powers outside the region, is evident from the cautious approach to the issue maintained constantly by almost everybody except the United States and good old Great Britain of Margaret Thatcher. But the first and foremost condition for sanity to be allowed a chance in the highly flared-up situation is that all extra-regional forces in and around the Arabian peninsula should beat a retreat from the area. Even as it is, the United States has been unable to convince the world community that it either has the justification to enforce its unilateral writ or the ability to achieve anything other than sparking off what could be a veritable conflagration. Apart from the suicidal megalomania of the American Establishment personified so accurately in the arrogant attitude of President Bush, there is no reason why the situation in the Middle East must necessarily lead to hostilities which would be equally devastating for the Arab world and the growing western military presence in the zone.

#### Advice to Interim Government

90AS0435E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
22 Aug 90 pp 4, 7

[Article by Syed Afzal Haider: "Dissolution and the Gulf Factor"]

[Text] It was not at all possible for the National Assembly of Pakistan or the elected Federal government to have permitted direct participation of Pakistan Army in the Gulf crisis in utter disregard and violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our principled stand to foster brotherly relationship between the Muslim countries. The prompt and immediate action to the caretaker government to impose Emergency throughout the country and ratify the planned policy decision of the president to involve the Army against certain Arab Muslim countries has been viewed with disgust within

and without the country. It is being asserted that the caretaker prime minister immediately obliged Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan by tendering advice to clamp Emergency and thumbmark his decision to despatch Pakistan Army to Saudi Arabia to serve under American control against another Muslim country.

It can also be argued under the circumstances that what could not be achieved through constitutional means and political process has been accomplished through a quick presidential decree of dissolution of the National Assembly whereafter political power was shared at the federal and provincial levels with the COP-IJI [Combined Opposition Parties-Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad]—the staunch antagonists of Bhutto family and PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. What was not possible due to the 1988 split mandate may now be made feasible in the so-called fair and free elections after putting all the resources of State at the disposal of COP under the grab of selective accountability. It is, however, certain that the powers who blessed the dissolution move have been amply repaid through the Cabinet decision to deploy Pakistan Army on foreign soil.

The indiscreet mode of deposing Ms Bhutto has certainly made her a martyr and it is her good luck that the group in power hardly wields credibility. The dissolution feat also explains the reason why Mr Ishaq Khan immediately decided to form a caretaker Cabinet and nominate a prime minister on 6 August which constitutional obligation he conveniently forgot when he took over as president in August 1988. This is ample indication of the manner how he operates. No doubt, he is the only living person in our political set-up who has the capability of playing important roles in every regime. Does this fact alone not call for his accountability.

Without introducing the caveat that a caretaker government is not authorised to make a policy decisions of serious nature and to go beyond the mandate of supervising fair and free general elections without interfering in the existing electoral laws and regulations, let us look at the Gulf situation which has cast deep shadows on our political horizon.

Is Saddam Husayn really preparing for an attack on Saudi Arabia and is he really interested in occupying the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina? Let us be very clear and firm. If Iraq is planning to occupy the Holy places then it is the duty of Pakistan and all the Muslim countries to form a joint defence and control council on permanent basis for protecting and safeguarding not only these holy cities but also providing an impregnable umbrella over at least 30 miles area around these cities. This measure will not only deter any future adventurer of Bonapart but would be a positive step towards better understanding and mutual cooperation between the Muslim Ummah. It will also help us develop our own resources and inculcate the habit of self reliance. In order to achieve this objective the services of Muslim scholars, jurists and military experts can be obtained and all the

Muslim governments can devise and agree on a modus vivendi to achieve the desired objective for all times to come.

But if the objective of the imperialist powers present in the gulf, is to divide Iraq or defend the dynasty of the House of Saud and perpetuate the despotic rule of Muslim Sheiks and Emirs or to safeguard the interests of Western world or to compel the Muslims to accept Israel or to redraft the politico-geographical map of the region, then the decision of the caretaker Cabinet to extend military support to Saudi Arabia would be only at the cost of fundamental principal enunciated in Article 40 of the constitution which proclaims that the State of Pakistan shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic Unity.

In his view of the matter, the first important "decision" of that caretaker government has violated the constitutional provision. It is worthy of note that under Article 245 of the Constitution the functions of the Armed Forces are restricted to

- i) defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war and or
- ii) subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so. The Constitution does not contemplate deploying Pakistan Army in foreign land. This concept is alien and contrary to the Constitution of Pakistan. It is the negation of the struggle of Independence because we fought against British occupation of India and have always condemned the presence of alien army in any State.

The oath of office as member of the Armed Forces, under Article 244 of the Constitution, is to the effect, "I...do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law." It will be appreciated that even the oath of office under the Constitution is relatable to Pakistan and to the Constitution of Pakistan alone. On this score as well, the caretaker government could not pass the said order. Has the caretaker Cabinet not been duped to play this ignoble role?

There is still another aspect worth consideration. Article 243 of our Constitution contemplates that the Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces. When we decide to place a portion of the Pakistan Army at the disposal of a foreign country, the Federal government ceases to have control over the actions and movement of our Armed forces. It is utter violation of the Constitution to place our forces under the command of American generals who will be using them at any place against any other Muslim country thus compromising not only the position of Pakistan but also earning a bad name for our Army.

The American intervention in the Gulf is aimed basically to strengthen Israel. Who knows that the Israeli commandoes may be present in Saudi Arabia at strategic places. Pakistan has not awaited the decision of the Security Council and the peace overtures being made by Iraq and others. Would Pakistan not ask for evacuation of Arab territories annexed forcibly by Israel in exchange for withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait? Pakistan, instead, should use discretion as better part of valour.

We are not at war with Iraq, nor has Iraq posed any threat to Pakistan's territorial integrity. On the contrary, by submitting to the directions of Western powers, we will be surrendering our sovereignty to foreign military powers by providing facilities from our shores as well.

Does the caretaker Cabinet not realise that almost 70 percent of the known oil reserves are under the control of Muslim countries in this region, and for the first time in history the Muslim bloc has been virtually besieged by non-Muslim military powers and for all practical purposes the Muslims, in millions, are hostages on account of the gunpowder strategy of imperialist powers? It is unfortunate that Pakistan has submitted abjectly before the dictators of Washington. Could we not demand withdrawal of foreign military powers from the Gulf? Could we not leave the issue with the Arabs to sort it out themselves.

Did we take sides militarily between Iran and Iraq war, though morally we were indebted to Iran who extended support to us twice during Indian aggression. "Iran supported the cause of Kashmir openly. In spite of the recent frantic efforts of Ms Benazir Bhutto with Arab States we only succeeded in placing Kashmir issue on the agenda of the OCI [Organization of the Islamic Conference]. During the naked aggression by India against Pakistan, did the oil-producing Muslim Arab countries even warn India? The supply of oil could be suspended and the airports could be closed to Indian airlines. Such an action or a threat would have made India think a hundred times before bifurcating Pakistan or keeping Kashmir under her control.

Did the Security Council act as swiftly when Pakistan was attacked, or when Kashmir, Junagarh, Hyderabad Deccan States were annexed by India? What is the record of the Security Council in the military interventions all over the world? What about Israeli occupation? That Pakistan should be committed militarily against Muslim countries on the 44th Independence Day is tantamount to negating the basis of our political struggle for Independence.

This indiscreet decision to commit Pakistan Army in Arab conflict, the creation of Western intrigues in the Muslim world after the first World War, can lead us to disaster. Some of the Arab countries are not going to accept our decision at all. In spite of our continued support to the Arab cause on the question of Israel, we were never forgiven by Nasser and his allies and we earned the title of stooge of Western powers with the

result that India gained strength diplomatically and has won the friendship of a few Arab States.

It is high time the caretaker government got seriously involved in ensuring free and fair elections within the scheduled period and desist from undertaking political and military adventurism. Let the affairs of the State be administered by the chosen representatives of the people of Pakistan as enshrined in the Objectives Resolution which, as asserted by the members of present government, is operative part of the amended constitution. The caretaker government is nominated and is not an elected one. Let us ask instead for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf and urge upon the Arab States to resort to peaceful measures. Before the political map of this region is altered and the Muslims are put to shame, let us reconsider the decision of playing a subservient role.

A note of caution might as well be added here. The COAS [Chief of Army Staff] in reply to certain questions put to him by the journalists at the reception of 14 August hosted by the caretaker prime minister, and widely reported in the national press, states

- a) Saddam's removal will resolve the Middle East crisis, and
- b) that the decision of the president in dissolving the National Assembly was an appropriate action. It is submitted that we do not expect such statements from a soldier like General Beg placed at a very important position. His approval means a clear-cut backing and is likely to be interpreted differently. He has earned the reputation of defending democracy and eschewing adventurism. Let the people feel that democracy has the potential of evolution in this country.

#### Deployment Defended

90AS0435F Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
24 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Brig (R) S.A.I. Tirmazi: "Pak Troops To Deter U.S. Ambitions in Gulf"]

[Text] Bells have rung and a Pakistan Army contingent may be off to defend Saudi Arabia as part of a multi-national force being collected here under the aegis of the United States. The government of Pakistan maintains that the decision has been taken on the explicit request of King Fahd as conveyed through his special envoy. Although the components of the said force, its strength, timing and the modalities of command and control have still to be worked out yet, the authorities have declared that the Pak troops shall only be employed in a defensive role.

Professionals would agree that when a small force is integrated into a bigger contingent and allotted a task in a theater, the command can only function efficiently if all elements work in cohesion as one team under one captain. Smaller elements of a multi-national force cannot afford to pull in different directions. How far the

Pakistan Army contingent will be able to maintain this stance will only be known after the first shot has been fired. However, as Pakistan has aligned herself with and accepted to fight alongside the United States, Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan etc. troops, then it must also share all the credits and discredits that this multi-national force ultimately comes in for from this crisis.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has said that Pak troops will remain and operate within the borders of Saudi Arabia. The COAS [Chief of Army Staff], General Mirza Aslam Beg has viewed the Iraqi angle from three divergent directions. According to him, the Pakistan Army contingent is going there to defend the Haramain Sharifain. Does this imply that Pak troops will be employed on internal security duties or around Makkah and Madina only to defend these holy places of Islam when threatened by Iraqi forces? How does he envisage the emergence of such a situation? General Beg also wishes the removal of President Saddam Husayn but at the same time does not wish any harm to the Iraqi forces, which he feels are maintaining a critical balance in the Middle East and probably could play a vital role as and when there was a war between the combined forces of Islamic countries and Israel. General Beg who, in the past two years as COAS, has earned the reputation of a clear-headed military planner, a strategist of high calibre, an meticulous tactician and a proponent of a theory of Glasnost must put the agitated minds of the people at rest by elaborating his politico-military philosophy governing the role of Pakistan in the context of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

Pakistan's decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia has generated heated discussion in the media and the majority of analysts opine that it was against Pakistan's national interests. However, the single most important factor against which this decision can be measured, is the security of Pakistan. Does this help to enhance Pakistan's security perceptions or expose it to unnecessary security risks?

As regards foreign policy, it is the first time that Pakistan has taken a principled moral stand against aggression by a stronger country against a smaller and weaker neighbour. Instead of hiding the usual diplomatic jargons and indecisiveness, Pakistan has demonstrated the capability of take a bold step against a morally incorrect and unacceptable position adopted by Iraq.

President Saddam Husayn is known for his inhuman and ruthless actions, against his own people or against a foreign country, whosoever and whenever he chooses to declare them as enemies. His volte-face in accepting the 1975 Algiers Treaty, after having fought a nine-year long war with Iran and bringing about immeasurable sufferings to the peoples of both the countries, proves beyond any doubt that his actions can be senseless, irrational and unpredictable. How can anyone say with authority on whom Saddam would pounce tomorrow and with whom he may declare friendship? It is not certain if his offer of accepting his folly of attacking Iran in 1980 is honest or

just another treacherous move as he finds himself isolated with his back exposed and confronted with suffocating economic sanctions. Such a dictator must be forced to conform to the internationally accepted norms of behaviour and contained within his legitimate geographical borders. If Pakistan did not find it prudent to condemn the wanton behaviour of a self-proclaimed heir to Quaidseya, then it does not mean Pakistan should not stand against him now.

With the forcible occupation of Kuwait by Iraq new geo-strategic factors will emerge in the Middle East with serious ramifications in the Muslim World and the region in particular. There have to be new alliances and new lines will be drawn to safeguard the economic and geographical interests. Due to the geo-strategical position that Pakistan has in the area, it cannot afford to be absent. Pakistan must stay a centre stage at the time and place where historical decisions are going to take place, lest it is left out and becomes a nonentity. The presence of our troops in the area will ensure that our interests are looked after.

Militarily, the 10,000 strong force of the remaining members of GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries can provide a 'shield' in name only and not in reality.

The OCI [Organization of the Islamic Conference] has been badly shaken and stands divided. The Arab League has failed to find an 'Arab' solution to the dispute and is also not capable of putting up a viable military defence against the aggression. Pakistan is in a position, both politically and militarily, to tip the balance when battle lines are drawn in the Middle East. The combined strength of the friendly Muslim forces provides an alternate to the U.S. forces in the area. As and when a strong shield is raised against the expansionist designs of Iraq, U.S. forces will have no justifiable reasons to continue to stay in S. Arabia. The mere presence of a strong contingent of Pak forces will have desirable effects on Iraq as well as on the United States.

Purely from the professional angle, the Pakistan Army stands to gain in terms of equipment and experience. Pakistan is constantly under threat from her bigger neighbour. We need the advanced weapon systems and material and moral help to offset the existing threat to our integrity. Indian leaders have made it a national policy to humiliate, intimidate and browbeat Pakistan on every occasion. Even Mr V.P. Singh got excited, like a child, on the test firing of 'Akash' surface-to-air missile and lashed out at Pakistan. The bold position that Pakistan has decided to take in the Iraq-Kuwait/Saudi Arabia conflict and the new alignment that has emerged will surely help it to enhance its military strength and political prestige.

Whereas Pakistan seems to have considered the advantages of sending the troops to S. Arabia, it would have been more acceptable to the nation if the command structure, tasks, combination of forces and groupings were considered and discussed in the context of U.S.

ambitions and designs in the region. As the heavy buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf/Saudi Arabia/UAE has generated negative factors, Pakistan's decision is being taken as an unquestioned alignment with whatever ulterior motives the Americans might have in the region. It would have been in the fitness of the situation if our traditional friends Iran, Turkey and China were consulted and a joint strategy was formulated and implemented. There is still time to arrive at such a consensus before the troops are despatched.

#### **Commentary: Political Chaos Leads to Economic Ruin**

90AS0444F Lahore *VIEWPOINT in English*  
23 Aug 90 pp 5, 6

[Article: "The Consequences"]

[Text] After every major constitutional crisis—that stops short of direct military rule—a partisan political debate seizes the country. The President's Order of August 6, disbanding the Governments and dissolving the Assemblies elected only twenty months ago, has generated the customary polemical contest. Each side involved in the continuing struggle for power blames the other for the system's malfunctioning on account of the other side's violations of democratic norms and disregard of constitutional proprieties. Charge and counter-charge are being exchanged daily, and the language used is always rude and often vicious. The statements churned out by the main propaganda cells try to establish credibility through repetition but this does not always help. Then, with some sort of an election said to be in the offing political parties, factions and cliques are seen preparing for the next round at the hustings. The stage was set in what has become routine action, with the Establishment, after getting rid of the ruling party, nominating Caretaker Governments, which continue to grow and grow to meet the ruling coalition's political requirements, not necessarily those of the administration whose sole purpose should be to make arrangements for clean fair elections.

At this point of time, it is impossible to predict whether and in what manner the promised elections will be held or what will be the results. In what shape will the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] emerge after its ouster and the accountability process? Will the COP-IJI [Combined Opposition Party-Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] ambition of arranging for one-against-one electoral fight materialise since the combine shelters a large number of budding Prime Ministers and disparate elements whose only point of agreement is hatred and fear of the Bhutto regime? While only time will tell how the country bears up under the latest constitutional coup, it is surprising that little serious attention is being given by the country's scholars and political commentators to the consequences of what has become Pakistan's strangely wayward way of political life. Elections take place rarely in our land; when held the polls are not honestly conducted; and, in any case, often the results registered are not

accepted by Higher Authority or other powerful groups. In the present case, the Establishment allowed the party with the largest number of seats in Parliament to form the Government but with great reluctance, and all along it was being said that a coalition should be set up to give the country stability. Stability was anyhow possible if the Governments formed had been allowed to settle down to work. This did not happen, because the battle for influence and power raged on various fronts—until the time was considered ripe for the regime to be toppled.

Such political shenanigans always have a visible effect on the fortunes of political parties and on personal fortunes, but over the decades no change has ever served the public well or brought any benefit to the people. In fact, as a direct result of this perpetual merry-go-round, every sector concerned with the people's welfare presents a dismal picture of total neglect. To mention one or two examples, after four decades of independence, national education remains in tatters. Calls for free and compulsory primary education have echoed for years in ministerial corridors, and occasionally the promise that education will reach every citizen of our free State has been made with great solemnity. The truth, unpleasant but undeniable, is that hardly any progress has been made in this field, while there has been much deterioration. Multiplication of the country's population has not persuaded the rulers to expand educational facilities commensurably with growing needs. The result is that the percentage of literacy has fallen steadily, although official statisticians try to cover up the decline by juggling with figures or offering quaint excuses. Programmes for adult education, again a popular theme with most governments, have not shown any results, because the various schemes announced were apparently meant only to provide favoured bureaucrats with sinecures. Another tragedy is that like every other sector of Pakistan's life, education has been corrupted and the examination system often placed in the hands of goons or teachers ready to sell themselves to the highest bidders among the students or, to the country's greater shame, their parents. Uncontrolled privatisation has allowed rampant commercialisation which means that only persons capable of investing big sums of money are now entitled to obtain a reasonable measure of education for their children.

Similarly, in the field of health the demand for medicare has outstripped available medical facilities. Then, a series of UN reports show that standards of nutrition have fallen steadily in Pakistan, and the situation is made worse by the increasing pollution of its soil, water and air. Another promise always made with great fervour is that of a decent labour policy but always it gets buried with the death of every regime.

These and a host of other factors that impinge on the people's lives, adding to their burdens and misery, result mainly from the fact that the ruling parties in Pakistan always seem to be more concerned with perpetuating their rule rather than giving proper attention to the people's needs. Apart from the basic changes that are required in our socio-economic set-up and in our polity,

it is vital that all concerned citizens should begin to assess the consequences of Pakistan's persisting political chaos in terms of the people's deprivations and impoverishment. If these warring clans cannot be driven to a fuller realization of national needs, the people will continue to suffer year after year, decade after decade. If those in control of Pakistan's governments do not change their policies and attitudes, the people must change such governments, and this can only happen if their right to do so through elections remains free and unfettered, without any partisan interference and influence.

**'Double Column' Proposal for Territories Revived**  
*90AE0220A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 27 Jul 90 p 8*

[Article by Yosef Goell. First paragraph is introduction.]

[Text] An old proposal for the territories, once again under consideration, combines unilateral annexation with unilateral withdrawal. Ever since Israel's astounding victory in the Six Day War, the Israeli public and its policy-makers have been impaled on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, there is the unremitting demand for independence by the large and increasingly hostile Palestinian population in the administered territories. On the other hand, there is the equally unrelenting reality of the Arab states' feral hostility to Israel's existence, a hostility that may well be enhanced rather than mitigated by Israel's relinquishing of those territories. The polar extremes in Israel's political community pretend that they have no problem in extricating Israel from the dilemma. The vast majority of Israelis in the middle, however, continue to be firmly impaled on it.

Various compromise solutions have been mooted: Labour's unofficial Alon Plan; Moshe Dayan's opposing emphasis on Israel retaining the spine of the Judaean and Samarian mountains (and before Camp David, of retaining eastern Sinai, too); the various proposals for a functional division of authority in the territories between Israel and some Arab entity; the Jordanian option, and the Palestinian autonomy envisaged by Menachem Begin.

The basic weakness of all of these compromise proposals was that the Arab side was never ready to buy any of them, or to indicate the slightest readiness to cede a square centimetre of "holy Arab soil" to Israel as part of any peace agreement.

A different and novel proposal for a trade-off compromise, called "the Double Column" by its initiators, was floated in 1976, and has now resurfaced. At the time, it was presented to then-prime minister Yitzhaq Rabin, defence minister Shim'on Peres and foreign minister Yig'al Alon. Ari'el Sha'ron, who was not yet in the Likud, also clasped it to his bosom at that time. But it died a slow death following the Likud's electoral victory of 1977.

The Double Column proposal has now been disinterred, and is being pushed with renewed vigour under the impetus of the intifadah, King Husayn's scuttling of the Jordanian option, and the intensification of international pressures on Israel to get out of the territories. I met last week in Haifa with the main initiator of the original proposal, Prof. Avraham Wachman, the former dean of the Technion faculty of architecture, and with two other proponents, former navy commander Aluf Yoha'i Ben-Nun, and David Rothenberg of kibbutz Beyt Oren.

The novel aspect of their proposal, they say, is in the trade-off it envisages: unilateral Israeli annexation of the Jordan River Valley and the Judaean Desert as part of the creation of an Israeli "Eastern Column" stretching from the Golan Heights down to Eilat, in exchange for Israeli acquiescence in the establishment of an independent Palestine in the remainder of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

They concede that there is no hope of the Arabs or the Palestinians ever agreeing to cede even the tiniest sliver of land to Israel in any negotiations. The way they propose to get around this obstacle is by confronting the Palestinians with the fait accompli of unilateral annexation, but of sweetening that step by agreeing to enter negotiations on Palestinian independence in the rest of the territories. If the Palestinians are really intent on independence rather than on continued hostility to Israel's existence, they may well be ready for such a deal, they believe.

The Zionist rationale adduced in support of their plan by Wachman, Ben-Nun and Rothenberg, derives from the dangers they see in today's crowding of 75 per cent of Israel's Jewish population, and most of its economic infrastructure, into the "First Column," Israel's coastal strip measuring 200 kms. by 25 kms. Since they see no chance of the disappearance of the heavy concentration of Palestinian Arabs immediately to the east of that strip, they believe that Israel should "skip over it" and predilect its own development goals and peace plans on the creation of a heavily built up "Eastern Column" further east.

The area slated for that Eastern Column has little Arab population and should become the basis for the absorption of up to 1.5 million Jewish settlers over 20 years. (See map).

Where the Double Column proposal differs from the original Alon Plan is in its focus on a Palestinian Option, rather than on a territorial compromise with Jordan. They assert that this Palestinian focus is much more essential for Israel's security than the Jordanian Option, which had been the basis for Labour's policy. They would, however, insist on eliminating the corridors envisaged under the Alon Plan that would have connected the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, and those two territories to Jordan via a Jericho corridor.

Such an arrangement, they claim, would have meant acquiescing in the linking of such a Jordanian Palestine to a potentially hostile eastern front stretching from the West Bank to Iraq. It is essential, they argue, that the independent Palestine to which Israel would agree be demilitarized and totally sealed off from the rest of the Arab world. "Only the presence of the Israel Army on the Jordan River can guarantee actual demilitarization of such an independent Palestine."

An independent Palestine, totally isolated from the surrounding Arab world, would also be compelled to develop more meaningful forms of cooperation with Israel, they believe. Ideally, they would expect this to express itself in confederation with Israel, but such a proposal, like the alternative of federation with Jordan, should be left to negotiations with the Palestinians, they add.

In addition to Israeli annexation of the Jordan Rift and the Judaean Desert, they would call for only minor border rectifications: on the western edges of the West Bank, in the Jerusalem Corridor up to and including Ma'ale Adumim to the east, and in Gush Etzion to the south of Bethlehem. Those rectifications could go both ways, with some Arab villages in Israel's Triangle area being given the option of joining the independent Palestine in return for some West Bank Jewish settlements being annexed to Israel.

In any case, the principle of open borders would have to be part of the deal; this would make the specific location of the borders less crucial in daily life. Arabs in Israel and Jewish settlers in the independent Palestine would each be given the option of holding either Palestinian or Israeli citizenship, respectively, while continuing to live where they are today.

Why their sense of urgency, if they admit that no Arab can be expected to agree to their proposal, I queried. Their great fear is that the international pressures that are building up, either for Palestinian elections, or for an international conference, could push Israel into agreeing to some form of Palestinian autonomy over the entire territory, which would preclude the possibility of any viable and safe future territorial compromise.

Much more immediately, the group behind the plan is largely identified with the hawkish wing in the Labour Party and especially in its United Kibbutz Movement. They brought up the proposal at last week's session of the UKM's council in kibbutz Kfar Blum. They hope that endorsement by the UKM could serve as a stepping stone to its eventual adoption by the Labour Party, and possibly by a broader non-partisan Israeli consensus. But will it fly? Meaning, will the Americans buy it, and stop pressuring Israel to make potentially dangerous concessions. Wachman says that the Americans have never agreed to unilateral Israeli actions, but have a record of always acquiescing in the results of such actions if they were judged reasonable. The U.S. would obviously not be happy with unilateral Israeli annexation of any of the

territories. But they might just buy it if it were part of a trade-off for a revolutionary Israeli agreement to enter negotiations for Palestinian independence.

### Sindh: Aspects of Problem, Solutions Viewed

#### 'The Mohajir Factor'

90AS0433A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
16 Jul 90 pp 4, 7

[Article by F. D. Masuood: "Perpetuating Alienation"]

[Text] An article "The Mohajir Factor" by Syed Mohammad appeared in THE MUSLIM of 3 July 1990 which has prompted further elaboration of some facts. Syed Muhammad has briefly pointed out that "Mohajirs are not really bad as they are being painted" and they are the people who made the country stand at the time of partition. He was of the opinion that the ruling party is angry and revengeful because the Mohajirs withdrew their support of the party and on the other side the Mohajirs are annoyed with them because of persistent discrimination against them.

Recently our prime minister has made it clear in her statement published in THE MUSLIM of 7 July, that the disturbance in Sindh was a sensitive issue created by vested interests to spread anarchy by fanning ethnic riots.

#### Nomenclature

As a matter of fact, in a free democratic society every member is free to express his or her feelings. Syed Muhammad's analysis of the 'Mohajir Factor' can be treated as a valuable contribution towards finding a solution to the problem.

Somehow the very use of the word Mohajir and its use for a peculiar group of population seems to be vague, soundless and to a certain extent meaningless with particular reference to Pakistan. A Mohajir seeks refuge for a transit period for instance the Afghan Mohajireen.

Primarily, Pakistan is the creation of the two nation theory. The Muslims who ruled over the sub-continent for centuries were being subjected to all types of ordeals and economic deprivation by Hindus, with the help of alien rulers, who never wanted to return the reins of government in the hands of the Muslim population of India. The Muslim thinkers, philosophers, poets and politicians once and for all accepted the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and under his dynamic leadership Pakistan was created.

Every Muslim was ambitious to be blessed with a country where they should be free of adverse economic stress and strains and could practice their faith with entire satisfaction with full freedom. It resulted in the mass influx of the Muslim population to the areas declared as Pakistan.

The gates of opportunities were thrown open for the Muslims coming to the territory declared 'Pakistan.' Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah flanked with his trusted workers like Liaquat Ali Khan, Mian Iftikharuddin, Nawab Mamdot and Nawab of Junagarh and many other important and distinguished Muslim personalities and, the local Muslim population received them with open arms and made all out efforts to rehabilitate the incoming Muslims to settle them socially, morally and economically. Liberal allotments of agricultural lands, immovable and moveable properties in rural and urban areas besides services, were offered to the coming Muslims.

A large chunk of population coming from East Punjab, and from the CP [Central provinces] and UP [Uttar Pradesh] provinces of India settled in the Punjab, NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and Balochistan. They all were well accommodated in the provinces. The Muslim population which mostly entered Pakistan through Khokharapar and nearby routes, settled in the urban areas of Sindh. With the passage of time in the past 40 years two generation have replaced their ancestors. The taking over younger generations seem to have forgotten their ancestral abodes across the border in India. On the other side the left over relations in India of the people who opted for Pakistan, have practically vanished and the new generation in Pakistan and India have formal relations, just as a matter of memory on both sides of the border.

With this background to declare a group of population as Mohajirs is a misnomer. There seems to be no logic and basis to declare a certain group as Mohajir. Rather it is a pity to label an innocent group of people as Mohajir. They are really patriotic Pakistanis who left their homes to settle in Pakistan forever. But by calling them Mohajir they are actually being declared aliens. In a way they are being deprived of all social, political and economical rights in Pakistan. This is the height of callousness on the part of vested interests, who are trying to malign the noble citizens of this country to meet their political ends by creating hatred among Pakistanis.

### Obligation

It is the obligation of all the intellectuals, thinkers, elite and respectable citizens of this country not to use the word Mohajir for any Pakistani. Just for a second think that, those who opted for Pakistan and settled in the provinces of Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan do not claim themselves to be Mohajirs.

If the matter is examined academically the anthropologists and sociologists will agree that the people who settled in the Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan accepted and adapted themselves to the prevailing customs and cultural pattern of their respective provinces. Only language cannot be a factor to declare a population a separate ethnic group in a federating unit. The world over Muslims have different languages, culture, customs,

traditions—but Muslims are Muslims. Unfortunately, in Sindh the "Wadera Shahi" system could not come out of their set pattern of life.

Sindh in the early days was primarily populated mainly by agriculturists known as Haris, fisherman and a small tribe of Memon and Kuchi traders. The basic agriculturalists known as 'haris' are still most docile, meek, humble and confine themselves to their Goths and nearby fields. The poverty and strong control of 'Wadera Shahi' deprived them of all the social requirements. On the other side the 'Waderas' only accepted the urbanisation for their social uplift and pleasure. During this course of 43 years, the Muslims coming from India worked hard for their survival and occupied the major share in trade and industry in the urban areas of Sindh. With this economic prosperity and lack of interest of the larger rural population of Sindh comprising 'Haris' the respect of the local customs and cultural pattern was ignored by the newly settled, urban population. This was seriously noticed by the Sindh locals and as said by Syed Muhammad, a silent and suppressed agitation during the first PPP regime in the 70's started. The Sindhi 'Waderas' just to retain their cultural pattern tried to politicise the situation, which was resisted by the newly settled people of Sindh particularly of the urban areas.

But it is not an abnormal course in anthropological change. When society is studded with various shapes of people, first the ancient colour of a society fades out, but always a new, more fruitful pattern of living together, appears on the horizons of the motherland.

The President of Pakistan Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan while addressing the Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 7 July (appeared in THE MUSLIM of 8 July) emphasised that all the parties concerned must rise above political considerations, see the objective realities in a dispassionate manner and try to work out a solution through political dialogue. He said "democracy meant dialogue, negotiations, accommodation, give and take, even handed justice and fair play." This is the only course of action which could provide a durable solution to the Sindh problem.

The directive of the president demands that the public leaders, the elite, notable educationists, social workers and religious leaders play their vital role in weaving the torn fabric of society. They should approach people of all walks of life to create better understanding, tolerance and harmony on the principles of give and take, as pointed out by the president. The senior citizens ought to take up their responsibilities for their progeny, promising a bright and prosperous future.

### Alleged RAW Involvement

90AS0433B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
17 Jul 90 pp 4, 7

[Article by Brig (Retd) S. A. I. Tirmazi: "Confrontation with RAW"]

[Text] The Sindh situation portrays a textbook case study in the art of psychological warfare and subversion,

leading to terrorism and insurgency with the ultimate objective of dissension. The Indian Intelligence agency, RAW, that is conducting this clandestine operation, has come a long way in developing into a mature organisation. Today, they are capable of supporting a machinery of great magnitude, and are able to conceive of and execute very sensitive and delicate operations in a foreign land. RAW has been successful in creating a serious situation of anarchy and lawlessness, in one of the most peaceful and commercially productive areas of Pakistan. The subversion has been so expertly conducted that even the administration and leadership have not been able to identify correctly the causes of mischief.

#### Secret Arm

RAW is the third dimension of India's foreign policy manifestations. This intelligence wing, enables the Indian strategists and policy makers to extend their secret arm into foreign lands for executing political assassinations, terrorism, violence, subversion, gunrunning, narcotics smuggling and espionage in the name of 'security' for India.

Encouraged by their successful operations in East Pakistan, in 1971, RAW was directed to concentrate on Sindh as the next target in Pakistan. Once again, their strategic objective is to divide and weaken Pakistan, to an extent that it ceases to be a 'threat' to the security of India. Ideologically to ridicule the 'Two Nation Theory' and to convey that religion alone was not strong enough a bond to ensure national cohesion and integration.

Subversion is a science, where concerted and well aimed psychological strikes are made at the minds and thoughts of the people with a view to changing their loyalties and commitments from the established norms of faith, discipline and behaviour to treason, violence and lawlessness. Here in Sindh, the target areas include exploitation of the ethnic, cultural, social, linguistic and political differences existing in a heterogeneous society.

In phase I of this operation RAW's Office of Special Operations (OSO), cultivated some people living along the border areas in Sindh. Most of these people have been recruited by ideological motivation of 'duty' towards Bharat Mata. Their collaboration in the nefarious activities, included the procurement of vital information, smuggling of weapons, facilitating cross border movements and to act as couriers. An important role is also played by dacoits, criminals and cross-border smugglers, who are promised protection and freedom of their criminal activities as a reward for their services. Agents seem to have also been cultivated or directly recruited from various social, political, religious and other ethnic groups.

Simultaneously, the Special Services Bureau (SSB), another important wing of RAW, established training camps along the border. The task of SSB is to train, arm and infiltrate the agents back to the target area. The

armed infiltrators are operating with criminals and dacoits and they are striking in a manner so that their acts are being misconstrued as political, ethnic and religious motivated or simply a failure of the law enforcing agencies. Over a period, the activities of these agents have not only inflamed the feelings of major ethnic groups against each other, but the law enforcing agencies have been discredited and the general public is getting divided into alien groups. Common bonds, associations and social relations have started to crack and serious fissures are appearing in the national fibre. Some of us, due to ignorance, petty mindedness, lack of commitment to larger national interests and political polarisation have fallen victim to the enemy tactics of disinformation, malicious propaganda and subtle subversive campaign. Not realising that this is pure psychological warfare being financed and executed by paid enemy agents they are adding fuel to the furnace. Perfectly law abiding citizens have become partisans in street battles.

#### Phase Two

The Phase II, in addition to the low grade agents, street urchins and criminals, RAW activists also operate at a higher political, social and intellectual level. 'Agents of influence' is a very potent weapon. These men and women are usually placed or are cultivated at the level of decisionmaking bodies in the government departments, law enforcing agencies, pressure groups and various student organisations impartial and honest state functionaries. Political and religious leaders are influenced to take decisions which add to the existing tension, create misunderstanding and are ultimately beneficial to the enemy. Over the period, an 'agent of influence' develops around himself a circle of the most competent and loyal staff member, his opinion becomes most valuable and all important decisions are taken according to his 'advice.'

A critical analysis of the deteriorating law and order, political and social situation in Sindh, would lead to the conclusion that a lot of wrong has been done by taking wrong steps, listening to wrong advise and getting agitated over issues which could have been amicably settled. We are bound to discover the invisible hand of the 'agent of influence.'

The confusion has often been further confounded as properly briefed and tutored 'informers' and 'inside men' are supplied to our own intelligence agencies to feed wrong information. Such men pose themselves as double agents, but are actually loyal to their original masters. They bring information which is cleverly coined to suit the situation and trends of the intelligence organisation. The information is hot and juicy, too good to be dropped but cannot be re-checked.

This category of agents is usually handled and briefed by the 'free-lance' who, as a matter of principle does not reside in the target country, but visits on a proper visa and legitimate cover of a journalist, student, airline

employee, businessman, sports spectator etc. The 'freelance' during his stay clandestinely meets the selected agents and briefs them on the next theme and makes his exit.

As the campaign gathered momentum, new themes of subversions were fed and terrorism was accelerated. This was the stage when the tension between various groups started to take on ethnic colour and political overtones. Sharp polarisation started to appear in Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi and Pashto speaking people and they were further sub-divided into MQM [Mujahid Qaumi Movement], Jeay Sindh, PPP [Pakistan People's Party] etc, parties. Over the period, the political differences have assumed great dimensions, attitudes have hardened and there are serious allegations and counter allegations on the questions of loyalty, integrity and honesty of each other.

An important role has also been played by the under-cover intelligence persons posted in Karachi. Intelligence sources claim that officially and also in 'darkness' selected politicians and members of various groups with a view to gathering information as also to feed false information, make promises of 'support' and 'help.' A stage has been reached, where the real enemy has become obscure but death lurks at every street corner. Everybody suspects everybody else. Political and cultural differences have turned the streets into battle grounds. Even the political leadership, at some level seems to have got involved and one political party is contemplating to annihilate the other party. Both, the party in power and the opposition has been so caught up in the quagmire of hatred, controversy and confusion that private armies are being raised and armed as if preparing for the final showdown.

The objective of RAW has not yet been achieved. The enemy looks far beyond. The intention is to seek destruction or elimination of the Pakistan Army which has till now frustrated the Indian hegemonic designs. This they plan to achieve in a number of ways. They have tried to create tension on the borders and have moved forces close to their battle locations. At the same time they have raised the tempo of insurgency in Sindh, so much that, the Army had to be called into aid civil power.

This is a delicate situation. If the troops get too involved in counter terrorist operations, the Indian army could start nibbling away on the Kashmir border, like they had done in Siachen. They could also start provocative actions along the border, in the air or over the sea so that the Pakistan Army is forced to react and their attention gets divided. In case of even the slightest reverses in the border defence duties of anti-Terrorist operation, a vocal propaganda campaign would be launched to defame and degrade the Army in the eyes of the general public. By rumours and a whispering campaign, efforts are already afoot to lower the confidence of the public as regards the ability and the role of the Army. Agents of influence are also busy trying to create controversies regarding the duties and the authority of the Army.

Thoughts are being floated by the enemy agents that General Beg is pro-MQM. There are serious differences of opinion between the prime minister and Gen Beg. The Army still calls the shots. Beg, the (COAS) [Chief of Army Staff] is the third angle of the Benazir-Ishaq-Beg triangle. The Army is looking for an opportunity to take over power, etc. In certain quarters there are talks of 'Horse Trading' of General Officers and there are also speculations if some of the formation commanders were loyal to one political party or the other. It is most unfortunate that these ideas are freely being played up and in certain cases the media is also speculative on some of these issues. If this trend continues, we will be helping the enemy to achieve its objectives without going to the battlefield.

The Sindh situation is, therefore, primarily a security problem which has overflowed into the political mainstream. This has happened partly due to the clandestine enemy subversive activities and partly due to misjudgment of the situation by some of our political leaders. It is the responsibility of the Federal and Provincial Intelligence and security agencies, to accurately identify the subversive elements, terrorists and enemy agents who have infiltrated into various fields. Counter intelligence agencies should get the area, from the border inwards, combed by their 'invisible eye.'

It is time that Intelligence agencies are asked to perform their primary functions and are not employed on the political reporting and surveillance of political opponents and the production of DSR (Daily Situation Report), to the liking of their senior bosses. They must have clear understanding of their tasks, screen their informers, shift their information and re-orientate their thoughts and re-direct their collective efforts. They must work towards the real enemy. Intelligence agencies cannot be absolved of their responsibilities and their contributions towards the mess that we find ourselves in today.

It is one of the basic functions of the ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence] and IB [Intelligence Bureau] to find out and inform the executive authority, where our rank and file have been bugged by the enemy agents, fifth columnists and agents of influence. They must find out the Resident Agents, free lance and intelligence operators working in various cover appointments. These agencies must also work out a system to forewarn a politician or a government functionary regarding the trends and motives of any foreigners who may be trying to establish contact in an overt or covert manner.

It is for the political leadership to educate their workers and followers towards national integration and to teach them the basic norms of mutual respect, spirit of accommodation and tolerance. Harsh language, casting aspersions and physical confrontation in politics, can cause more damage than our national fibre can withstand. Finally, the onus of responsibility lies on the shoulders of the party in power and it must take on the task of thwarting the enemy in real earnest.

**Predismissal Commentary Views Possible  
Upheaval Action**

90AS0432A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
27 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Mumtaz Alam Gilani, MNA: "Is the Party Over?"]

[Text] Eleven years of statist authoritarianism of Ziaul Haq not only tried to depoliticise the society but at the same time adopted policies which really affected the traditional attitudes and options of the majority of the upper classes. The lower classes were also offered baits to become share-holders, and thus to keep them quiet. The gambit did not payoff much, as the masses were really concerned about the state of affairs and came out in the streets whenever their rights were seriously challenged.

This period was a real test for the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. Thousands of its workers and leaders were sentenced after trials in military courts. The remaining leadership went abroad to continue the struggle in one form or the other, supported by the enlightened and progressive intellectuals. Political activists associated with parties of MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] also honestly played their role and fought bravely for the restoration of democracy. The struggle continued till 17 August 1988, when circumstances took a dramatic change with the disappearance of Ziaul Haq and his close associates from the scene.

**Authority**

The new chief of army staff withdrew from politics, declaring that the Constitution would be followed in letter and spirit. The major forces in the election were PPP and the Muslim League formed by Zia's Assembly. The Muslim League had allied itself with fundamentalists and other right-wing parties. The other election alliances were less noticeable.

Though the PPP was less radical in its election manifesto, it promised to restore the 1973 Constitution, to abolish the Concurrent List and to ensure effective devolution of authority to the grassroot level.

The PPP was more pronounced in eliminating corruption through personal examples and in abolishing feudalism by destroying its political and economic strongholds. The manifesto also declared the willingness for comprehensive land reforms and land to the landless with full ownership to the benamdar peasants, besides many other things. There was a great hope for the downtrodden in an otherwise spineless society.

The sad fact of the election was that all the parties nominated candidates among whom had little difference as far as their class character was concerned. PPP also followed the same line and banked mainly on the traditional elite in which there were quite a number of new entrants, who had nothing in common with the old guard of PPP. The split mandate was not only embarrassing for PPP's leadership, but it also gave a sigh of relief to the

real power holders. In a way, the results of 1988 elections suited their designs. On the other hand, there was not much disappointment for IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] either.

Though PPP emerged victorious, it faced an uphill task to gain power. The masses and the PPP activists, fully conscious of the limitations, in an otherwise non-democratic social matrix of Pakistan, accepted the challenge and tried to swim against the current. Everybody now realises that it is not an easy task to run the affairs of the government where the Senate is hostile, where the president and the prime minister have different perceptions even on petty matters. The Armed Forces also behave in a way which sometimes embarrasses the political leadership of the country.

It is a great tragedy that there is a general consensus among the masses that political parties have been victims of political opportunism and have failed to develop consistent democratic policies. The parties have been the upholders of democratic values as long as they are in opposition, but once in power, they adopt methods which do not fit in the framework of their declared goals.

These days the PPP is also in the same quagmire. It is being shaken both from outside and inside. The new entrants and sycophants, who seem to be very close to the corridors of power, have not only proved to be political naives but also dishonest to the tradition of PPP. The impression wrongly or rightly has been created that the present ruling elite of PPP is neither sincere with the people of Pakistan nor with the leadership of PPP. They have also started believing the rumours that very soon the political scenario is going to be changed. Innocent and dedicated workers have also started sharing their views regarding stories of corruption, nepotism and amassing of wealth through illegal means, thought initially these were designed by IJI.

At every level in PPP, workers are discussing the future of the party. The relationship between the PPP and the government is also not very clear. The newborn ministers treat the workers with contempt. Workers feel themselves degraded in their presence and are shy of meeting them in their gorgeous houses. Most of them do not understand their political idiom.

There is a lot of confusion and abstraction about democracy in Pakistan. Its failure is mostly attributed to the intervention of Armed Forces, thus filibustering the civil order. Democracy, in the socio-economic situation of Pakistan, is nothing except legalizing the rule of elite and paying lip service to equitable society.

**Basic Issues**

It is quite ironic that PPP has done nothing to restructure the society on democratic lines after coming to power. Most of the policies introduced in Zia's regime have been adopted without giving them a second thought. Most of the basic issues have remained unattended. It was expected that after coming to power, PPP

would introduce fundamental changes in economic, industrial and agricultural sectors, but those who are at the helm of affairs like to perpetuate the policies of their predecessors. The financial resources are being depleted day by day. Nobody is ready to accept the responsibility. There is a complete chaos and lack of coordination at the higher level.

The PM Secretariat is full of strange faces showing a lot of activity but with no results. Their presence in such an important place is always questionable. After conversing with them one realizes that they are not properly schooled in political mannerism. One wonders why they have been selected for such sensitive posts. Their half-back knowledge about various government procedures is simply embarrassing. Statecraft is not a thing to be engineered by friends. It needs the total involvement of the professionals and statesmen of the highest order.

The presence of such persons around the prime minister is creating problems. The grand heritage of PPP is being wasted by whims of political pygmies. The leadership of PPP must understand that history never repeats itself. The time wasted is lost forever. History is the storehouse of innumerable mummies who used to rule this world in

their magnificent courts and parade grounds of Berlin. It is also a graveyard of indispensable who once thought to conquer the world.

The political murmurs among PPP leaders are significant. There is a note of some change in the air. Those who have dedicated their lives to save the democratic order are looking aghast. They are not being consulted. They are just spectators. The leadership is quite. [sentence as received] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has all the resources at her command to come forward to fight the vampires trying to sabotage the PPP philosophy of eliminating feudalism, corruption and minimizing the role of non-civil authority. If she feels shy in declaring the war in the present set-up then there is ample time and energy to take initiative to come out of the present set-up to wage the war against forces of disruption. The present structure which she had been heading has become obsolete.

People want to know who is more powerful in the trio. They think perhaps she is the weakest. If things continue to move in the same direction as they are rapidly moving then anything can happen tomorrow. The game of probabilities has started. Let us see who takes the initiative.

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42

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